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Abstract 
This portfolio contains my doctoral research, clinical work and reflections on my journey of personal 
and professional development during my training as a counselling psychologist. In the initial 
introduction, I briefly offer some information about my personal history, my philosophical world view 
and highlight some important learning experiences.   
The introduction is followed by my therapeutic practice dossier which offers an overview of each of 
my 3 training placements, encompassing almost 500 hours of clinical practice. My 3 clinical 
placements across my 4 years of training consist of working one year at a University student 
counselling centre, one in IAPT services and two years in primary care as part of a Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT). In my first year I had the opportunity to work using the person-centred 
model. In my second placement in IAPT I worked using brief psychodynamic therapy and in my final 
two years I employed a more integrative approach with a strong emphasis on traditional and third 
wave CBT. A number of anonymised case studies together with placement reports and agreements 
can be found in the signposted digital appendices.  
My research dossier begins with a brief introduction to three self-contained projects; a literature 
review and two qualitative studies. My literature review attempts to disseminate the literature 
regarding the differences between religious and secular individuals on psychological health and well-
being. The second project draws on Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to explore how Atheist 
clients experience psychotherapy. My final research project attempts to explore how religious 
fundamentalists exit their religion and abandon their religious beliefs. The final part of the portfolio 
includes a reflective paper on my identity development as a counselling psychologist. This piece of 
work includes key learning experiences and anonymised case studies which are interweaven with 
reflections on the four pillars of my professional training; Clinical, research, academic and personal 
and professional development. 
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Introduction to Portfolio  
 
Overview 
This portfolio represents a culmination of my four years of training as a counselling psychologist at 
the University of Surrey. The purpose of this introduction is to preface the research and therapeutic 
practice dossiers and provide a backdrop to contextualise contents. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
provide the reader with some background information, including my journey towards the course as 
well as relevant personal and professional experiences. Much information however is covered more 
fully within the clinical paper. 
 
Personal Background 
I am now 40 years old, so I came to counselling psychology relatively late. As a young child and up 
until my early twenties, I remember experiencing a poignant inner sense of disconnection, of 
estrangement from others and of not fitting in. I longed for meaningful connection with my peers but 
somehow satisfying relationships always seemed to elude me. Friends were few and sparse. For the 
most part, I felt socially insecure, a sense of lack and of being lost. Looking back, I realise that at the 
core of this was perhaps the way my father and older brother asserted their dominant personalities. It 
was as if there was little room for finding and expressing my own voice, especially in a family 
environment were speaking up was encouraged, while listening was not. In my seclusion, I usually 
felt contended staying in the sidelines and being an observer rather than an active participant. I started 
uncovering my natural disposition towards analysis and emotional depth and I began to learn how to 
attune myself better to other people’s unique voice, perhaps as a reaction to my own unfulfilled 
longing to be heard and understood. Especially when I encountered individuals who -  like me - felt 
that they were different or unique in some way and that they were living in the periphery of life. I was 
naturally drawn to difference and to people who outwardly expressed a unique sense of individuality.  
As a young adult, through my travels and experiencing the world, my commitment to understanding 
and accepting diversity grew stronger. In the same way, so did my ability to forge meaningful 
connections with diverse individuals from all walks of life. This I believe is one of my greatest 
strengths as a future practitioner. Similarly, my tendency to be an advocate against oppression and 
mistreating others also grew. In part, this took the form of embracing a humanist identity and 
engaging in atheist activism against religious oppression. Perhaps this was my attempt to raise myself 
above ordinary life through the idealism and nobility of my quest, at least in my own psyche. That 
said, my life experience has taught me the value of thinking critically and not just about the ideas of 
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others. I believe in being hard on my own beliefs, being intellectually rigorous in identifying my own 
biases, my prejudices and privileges. I think such a stance is relevant today more than ever, as most of 
society’s arguments are kept alive by a failure to acknowledge nuance and subjectivity. We tend to 
generate false dichotomies and then try to argue over a point using two entirely different sets of 
assumptions. It is like 2 tennis players trying to win a match by hitting beautifully executed shots 
from either end of separate tennis courts.   
 
Professional Development 
Perhaps these experiences and my personal philosophy can provide a useful context to understanding 
my strong identification with the philosophy of counselling psychology and its commitment to 
egalitarianism, criticality and social justice. They also offer some insight regarding my research 
interests in those who have attempted to escape their former religious identification and in how an 
atheist identity can interact with psychotherapy.  
Further, earlier experiences provided me with a sounding board for developing my pluralistic 
professional identity which emerged during my training.  During my undergraduate years in Greece 
and through my work in mental health services, I got a good sense of the pervasiveness of the medical 
model as an established part of the culture which offered some individuals with a form of containment 
and a basis for a shared professional language. In my reflective clinical paper, I offer a more in depth 
account of how my journey through the course further shaped my understanding and stance towards 
the reality of the medical model. I also discuss how I espouse a pluralistic epistemological stance to 
practice which allows me to move between a respectful and critical view towards the medical model’s 
usefulness and limitations. I now feel more confident moving between those lines where the different 
theoretical approaches to distress are often contradictory but interrelated. All in all, this portfolio 
represents my journey in finding my own unique, pluralistic voice as is illustrated by the dossiers. 
The portfolio begins with my therapeutic practice development dossier which gives an overview of 
the three clinical placements I trained in four years. A brief description will be given for each 
placement on the duration and type of client work I was involved in.  
 
Research 
The research dossier represents the three research projects I produced in the course of my training 
which stem from my long term fascination with religion and atheism.  The literature review 
attempts to disseminate the literature on the religion – mental health connection and in relation to the 
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understudied population of atheists.  It is argued that research which aims to delineate the various 
effects of religion and spirituality on mental health should address atheism and its various forms as a 
separate socio-cultural variable. My second research project is an IPA (Interpretive phenomenological 
analysis) in which I explore the subjective experiences of affirmative atheists in psychotherapy based 
on the evidence that an atheistic world view may fulfil similar psychological functions to those 
observed for religious beliefs, such as emotional reassurance in the face of adversity. Findings provide 
some support that atheists do hold distinct ontological and epistemological beliefs that can provide 
inspiration and consolation in the same way that religious beliefs do, even though participants rejected 
the notion of spirituality altogether. It also becomes clear how an atheist identity can find expression 
in different and interesting ways, especially in relation to perceptions of morality and existential 
issues.  My third research project took a similar epistemological stance, using constructivist grounded 
theory to explore how religious individuals who are very devout, abandon their faith and exit their 
religion. Results reveal that participants relinquished deeply held religious beliefs after experiencing 
insurmountable tension on an emotional, cognitive and social level, which eventually led them to 
adopt a new identity of unbelief.   
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Therapeutic Practice Dossier 
 
Introduction 
This section of the portfolio provides an overview of my clinical practice during my four year training 
as a counselling psychologist. It contains descriptions of each of my three clinical placements across 
different settings, the type and duration of therapeutic work and supervision, the client population and 
other relevant activities that I engaged in. My therapeutic practice was assessed through in-depth 
client studies and process reports, which can be found in the appendix section together with my 
supervisor evaluations and training agreements.  
 
Year 1 placement: University counselling centre (October 2013 – July 2014). 
The university counselling service is one branch of the student support services which offers time 
limited counselling to students, drop-in consultations and crisis appointments. Students were mostly 
self-referred and following a fifty minute assessment, there was usually an agreed focus to the work. 
The service consisted of 5 senior counsellors working in a variety of modalities and three trainee 
counselling psychologists. Over the course of my placement I worked with 8 clients over 
approximately 100 sessions. They were all young adults ranging from 18 to 23 and included both men 
and women and from a diverse range of cultural backgrounds. Most clients presented with moderate 
symptoms of anxiety and depression.  
My therapeutic practice was in the person-centred approach. Supervision was held once a week and 
my supervisor practiced from a person-centred and psychodynamic perspective. During supervision, I 
would present clients for discussion and would discuss with my supervisor process related issues, 
interventions and my general progress with each client. The Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation 
(CORE) outcome measure was also administered at the beginning and end of the counselling contract.   
 
Year 2 placement: Psychological Therapies and Wellbeing service –IAPT (October 2014 – July 
2015). 
This placement was in Psychological therapies in Primary care services of a Mental Health Trust. I 
was based in two General Practitioner Surgeries receiving referrals from the partners in the practices. 
Within this placement, clients were offered a total of 12 sessions (with the option of a brief contract 
extension if needed) which were typically preceded by two assessment sessions. My therapeutic 
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approach was informed by psychodynamic theory. Clients presented with a variety of mental health 
difficulties such as work related stress, bereavement, trauma, anxiety and depression. There was 
noticeable cultural and socio-economic diversity within my caseload as many of my clients were not 
from a white, British descent and ranging in age from 27 to 58. I worked with 9 clients over 
approximately 100 sessions.  
They were contacted within one month of the initial referral and to this end patients were contacted by 
a graduate mental health worker and interviewed over the telephone. This worked within the 
guidelines of IAPT. Clients were also asked to complete the CORE and PHQ outcome measures in 
every session. Following the end of contract, I would present the psychometric scores in my discharge 
letter to the GP.  My supervisor was a counselling psychologist who worked from a psychodynamic 
perspective. In my weekly one-to-one supervision, I presented my clients I needed supervisory input 
on and often presented with either a recorded session or a verbatim account for discussion. 
 
Year 3 & 4 placement: Community Mental Health Team (October 2015 – July 2017). 
This placement was situated within the CMHT of an NHS trust. The psychology team consisted of 4 
senior psychologists and 3 clinical/counselling psychology trainees. The team received referrals from 
local GP’s or via the care coordinators working in the service. Following their assessment, clients 
were usually offered an initial contract of 12 sessions with the possibility of an extension to longer 
term work depending on the client’s needs and progress. Clients were usually of severe and chronic 
presentations with mental health difficulties such as psychosis, Bipolar Disorder, Emotionally 
Unstable Personality Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, depression and anxiety. There was 
not a great deal of diversity in terms of the clients’ cultural background as most of my clients were 
White, British and ranging in age from 22 to 56. Clients completed the CORE and PHQ outcome 
measures in their first and final therapeutic session. 230 
Over the course of 2 years, I worked with 13 clients over approximately 230 hours. In my first year I 
primarily utilised a traditional CBT modality, whereas in my second year I adopted a more integrative 
way of working, drawing from person-centred therapy, second and third wave CBT (i.e. ACT and 
Compassion focused therapy). My supervisor was a counselling psychologist who practiced using an 
integrative perspective with an emphasis on relational aspects. In weekly supervision, I would usually 
present several clients for discussion and a small recorded segment from one of my sessions. We 
considered alternative responses and interventions, issues regarding the therapeutic alliance and 
relationship, and my development as a counselling psychologist.   
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Discharge letters were written to respective GP, briefly summarising clients’ difficulties, therapeutic 
progress, psychometric scores and future recommendations. Other placement activities included co-
chairing a weekly CBT coping skills group workshop and a weekly bipolar psychoeducation group.  
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Research Development Dossier 
 
Overview 
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, my research dossier includes one literature review and two 
qualitative reports. These 3 pieces of work are connected by my interest in how individuals 
experience their religious and atheist identity as well as the ways in which their identification can 
impact their psychological health and well being. The reports presented have been changed in light of 
marker’s feedback where appropriate and updated with current evidence where applicable. 
 
Project 1 – Are there no Atheists in foxholes? A literature review of the differences between the 
religious and non-believers on psychological health and well being.  
The main purpose of this review was to explore the conceptual and empirical literature examining the 
differences between religious and nonreligious individuals on issues of well-being and psychological 
distress. The review highlighted the significant methodological considerations in the research on the 
religion-mental health connection and revealed the existing biases and complexities surrounding the 
exclusion and inclusion of atheist population samples. The process of reviewing such studies, in 
considerable detail, helped me develop a more critical stance regarding the use of objectivist 
epistemologies which fail to capture and quantify important dimensions of religiosity or secularism. 
In my review, I argue that research which aims to delineate the various effects of religion and 
spirituality on mental health, should address atheism and its various forms as a separate diversity 
variable.  
 
Project 2 – The experiences of atheist clients in psychotherapy. A qualitative exploration.  
Through reviewing the literature I became more aware of how affirmative atheism  may function as 
an organised worldview which potentially influences the lives of its members in a similar way that 
religion does. Using IPA (Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis) I decided to explore the subjective 
experiences of committed atheists in psychotherapy based on the evidence that an atheistic belief 
system may fulfil similar psychological functions to those observed for religious beliefs, such as 
emotional reassurance in the face of adversity. As an affirmative atheist who has undergone 
psychotherapy, this was a particular interesting piece of research, as it challenged all my previous 
assumptions on what it means to be an atheist and on how atheists perceive that their atheistic beliefs 
might interact with the therapeutic process.  
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Project 3 – A grounded theory exploration of de-conversion from religious belief. 
Findings from my first research also brought to surface how many atheists struggled with abandoning 
their previous religious identification before embracing a secular identity. This provided me with my 
focus on for my third year research which explored how individuals de-convert from religious 
fundamentalism within the context of religions of the Abrahamic tradition (i.e. Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism). Using a constructivist grounded theory methodology, this project produced some rich, vivid 
and touching accounts, which again required the adoption of an especially reflective and ethical stance 
to support participants in exploring such an important transition in their lives.  
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Project  1.  Are there no Atheists in foxholes? A literature review of the differences between the 
religious and non-believers on psychological health and well being  
 
Supervised by Dr Dora Brown 
Word count: 10.998  
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See Appendix 1 for Journal Notes to Contributors 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The past 3 decades have produced an abundance of literature highlighting the beneficial effects of 
religiosity on psychological health and well being. However, empirical support for these tenuous 
claims is mixed due to unaddressed basic methodological issues with respect to construct validity, 
sampling methods and analysis. More importantly, the results of these studies imply that the absence 
of religious faith or atheism is associated with worst psychological outcomes. Though not a religion, 
“affirmative atheism” is currently enjoying something of a renaissance in the Western world and can 
be an orienting world view for its members in the same way that religion is. The purpose of this 
review is to summarise the conceptual and empirical literature concerning the connection between a 
secular world view and psychological health. It is argued that atheists are an understudied population 
and that atheism should be regarded as a meaningful socio-cultural variable in the study of mental 
health and coping with distress. Connections with the field of psychotherapy and areas for future 
investigation are also discussed.  
Keywords:  Religion, Atheism, Atheist, Mental health, Psychological distress.   
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Introduction 
As the evidence on the religion-health connection is continually growing, there is a substantial amount 
of literature highlighting the positive association between religiosity and indices of physical and 
psychological health (Levin, 2009). A number of reviews have summarised hundreds of studies of 
which the majority have consistently found that institutional religious participation (e.g. church 
attendance) and non-institutional involvement (e.g. praying in private) function as a buffer on 
psychological distress and are positively associated with psychological constructs such as self-esteem, 
hope, optimism, life satisfaction, happiness and well-being (Hackney & Sanders, 2003, Koenig et al., 
2012; Levin & Chatters, 1998; Smith et. al, 2003; Wong et. al, 2006). In one of the most 
comprehensive and referenced reviews in the field, Koenig and colleagues (2012) analysed the effects 
of religiosity/spirituality on anxiety, depression, schizophrenia,  substance abuse, delinquency and 
other outcomes. He concluded that in over half of the studies religious participation had a statistically 
significant protective effect. The expanding literature on religious coping has also highlighted how 
positive religious cognitions and behaviours are significantly related to better physical and 
psychological outcomes among people coping with bereavement or chronic and acute illnesses such 
as, cancer, myocardial infractions, HIV and spinal cord injury (Laubmeier et al., 2004; Johnstone et 
al., 2007; Persaud et al., 2007; Vance et al., 2008).   
 
On the other side of scale, there is a growing concern that these findings are speculative at best or 
highly controversial and many authors claim that the relationship between religion and health is far 
from settled (Hwang et al., 2009; Whitley, 2010). There have been reviews of reviews (Miller & 
Thorensen, 2003; Sloan, 2006; Sloan & Bagiella, 2002) that question the strength of this relationship 
on the basis of serious methodological concerns pertaining to inaccuracies in representation, sampling 
difficulties, publication biases and problematic analysis. They also caution that the alleged beneficial 
effects of religion to health may be largely attributed not to religious content or belief but to 
mediating, non-religious factors such as social support or the promotion of healthy behaviours. 
Perhaps one of the most controversial suggestions resulting from the tenuous, positive association 
between religiosity and mental health is that if being more religious is health-promoting, individuals 
who are atheists or secular have poorer psychological outcomes (McCullough & Smith, 2003; Hwang 
et al., 2009). Researchers advocating the health benefits of more religiosity assume a linear 
relationship between the two and are often implying that non-believers have a harder time adjusting to 
difficulties in life (Hackney et al., 2003, Myers, 2000). This sentiment can be summarised in 
McCullough and Smith (2003) who drawing from the work of Koenig et. al (2001) conducted a 
systematic review of over 100 studies and concluded that ‘‘people who are religious devout, but not 
extremists, tend to report greater subjective well-being and life satisfaction, more ability to cope with 
stress and crisis and fewer symptoms of depression than secular people” (p.191-192). 
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In light of such controversy the main purpose of this study is to review the conceptual and empirical 
literature examining the differences between religious and nonreligious individuals on issues of well-
being and psychological distress. Initially we will selectively discuss some methodological 
considerations in the research on the religion-health connection and their relevance to the under-
investigated group of nonbelievers. It is argued that research which aims to delineate the various 
effects of religion and spirituality on mental health should address atheism and its various forms as a 
separate diversity variable. Following the analysis of recent findings on the psychological outcomes 
of nonbelievers, implications for future research and therapeutic practice are discussed.      
 
Definitions 
Before reviewing the research, it is important to critically discuss how religion and spirituality are 
defined, as these terms present considerable ambiguity that can affect the interpretations of findings.   
The question of what it means to be religious and how it can be measured has been a conceptual 
debate that has troubled researchers for decades (Hall & Edwards 2002). Throughout most of the 
literature in modern psychology, religion has been regarded as both an individual and an institutional 
construct (Hill & Pargament, 2003). The American philosopher and psychologist William James 
(1902) states that even though religion is experienced and practiced in an immediate and direct way 
by the individual, it follows a tradition that is institutionalised and inherited. Indeed, while the 
practice of religion can be a private affair, central to its definition is that it is rooted in an established 
tradition that arises out of groups of people with common beliefs and practices regarding the sacred. 
According to Pargmanent (1999), the sacred entails the transcendent, the idea of the divine or a deity, 
the concept of an ultimate truth or reality and any aspect of life that is experienced as extraordinary by 
association with such concepts.  More contemporary however, Wulff (1997) notes that the term 
religion is often used in a reductionist way to highlight a rigid system of fixed ideas, ideology and 
commitments that cannot sufficiently represent the dynamic and personal nature of human piety. 
Concurrently, the term spirituality is commonly used to refer to the personal, subjective side of 
religious experience (Hill & Pargament, 2003). Thus, what is being observed, especially in the more 
religious environment of the United States, is a polarization of religiosity and spirituality, with the 
former representing a more outward and formal expression of doctrinal and authoritarian piety and the 
latter representing an expression that is more individual, subjective, inward and unsystematic (Koenig 
et al., 2001). 
 
Even though some researchers may find this distinction a useful heuristic, many express caution 
against such a division (Hill et al., 2000; Pargament, 1999) for several reasons. First, the polarization 
of religion and spirituality into institutional and individual domains ignores the fact that all forms of 
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spiritual expression take place in a social context and that virtually all organized faith traditions are 
interested in the ordering of personal affairs (Wuthnow, 1998). Second, implicit in the evolving 
definitions is the sense that spirituality is good and religion is bad. Arguably, such a simplistic 
perspective may overlook the potentially helpful and harmful sides of both religion and spirituality 
(Pargament, 2002). Third, the empirical reality is that most people experience spirituality within an 
organized religious context and fail to see the distinction between these phenomena (Marler & 
Hadaway, 2002; Zinnbauer et al., 1997).  
 
At the same time, a number of attempts within the psychological literature to define spirituality reveal 
a range of concepts that vary greatly in their focus and emphasis (Crossley & Salter, 2005). Some 
definitions of spirituality focus upon the concept of transcendence and relates to beliefs regarding 
powers that transcend our understanding of reality (King et al., 1999). Other similar definitions 
highlight the dualistic approach of distinguishing the worlds of spirit and matter, but without referring 
to transcendent forces. From this perspective, spirituality is held separate from the content of life or 
refers to a quest for meaning and purpose that goes beyond the material aspects of life (Nino, 1997). 
Other constructions place their emphasis upon the values the spiritual individual holds. From this 
vantage point, spirituality can be idiosyncratic and personal, relating to each individual’s unique value 
systems (Duffy, 1998), or it may be concerned with specific attitudes and values such as respect and 
compassion towards all life (Haug, 1998) 
 
This tendency for definitions to reveal numerous nuances of form and content adds a significant 
hurdle against developing common reference points for discussions and investigations (Nino, 1997). 
In relation to the studies reviewed, given that  personal definitions of spirituality vary so widely 
among investigators and potential participants, it is difficult to determine what, if anything, it means 
to be highly spiritual, as opposed to highly religious 
 
Religious behaviour, orientation and beliefs 
Several authors have argued that the mixed results often found in similar studies exploring the 
religion-health connection are attributed to the inconsistency in measurements of religiosity (Egbert et 
al., 2004; Dein et al., 2012). There is a lack of a universally accepted definition that can be quantified 
and as a result a plethora of studies use single item variables such as attendance at church or 
frequency of prayer (Sloan, 2006). From a positivistic vantage point using such measures that are 
observable and quantifiable are arguably convenient as well as objective. For many years, religious 
participation has served as the main framework for exploring the connection between religion and 
health and authors have highlighted its usefulness for practical purposes (Hill & Pargament, 2003). 
Such attempts however inevitably result in a methodological and ontological reduction of what it 
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means to be religious and precludes researchers from delineating the complex religion-health 
relationship. Albeit important, religious behaviour is but only one of the dimensions of religiosity and 
does not capture the cognitive, emotional and motivational aspects of religion (Koenig, 2012). 
Further, the reduction of religiosity to congregational participation becomes problematic when 
associations are made with positive health outcomes. If religious attendance is positively associated 
with improved well-being and reduced distress, it could be argued that healthier individuals are more 
able to become involved in religious activities. Indeed, most of the research on religiosity and well-
being is correlational and many researchers appear to confuse causality with correlation while 
implying tacitly that religion has a therapeutic impact (Sloan & Bagiella, 2002). Others falsely posit 
that the religion-health relationship is one directional and do not consider that the relationship might 
be explained by other unidentified variables. For example, Levin (2010) postulates that the overall 
positive findings have been replicated for both sexes and across different ages irrespective of 
socioeconomic status race, ethnicity, and specific outcome measures. However in a review conducted 
by Sloan (2006) it was concluded that age, race or general social activities may have a significant 
confounding effect towards the alleged association. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the 
strength of the relationship may be undermined due to the imprecise measurements of 
religiosity/spirituality (Hill & Pargament, 2003).      
Such valid methodological concerns on the conceptualisation and measurement of religiousness 
capture only part of the problem. Sherkat (2008) suggests that even if some people self-identify as 
religious, they may attend church regularly for reasons other than religious devotion or worship, such 
as maintaining a social network or conforming to family obligations. Thus, it cannot be assumed that 
engaging in religious services is synonymous with having religious beliefs. Similarly, the term 
“culturally religious” has been used to describe individuals who may identify with a certain religious 
tradition and practice their religion out of shared cultural heritage rather than subscribing to the 
theological content thereof (Zuckerman, 2008). This point is important because it emphasises that 
religious participation often includes individuals who are not considered religious in the traditional 
way or who may even have an affirmative secular world view (e.g. atheists).  
 
Rather than focusing on religious participation, many researchers have suggested that the differences 
in religious attitudes (i.e. religious orientation) are more important predictors of mental health than 
religious involvement (Maltby & Day, 2000). To this end, there is growing research attempting to 
measure the impact of different religious attitudes on psychological health using Alport and Ross’s 
model (1967) which distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. Intrinsicly 
religious people are motivated by their religious values, are committed to their beliefs and are 
described as “living their religion” in most aspects of their lives (Ryan et al., 1993). On the other 
hand, extrinsically religious individuals may use their religion for personal or social gain such as 
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status or in-group protection or are involved out of fear, guilt and external pressure. This theory is 
significant as it taps into the motivational qualities of people who are religiously involved. A number 
of studies using the ROS (Religion Orientation Scale) have positively associated intrinsic 
religiousness with measures of well-being while extrinsic religiosity has been correlated with higher 
anxiety and depressive symptoms (Pargament, 2008).  
 
However useful in capturing the motivational dimensions of religiousness, the notion of extrinsic 
religiosity and the use of a scale such as the ROS could be questioned in more secular countries were 
religious belief is more personal and less institutionalised (Saeed & Grant, 2004). Further, the main 
drawback of this model is that the category of extrinsic religious people conflates those whose 
religious beliefs are unimportant to them and those with affirmative secular worldviews (Hwang et 
al., 2008). In fact, some extrinsically religious people may be atheists who are afraid to “come out” 
out of fear of being ostracised and scorned. Especially in more religious countries such as the U.S., 
there is substantial evidence of how individuals with secular worldviews may experience stigma, 
discrimination and social exclusion which often leads to increased stress and need for social support 
(Edgell et al., 2006). Similarly, a recent online experiment in the U.K (Giddings & Dunn, 2016) found 
there to be widespread “prejudice” against atheists regarding their trustworthiness, Studies exploring 
the perception of atheists by others have also reported that atheists are often viewed as deviant, 
immoral and are perceived less favourably in terms of education, social status, parenting and life 
satisfaction (Hunter 1998, 2001; Jenks 1986). Silverman (2002) reports that in some communities 
they become a marginalised minority group or experience “closeting” in the same way that LGBT 
individuals do.  
 
Instead of focusing on religious orientation, other researchers have postulated that religious coping 
might be better placed to explain the relationship between religiosity and psychological outcomes 
(Harrison et al., 2001). Pargament’s model (1990) of religious coping has been the starting point for 
an abundance of conceptual and empirical research attempting to evaluate the circumstances under 
which religion can be either part of the problem or part of the solution when people encounter life 
crises. In short, Pargament and colleagues distinguished between a wide array of religious coping 
methods, which they grouped into positive and negative patterns (Pargament et al., 1998a). For 
example, positive aspects of religious coping include belief in a God that is just, benevolent or a 
supportive partner, involvement in religious rituals and search for congregational support. However, 
seeing one’s troubles as God’s punishment has been associated with poorer mental health outcomes, a 
finding that has been replicated several times (Pargament, 2002). Such beliefs have been described as 
“religious red flags” and can serve as indications for mental health professionals that the religious 
dimension of clients should be explored in greater depth. More specifically authors have distinguished 
between: 
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- Problems of means – ‘wrong road’ beliefs (e.g. “I believe that God is punishing me for my 
sins”). 
- Problems of ends  – ‘wrong direction’ beliefs (e.g. I have decided to turn away from God and 
live life for myself).  
 
The research on religious coping is important because it extends the dialogue of the religion-health 
connection from religious involvement and orientation to include religious belief and content as an 
important variable affecting psychological outcomes. However, studies on people with “wrong 
direction” beliefs who lose their faith, examine coping at one specific point in time (Miller & 
Thorensen, 2003). Thus, they do not consider those who consequently found meaning in a secular 
worldview. While there are many studies exploring the phenomenon of religious conversion (Hwang 
et al., 2008), researchers have neglected to examine the process of apostasy or religious de-conversion 
in which people reject all religious or spiritual belief and embrace a secular worldview.  
Consequently, we have no information on how this may have affected their coping and well-being.  
 
Further there is evidence that atheists might experience psychological distress as a result of 
harbouring feelings of anger towards God (Exline et al., 1999). Exline and colleagues (2002, 2011) 
found that many self-identified atheists had greater difficulty forgiving God than religious individuals. 
While this might sound paradoxical, it demonstrates that some secular individuals have a history of 
religious belief and might still be struggling to come to terms with their secular identity. Moreover, 
when individuals withdraw from religious affiliation this is often accompanied by loss of a significant 
support network which might leave atheists and secular individuals more exposed during difficult 
times (Hwang et al., 2009). Social support provided by religious congregations to its constituents has 
been posited to be an important mediating factor explaining the positive link between religion and 
mental health (Koenig et al., 2012). If indeed that is the case, psychological research that focuses on 
de-converters as a separate subgroup is warranted.   
 
 
Religious “nones” and Atheists 
 
Another consideration in the literature that has been largely ignored pertains to the way secular 
individuals are included in empirical studies. The aforementioned research on religious involvement, 
attitudes and coping use self-reporting, Likert-type scales where participants are classified as “High” 
or “Low” on religiosity/spirituality or as religious “nones” (also referred to as “unaffiliated” or 
“independents”) (Hwang et al., 2009). This last category has been typically used to include 
individuals with various degrees of religious unaffiliation and researchers are debating as to whether 
this is problematic in terms of construct validity. Hall and colleagues (2008) published an article 
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titled: Hitting the target: Why existing measures of ‘‘religiousness’’ are really reverse-scored 
measures of ‘‘secularism’’. The authors argue that since existing measures of religiosity do not 
accurately capture the variance between religions, these measurements can be better understood as 
reverse-coded indices of secularism because different secular worldviews have more in common than 
different religious traditions. Similarly, for Beit-Hallahmi (2007), the findings on mental health for 
religious believers serve as a “psychological mirror” for the irreligious and atheists.   
 
However, the measures used are designed to capture how religious someone is and we cannot by 
extension infer that a low score means greater secularity or atheism. The aforementioned authors rely 
on functional definitions of Atheism and Agnosticism which share scepticism about God with atheism 
being more resolute. Further, researchers express doubt whether the concept of secularism can fully 
capture the concept of atheism (Whitley, 2010). Grouping together all individuals with no religion 
affiliation results in a population that is very heterogeneous in terms of attitudes, beliefs and world 
views (Hwang et al., 2009). Such groups are also likely to vary between studies. When researchers 
fail to distinguish between individuals with affirmatively secular worldviews and those whose belief 
systems are vague, transitory or conflicted they are comparing known groups (e.g. Catholics, 
Muslims) to an unknown and then assuming that there is a meaningful comparison being made. This 
is like claiming that all Christians are identical without accounting for the great variety of Christian 
denominations.  
 
As a remedy to this lack of specificity, Whitley (2010) presents a typology which replaces this 
category with categorical variables such as “atheist”, “agnostic” or “spiritual but not religious”. 
Indeed using such options could present an immense improvement in epidemiological surveys 
assessing risk ratios and prevalence rates of disorders and psychological outcomes in relation to the 
irreligious. However, simply using self-identification terms may also be problematic as studies have 
shown that the belief labels individuals use, often do not correspond with responses to philosophical-
belief items (Saroglou et al., 2004). Further, a significant part of nonbelievers may not be aware 
whether descriptions such as “atheist” characterise their world view or might even misunderstand the 
term and prefer other similar terms such as humanist. For example, in a large scale Pew survey it was 
reported that nearly a quarter of people self-identifying as atheists proclaimed to have belief in God or 
have faith to a “personal” God (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009). A small portion of this 
group even gave definitions of God using secular terms such as “God is Love” and interestingly the 
researchers present this finding without accounting for this obvious self-contradiction. More 
importantly, based on their responses to multiple questions regarding religious beliefs, 30% of self-
identified atheists were found to be agnostic and about 15% were either deists or theists. The notion of 
a religious person who is also an atheist is not uncommon, especially in some Eastern religious 
traditions which do not contain a specific belief in a deity (Hood et al., 2009).   
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Like the term “religious”, clearly defining complex terms such as “atheist”, agnostic” or “secular” 
seems to resist consensus among researchers (Bainbridge, 2005). Social scientists and philosophers 
have long debated whether atheism can be considered a religion, or even whether it involves belief. 
Most definitions and conceptualisations of atheism focus on the lack of belief in a deity or use atheism 
as an umbrella term which covers a broad spectrum of non-belief including agnosticism, humanism 
and indifference to existential and philosophical matters. Despite the lack of a uniform ideology to 
which all atheists adhere, many authors have argued that atheism often functions as an organised 
worldview which influences the lives of its adherents in the same way that religion does (Caldwell-
Harris et al., 2011, Bullivant, 2013). Dawkins (2006) suggests that if religion is a shared belief system 
based on a transcendent understanding of life then atheism can be understood as a shared system of 
belief based on a materialist conceptualisation of the world which offers naturalistic explanations and 
derivative principles. These include for example a belief in humanity’s intuitive morality, a belief that 
humans are entirely physical matter and on death cease to exist, and that there is no need for the 
supernatural to do good, to enjoy life, and to cope.  
 
In order to understand atheists as spiritual seekers rather than simply a classification of non-belief, 
Hood and colleagues (2009) have theorised that experiences of transcendence can occur either 
vertically or horizontally. A vertical transcendence involves experiences “above this world” such as 
the Devine or “heaven”, whereas a horizontal symbolisation refers to experiencing something of 
ultimate concern that is sacred but “within this world” as is the case with “Mother earth” in the 
ecological movement. Conceptualising atheistic non-belief in this way facilitates our understanding of 
how atheists may hold a place in spiritual seeking and belief.  
 
From a more static viewpoint, Martin (2007) emphasises the distinction between “negative atheism”, 
which is the quiet lack of theistic belief and “affirmative atheism”, which is a more elaborate and 
explicit disbelief in God. In Western cultures, affirmative atheism appears to be marked by a 
renaissance to the point where it has been referred to as the “new atheism”. The rebirth of the atheistic 
movement has been led by prominent writers such as Richard Dawkings, Christopher Hitchens and 
Sam Harris whose best-selling works have gained massive popularity in the United States and Europe. 
There are several examples of the increased activity of this movement such as the advertisements of 
the British Humanist Society on London buses which state “There is probably no God. No stop 
worrying and enjoy yourself”. Their American counterparts have made similar attempts with posting 
signs that broadcast “Why believe in God? Just be good for goodness sake”. Further, recent surveys 
show that 13% of Britain’s population consider themselves affirmative atheists (WIN/Gallup 
International, 2014) while around 53% of adults in Britain describe themselves as having no religious 
affiliation (Sherwood, 2017) 
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Religion, Atheism and meaning-making 
One of the ways proposed to explain the religion-health link is that religious ideology meets the need 
of individuals for finding a meaning in life (Hood et al., 2009). The struggle with existential questions 
about human nature, the origin of life, the purpose of living and the corresponding search for answers 
to such questions often leads individuals to religion. Park (2005) highlights that religion is in a unique 
position to provide what he refers to as “Global meaning” – a general sense of meaning to life that 
involves beliefs, goals and subjective feelings.  This may be the case because religious ideology as a 
meaning-making framework is capable of subsuming other sources of meaning such as work, family 
or enduring values. Further, it is transcendent in that it points “beyond me” to some greater being or 
ultimate authority and makes direct claims as a meaning provider through its sacred character (Hood 
et. al., 2009). Empirical research has demonstrated that having a sense of meaning and purpose in 
one's life is associated with higher levels of well-being and that religion may serve as a form of 
“meaning making” (Fry, 2000; Krause, 2003; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). This association appears 
stronger among religious elderly persons who experience a sense of hope, self-esteem and optimism 
through their religious convictions.   
From a humanistic perspective, the inherent need for meaning, growth and self-actualisation can be 
mediated through religious belief and behaviour thus contributing positively to psychological well-
being (Dombeck & Karl, 1987). The continuing desire to “be all you can be” and fulfil personal 
potential can be expressed in a religious framework as the desire to know and attain a union with God 
or to live a life of virtue with a “pure soul”. Such a view emphasizes the constructive role religion can 
play in providing life meaning. However it could be argued that existential struggles pertaining to 
God’s “fairness” or the conditions of worth imposed on the religious by the perceived “demands” of 
religious conviction may adversely hinder self-growth and psychological health.   
 
Yet, not all people turn to religion for meaning in life. The atheist social philosopher Charles Taylor 
acknowledges more firmly the changing zeitgeist regarding the way people attempt to find meaning. 
He highlights that we live in a “secular age” where even though religion has not been replaced it has 
been transformed through a continuing change of options (Taylor, 2007). Each option can be viewed 
as a new departure point where spiritual landscapes are explored and quests for individual meaning 
are pursued. So we have gone from a world where belief in God was a given to a world where atheism 
has become a legitimate option. One set of continuous changes described by Taylor has resulted in a 
redefined understanding of meaning or fullness from something that comes totally from “beyond” 
human life to something that has come from “within” human life. He persuasively argues that in our 
“secular” age, the sense of “transcendence” described earlier is no longer a necessary requirement for 
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meaning. Fullness or meaning in life may also be found in the “immanent” (the state of being within) 
order of nature, such as in our sense of human flourishing. This notion echoes the existential 
perspective of a personal meaning in life devoid of any overarching purpose imposed by a 
supernatural authority. 
From a social cognitive perspective, attribution theory provides a paradigm for understanding the 
psychological process involved in the way individuals find meaning in life through religion. It is 
concerned with providing explanations about people, things and events and is therefore a theory of 
meaning making (Hood et. al., 2009). One reason why individuals make causal attributions is a 
general desire to understand and seek meaning in the world. Similarly, causal explanations are the 
hallmark of religion with teachings that attempt to answers questions that otherwise seem 
unanswerable. In this respect, religious beliefs and values are viewed as cognitive structures which are 
activated to decrease cognitive dissonance created by existential concerns. The research on religion 
and attribution theory is extensive and the use of terms such as attributions and “schemas” reduce the 
scientific vagueness to the idea of “meaning” thus providing operational constructs that can be 
empirically researched. However, attributions are only part of the total meaning making process. 
People, whether religious or not, do not talk about their attributions. They talk about what makes life 
meaningful. The cognitive aspects of the search for meaning should not be taken to mean that this 
search is conducted in isolation with other people. The need to belong is a powerful human drive 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and from this point of view the search for meaning can be materialised 
through fulfilling relationships with others (meaning through God vs. Meaning through others). 
From a social identity perspective being religious offers a membership to a group in which a common 
guiding belief system is used to interpret experiences and give them meaning (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). 
Social identity theory reminds us that identifying with various groups can be beneficial to subjective 
well-being by providing a sense of belonging and enhanced social support during difficult times. 
Many authors have postulated that these are the two key mechanisms that mediate the positive 
relationship between religion and health and not religious belief or content per say (Sloan & Baggiela, 
2002). Arguably however, it is the shared beliefs and attributions that drive the formation of organised 
religious congregations which allows its members to access instrumental and emotional support. In 
any case, religion may lend this particular social identity a personal significance exceeding that of 
membership in other groups (Kinnvall, 2004; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Nelson (2006) highlights 
that a religious or spiritual social identity often invokes shared epistemological beliefs about what we 
can or cannot know and ontological beliefs pertaining to what does or does not exist. The concept of 
an afterlife and belief in the existence of a deity can reduce existential anxiety through the prospect of 
a membership in an eternal group. On the other side of the spectrum, Fales (2007) points out that an 
affirmative atheistic worldview also coincides with an epistemological and ontological framework 
through which to understand and interpret the world, namely naturalistic materialism. Arguably a 
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coherent atheistic belief system can also offer potential explanations regarding what can be known 
and what can exist with important implications for the well-being of those whose self-identification as 
atheists is central.  
 
On the issue of meaning-making, empirical studies that have included atheists rather than religious 
“nones” are scarce. Schnell and Keenan (2011) attempted to explore how self-declared atheists 
compared to “religious” and “nones” in terms of experienced meaningfulness in life. In general, 
results indicated that the atheist participants live rather meaningful lives but to a lower degree than 
both subgroups. This offers some support to the notion that a rejection of God might be associated 
with a less meaningful life perhaps as a result of lacking breadth in sources of meaning. Atheists also 
suffer from crises in meaning as frequently.  However, cluster analysis revealed that there are 
different types of atheists based on their degree of commitment to different sources of meaning. This 
heterogeneity in self-declared atheists confirms that researchers should avoid catch-all categories 
when studying secular subgroups. In contrast to high-committed atheists, those with less assertive 
atheistic worldviews were marked by the highest frequency in crises of meaning and the lowest 
meaningfulness in terms of well-being and relatedness with others. Interestingly, atheists endorsed a 
number of shared values such as a commitment to knowledge of self and the world, freedom, 
individualism and comfort.  
The results indicate that religiosity and secularity may share a common ground in terms of 
experiencing well-being or the lack thereof through the quest for meaning and purpose in life. 
Methodological limitations not addressed by the authors warrant caution when interpreting findings. 
The distinction between the “religious”  and the “nones” was based on whether participants attended 
church and even  though the authors claim that these groups were differentiated according to religious 
sources of meaning (i.e. extrinsic religiousness, morality) the subgroup of “nones” contains an 
unknown variety of world views.  In addition, the values on the scale used to operationalize the 
“sources of meaning in life” appear to be positively skewed by statements such as “I lead a fulfilled 
life” and “I think there is meaning in what I do”. Future studies should attempt to use scales 
measuring well-being and meaningfulness that are standardised according to clear definitions so it can 
be distinguished which aspects of these multidimensional variables are measured.  
Horning and colleagues (2011) assessed four belief groups including atheists and agnostics to 
determine if they varied on the presence of meaning and on the extent of search for meaning. The high 
religiosity group did endorse higher levels of life meaning which is consistent with the findings in 
Schnell and Keenan (2011) described even though the two studies used different measures. Similarly, 
despite the lower levels of meaningfulness in the non-religious group, participants were not found to 
be searching for meaning in different rates nor was there any difference on well-being levels between 
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the groups. This is in line with Schnell and Keenan‘s (2011) assertion that both secular and religious 
individuals may experience crises or contentment in life-meaning independent of reliance on a 
religious framework. In contrast, the lower level of life-meaning for the secular did not correlate with 
lower life satisfaction as has been demonstrated with the religious in previous studies (Koenig et al., 
2001. This might reflect the existential indifference that often characterises secular individuals. 
In an earlier study, Vilchinsky and Kravetz (2005) explored how different aspects of religiosity relate 
to negative and positive aspects of mental health among a large sample of Jewish Israeli students with 
different religious identities (secular vs. religious). In contrast to the two previous studies, 
multidimensional self-report scales were used to measure religious identity as well as corresponding 
religious belief and behaviour.  The secular Jews attributed their religious behaviour not on the 
psychological ramification of belief in a divine order (such as "fear of transgression," or "connecting 
with God"). Rather they were motivated by the opportunities it provides to connect with family and 
enhance familial bonds. This means that secular individuals are not always characterised by a lack of 
religious belief. Their belief may be different in quality and motivation and is expressed in religious 
participation that contributes to a sense of meaning through enriching familial and social 
relationships. These differences in individual attributions on the image of God (e.g. as a “supervising 
agent” vs. a “vague construct”) account to an extent for differences in how religiousness gratifies the 
need for life meaning. These findings suggest that there are differences in the path from religious 
belief to meaning and well-being between the religious and those with secular identity who are 
religiously affiliated.   
Other models attempting to explain the relationship between religion and psychological well-being 
are centred on the fear of death as a mediating factor (Paloutzian, 1996). They view religion as a 
shield against people’s inherent insecurity about the prospect of dying and highlight the defensive role 
religion can play rather than focusing on its potential to provide meaning. James and Wells (2002) 
compared atheists with Catholics to investigate whether their beliefs about death were associated with 
death anxiety. For the Catholics, their negative or positive beliefs regarding the nature of an afterlife 
(such as eternal punishment or divine reward) were associated with increased or decreased death 
anxiety.  In contrast, death anxiety for the Atheist group was associated with guilt over leaving 
dependents behind whereas a significant number of participants in that group experienced less anxiety 
than believers and held an attitude of indifference towards the finality of death. These results are 
somewhat contrasting to an earlier study which indicated that atheists scored higher on a self-report 
scale regarding death anxiety than did believers (Lundh, & Radon, 1998). However the same study 
found no difference between the groups when a more objective Stroop interference task was used. 
Difference in measurements could account for the inconsistent results but such studies highlight that 
there might be distinct differences on perceptions of death between atheists and religious individuals 
with different psychological outcomes. These studies provide an opportunity for future research to 
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investigate if specific beliefs on life and death from an atheistic worldview might impact 
psychological distress and explore underlying mechanisms of such an association. 
 
Coping, well-being and psychological distress  
The attribution process described earlier represents not just a need for meaning but also for mastery 
and control during times of crises and psychological distress (Hood et. al., 2009). Especially when 
threatened with harm or pain, individuals seek to predict or control the outcomes of the events that 
affect them. Park (2005) provides an important distinction between what she calls “Global meaning”, 
which refers to a general life meaning that involves beliefs, goals and subjective feelings, and 
“meaning making”, which occurs during hardship and difficult circumstances. Meaning-making 
coping involves an interaction between an individual's belief system and cognitive appraisal of the 
situation. Religious ideology and beliefs often act as a core schema which shapes an individual’s 
framing of traumatic and stressful events (Pargament, 2002). For example belief in life after death or 
in a benevolent God who makes things happen for a reason can facilitate adaptation in a positive way, 
whereas religious passivity which defers all responsibility to God or the view of a punishing God can 
adversely affect the coping process. However, the importance of belief and cognitive appraisals in 
coping should not be overstated. How someone copes may ultimately depend on other more 
influential factors such as social circumstances, behavioural responses or individual constitution 
(Mattlin et al., 1990). There is extensive literature on how beliefs based on a transcendence 
understanding of life can mediate coping. However conceptualisations have not extended to include 
an atheistic belief system derived from a naturalistic-materialistic view of the world  
In a study on the differences in coping behaviours between religious and non-religious older adults, 
Horning et. al. (2009) found that the two groups utilised many of the same non-religious coping 
strategies (i.e. distraction, denial, venting, planning, acceptance). Religious coping was prevalent in 
the religious group but not absent from the non-religious, perhaps reflective of the wide range in 
belief systems of participants in that category. While the non-religious used coping methods such as 
humour and use of substances to a greater extent they did not differ in terms of positive reframing or 
on having a greater sense of control. This is contrary to the hypothesis that religious coping methods 
such as praying or relying on God to intervene gives religious individuals a greater sense of personal 
control compared to the non-religious (Siegel et al. 2001). In a different study however, Park and 
colleagues (2009) found that religious ways of coping were superior to secular when dealing with the 
diagnosis and treatment of cancer. They report that the religious coping pathway, including God’s 
control over cancer was a much stronger predictor of stress-related growth over time. Notably, the 
authors compared religious coping to secular for individuals with varying degrees of religiosity and 
did not include a separate secular comparison group.  
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Despite the specific differences in ways of coping, it appears that secular and religious individuals 
may be more similar than different and the benefits of religious coping over other ways remain 
unclear. Little is known about whether particular coping behaviours are more directly linked with 
atheism. If however the non-religious utilise methods such as humour or medication more often, 
future studies should focus on which coping behaviours are more directly linked with an affirmative 
secular worldview. It should be noted that the authors do not mention whether the influence of 
confounding factors such as age and sex was dealt with in the statistical analysis even though there 
was a significant difference in these respects between groups.  
 
In a qualitative study, Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) interviewed two groups of older people with 
polarised atheistic and religious beliefs to examine if the content of the belief system itself plays a role 
in coping with stress and loss. The pairs were matched for the nature of their distress (e.g. 
bereavement, old age, deteriorating medical condition), but the two individuals in every pair had 
opposed atheistic and religious beliefs. The analysis provides some support that a strong atheistic 
belief system may serve to provide explanation, consolation or inspiration in the same way that strong 
religious beliefs can. Atheist participants highlighted how they were able to find a great deal of 
comfort and inspiration through realising the universality of the human condition and their immense 
insignificance in the journal of space and time. In the case of bereavement, while theists would draw 
comfort through the notion of an afterlife reserved for their loved one, atheists would experience the 
continuing presence of that person through their memories and their descendants. Likewise, Smith-
Stoner (2007) interviewed atheists with terminal illnesses about their end of life preferences. 
Participants expressed a deep desire to find meaning through a continuous appreciation of the natural 
world and through maintaining connection with loved ones. If atheistic belief-based coping methods 
are analogous to theistic, researchers should focus on understanding which factors enable or impede 
such a way of coping. Although results from qualitative studies cannot be generalised, they are 
important in providing theoretical insights for creating models of coping that include people with 
atheistic beliefs.   
 
However few in number, there have been survey and epidemiological studies which attempt to 
measure group differences on indices of well-being and psychological distress between secular and 
religious individuals. These studies are unique in that they have included separate comparison groups 
of atheists and/or agnostics rather than comparing groups with different levels of religiosity based on 
religious participation or orientation. Baker and Cruickshank (2009) found that atheists and agnostics 
in the U.S. did not differ significantly in symptoms of depression compared to Christians and 
Muslims. Similar results were reported in a study focusing on determined atheists in Germany when a 
comparison was made with Church going Christians (Beggle et al., 2008). In the same vein, 
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O’Connell and Skevington (2009) reported no differences in measurements of life satisfaction and 
well-being between atheists, agnostics, and religious. Most notably, a number of these comparative 
studies have attempted to explore how the degree of certainty of belief or non-belief is associated with 
measures of well-being (Galen; 2009, Galen & Kloet, 2011; Mochon et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2005). 
Findings suggest that there is a curvilinear relationship between strength of belief (either of religious 
conviction or commitment to atheism) and mental health. Specifically, those who were more 
confidently atheists or religious, scored higher on life satisfaction, well-being and emotional stability 
than the weakly religious or agnostics.  
 
These patterns suggest that confidence in one’s beliefs and worldviews may be much more important 
for mental health than the content of these beliefs. As reported earlier in this review, the degree of 
conviction was also associated with experienced meaningfulness and improved coping (Schnell & 
Keenan, 2011; Wilkinson & Coleman, 2010). Overall, these findings question the hypothesis of a 
linear association between religiosity and well-being. It seems that those with wavering beliefs would 
benefit more either with a stronger religious commitment or if they endorsed an affirmative atheistic 
worldview. System justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2005) provides a possible lens to understand 
the psychological process underpinning this relationship. When people maintain confidence in a 
coherent worldview this may reduce negative affect and anxiety while increasing satisfaction with 
one’s situation. Conversely, doubting one’s worldview is associated with higher distress (Krause et 
al., 1999). This could explain why confident atheists, may experience greater psychological well-
being than uncertain believers or agnostics. Although there is evidence suggesting that religion 
contributes to maintaining such coherence, less is known about the certainty of an atheistic 
worldview.  
 
Taken from the analysis of the aforementioned studies, this curvilinear effect seems more prevalent in 
less religious contexts outside the U.S., like in the U.K or Germany where religious and spiritual 
beliefs are becoming more personalised and diverse. At the same time, researchers recognise that in 
more secular countries the positive association between religion and mental health is harder to detect 
(Sloan & Baggiela, 2002). This suggests that every individual study on religion and health is able to 
offer insight only in relation to the specific socio-cultural context it is conducted in. Given that most 
survey and epidemiological studies are conducted in the U.S. where religiosity is much higher than 
most parts of Europe, the absolute number of determined atheists is very small compared to the 
number of more or less religious people. That means that the non-belief part of the curve is 
underrepresented and findings from such studies would typically show a more positive linear 
relationship. Conversely, the same studies in more secular countries reveal contradicting findings 
perhaps as a result of capturing more of the middle and non-belief part of the spectrum, including 
agnostics and affirmative atheists. This highlights the need for more cross-cultural studies that include 
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adequate samples of the full range of belief and non-belief. Such studies would confirm whether a 
curvilinear relationship exists across cultural contexts and diverse beliefs.     
  
 
Implications for research and therapeutic practice 
 
The population of the irreligious and atheists is growing faster than any religious denomination in the 
Western world (Whitley, 2010). Yet, researchers are only beginning to conceptualise and understand 
atheists as a distinct socio-cultural minority. The present review of the psychological literature on 
non-believers suggests that an atheistic belief system can potentially influence psychological 
outcomes, experienced well-being and coping with distress, However, any reliable conclusions 
regarding the relationship between atheism and mental health cannot be elicited. Further, there are 
possible distinct sources of distress associated with maintaining an atheistic orientation such as stigma 
and marginalisation, negative perceptions of death and spiritual struggles of de-conversion to 
secularity. It also becomes apparent that when studies examining the religion-health relationship 
include subgroups of atheist participants (rather than simply non-religious) the relationship appears a 
lot more complex than has been hypothesised. It is simply not enough to say that if more religion is 
better than less is detrimental. If we are to establish an axiomatic relationship between religion and 
mental health, it is imperative that more attention be given to secular and atheist subgroups as a 
separate socio-cultural variable. It is only through further research on the different types of non-
believers that we can understand what it means to be secular and by extension what it means to be 
religious.     
 
What becomes clear is that we know very little about how atheism with different degrees of 
commitment can influence the mental health of its adherents. Rather than focusing only on comparing 
atheist with religious subgroups, future research should begin to tease apart the differences in 
identification amongst the various subgroups of non-believers (positive and negative atheists, 
agnostics, secular, humanists, etc.). The tension between the way religious people self-identify and the 
way they are actually categorised in studies has stimulated discussions for an improved, 
multidimensional measurement of religiosity (Hill & Pargament, 2003). Such concerns have not been 
addressed for the various groups of non-believers. The development and use of psychometrically 
sound scales in studies would help distinguish the belief status of those who simply reject theism from 
those who hold a more affirmative and coherent atheistic worldview. In addition, given the scarcity in 
the psychological literature for atheists, it is troubling that the majority of the reviewed studies did not 
provide detailed demographic descriptions of their participants. Without more comprehensive 
descriptions the generalizability of results is not possible. More importantly, the identity of atheists 
appears to exist in a vacuum. We know little about who atheists are or what defines atheism. There is 
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no theoretical or conceptual basis from the field of psychology and the narrow focus of these studies 
does not capture the range of atheists’ lived experiences. In this respect, constructivist methodology 
and qualitative studies can provide valuable insight and are a necessary first step for theorising models 
that link atheistic belief with mental health and coping.  
 
In the psychotherapeutic literature, the importance of incorporating religion and spirituality into 
psychotherapy has been a growing realisation (Magaldi-Dopman et al., 2011). Extant research has led 
to advances in clinical applications which attempt to address the needs of individuals with diverse 
spiritual and religious beliefs. These attempts however have not extended to include atheism as a 
separate diversity issue despite the evidence that individuals with atheistic beliefs might cope 
differently than their religious counterparts. It has been hypothesised that this lack of attention might 
be due to the tendency of scholars to focus on issues that are politically correct and publishable or 
because the majority of psychotherapists are non-believers themselves, although this might not be true 
in more religious countries such as the US (D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007). However, to assume that 
one’s personal religious affiliation (or equally agnosticism or atheism) is adequate is like assuming 
that similar gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation automatically creates professional competence with 
these issues. If it is important to acknowledge diversity in beliefs and behaviours among constituents 
within a specific faith denomination, the same awareness should be extended to those with atheistic 
worldviews. If therapists with insufficient competence on religious diversity run the risk of 
stereotyping religious clients about what their faith means to them, the same stereotyping could occur 
with atheists. Thus, addressing diversity in counselling psychology does not mean understanding only 
those who are far removed from our own frame of reference. It is about being aware of how the 
diverse beliefs of clients might influence the therapeutic process and their ability to work through 
adversity. Including religious non-belief in counselling psychology diversity training expands the 
effort to embrace multiculturalism and to address all subgroups of people.  
 
Therapists who work with atheist or agnostic clients should be aware of some of the common 
struggles that non-believers may face. While religious individuals in times of crises often rely on their 
faith based communities for emotional and instrumental support, the scarcity of atheistic community 
groups may leave non-believers feeling solely responsible for dealing with psychological distress and 
creating life meaning. Such issues might be even more salient for religious de-converters who 
experience rejection and segregation from familial and community circles. Therapists may help such 
clients manage their feeling of isolation in a search for meaning by encouraging self-guided 
exploration activities, such as journaling (D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007). Further, a growing number of 
accounts from therapists and physicians indicate that atheist patients and clients express as much need 
as religious people to talk about existential issues (Josephson & Peteet, 2007; Moadel et al., 1999). 
When discussing issues about death and dying, counsellors should be mindful of clients who do not 
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believe in an afterlife or a “better place”. Helping a client understand his or her personal motivation 
for life without involving God or other spiritual ideas might present a significant challenge. D’Andrea 
and Sprenger (2007) suggest that for atheist clients, therapists might be well placed to use approaches 
that focus on personal responsibility and emphasise personal empowerment. Considering this, it might 
be fruitful to engage with clients in an open discussion about interventions and therapeutic goals while 
making sure to avoid reassurances which are typically soothing to religious clients such as “things 
happen for a reason” or “events are all part of a larger plan”. If affirmative atheists tend to believe that 
they create their own purpose and meaning in life they might benefit from an existential-humanistic 
therapeutic orientation or through rational emotive behaviour therapy (Ellis, 1980).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While much has been learned about the relationship between religion/spirituality and mental health, it 
becomes clear that atheism is still a very understudied variable.  It has been established that although 
not a religion, atheism and its various forms can be an orienting worldview that is often consciously 
chosen by its adherents, who firmly believe in the “truth” of atheism—a phenomenon known as 
“positive atheism” (Whitley, 2009).  This resurgence of the new atheistic worldview to public 
prominence shapes new identities, sensibilities and discussions. Thus, there is an imperative need for 
researchers and mental health professionals to respond appropriately and incorporate atheism in future 
research. 
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Appendix 2: Reflection 
My initial attempt to conduct a literature review was marked with great disappointment and 
frustration. A week before the deadline I came to the realisation that I was not able to deliver the 
doctorate level work that was required, in large part because the literature on the original topic I had 
chosen was very limited, descriptive and lacked considerable theoretical and empirical foundation. I 
reflected long and hard on the ways that I could have avoided getting myself in this very difficult 
position which ultimately had left me feeling defeated, inadequate and under enormous pressure to 
deliver on a new topic in a very limited amount of time. My inability to “let go” of something I had 
invested so much time and energy in and my misunderstanding of the process and criteria involved 
were indeed relevant in leading to what seemed a devastating result. In hindsight, what was even more 
frustrating is that my errors had left me with limited time to engage with my new topic for which I 
feel very passionate and enthusiastic.  
My fascination with the psychology of religion is rooted in the dissonance it creates on a personal 
level. It is related with my desire to understand something that is so removed and distant from my 
frame of reference and yet plays such an important role in the lives of millions of people. This 
dissonance is even more salient when I am faced with individuals who look to religion for answers 
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about the purpose and nature of their existence. That is perhaps why part of my focus is on religion as 
a meaning making mechanism. I have experienced situations where family members or friends have 
turned to religion for comfort and support, something which I can only comprehend on a cognitive 
level.  As a counselling psychologist I have often wondered whether I will be able to empathise and 
relate with my religious or spiritual clients when I do not subscribe having any similar inclination or 
experience. Perhaps this review is an attempt to fill in the gap. Whether or not a theoretical 
understanding of the psychological processes involved can help me as a counsellor to get closer to my 
clients’ experiences I do not know.  At the same time I have often found myself passionately debating 
my secular worldviews with religious individuals and have experienced disapproval from religious 
family and friends. This is ultimately very relevant to my choosing a critical stance of the religion-
health connection and its tacit assumption on the non-religious.  
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges for me throughout the process was retaining my objectivity, 
especially given my opinions on whether religion in general is a positive force in the world. As a 
committed atheist and a person who identifies with a naturalistic and scientific worldview, I have 
often found myself feeling perplexed about the usefulness of religious conviction. The atrocities of 
armed violence as a result of religious extremism and the infringement of civil rights often sponsored 
by religious ideology in issues such as abortion, sex equality and homosexuality, have shaped my 
negative assumptions about religion. Further the notable lack of empirical or conceptual literature on 
atheism from psychological journals had me feeling disappointed as well as infused to pursue this 
topic in a more systematic way.  At times I would come across a conclusion that religion is 
detrimental in some respect or that a worldview aligned with my own is superior, only to be proven 
wrong by another perspective or empirical set of data highlighting irrefutably that religion has indeed 
a positive effect on people’s lives. In the process a came to a more balanced and mature understanding 
of the complex association between religion and health with its positive and adverse counterparts. In 
the end, I feel that not losing sight of different but equally valid ontological claims is a marvellous 
part of scientific research which encourages challenging new questions and the progression of 
knowledge. More importantly it has given me an awareness regarding the significance of religion and 
spirituality in relation to my clients. I have always felt that one of my strong points as a future 
psychotherapist is my ability to embrace my clients’ diversity and phenomenology. My newfound 
insight on the importance of religion in people’s identity and its capacity to hinder or facilitate coping 
helps me further built on this strength. It prompts me to keep an enquiring and accepting attitude 
during assessments and therapy. 
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Abstract 
For over a decade “Affirmative atheism” has been enjoying something of a renaissance in the Western 
world. Though not a religion, many authors of the new atheist movement have argued that atheism 
often functions as an organised worldview which influences the lives of its adherents in the same way 
that religion does. Despite the growing literature on how religious beliefs may interact with the 
process of psychotherapy, little attention has been paid to the experiences of those with a firm 
atheistic belief system. Thus, little is known about which aspects of an affirmative non-theistic 
identity may be a source of strength or hindrance in the therapeutic encounter. This report presents 
findings from a qualitative study with six self-identified Atheists. Interviews were subjected to 
interpretative phenomenological analysis, to provide an in-depth analysis of how this sample of 
atheist experienced psychotherapy. Three main themes are reported; 1) The road to Atheism, 2) The 
humanist identity, 3) The therapeutic experience. A compelling feature was how participants rejected 
the idea of spirituality altogether as a factor of well-being and maintained a preference for using self-
awareness, reason and science. Findings also pertain to how individuals experience and express their 
atheist identity in relation to perceptions of morality and existential issues. These experiences are 
discussed through the lens of identity theories. 
 
Keywords:  Religion, Atheism, Atheist, Mental health, Psychotherapy, Counselling 
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Introduction 
The research exploring the association between religion and mental health is continually growing and 
many empirical studies highlight how religious and spiritual beliefs can facilitate or impede the 
therapeutic process (Koenig et al., 2012). However, religion has been in decline in the UK and many 
people today hold vague, individualised spiritual beliefs that are unattached to religious doctrines 
(Hwang et al., 2008). More importantly, a large portion of people unaffiliated with organised religion, 
reject spirituality altogether and embrace a completely secular identity. The population of the 
irreligious and atheists is growing faster than any religious denomination in the Western world with a 
national survey showing that about half of the population in  the UK have no religious affiliation 
(Sherwood, 2017) and around 13% self-identify as atheists (WIN/Gallup International, 2014). 
Moreover, the last decade has been marked by a considerable renaissance of “affirmative atheism” 
which is characterised by a more elaborate and explicit disbelief in God.  
Despite the growing shift in the religious belief dynamic, atheists in general remain an understudied 
population (Cotter et al., 2012). Most studies investigating the psychological benefits of religion fail 
to include well-defined nonreligious control groups and measure religiosity on a scale from “high” to 
“low” assuming that the positive association with well-being is unidirectional (Hwang et al., 2008). 
Therefore these measures completely obliterate the varieties of atheism and do not differentiate 
between affirmative atheists and those whose sense of faith is vague, unexamined, or conflicted.  
 
Although there is a lack of consensus in defining the term ‘atheist’, many contemporary authors of the 
new atheist movement have argued that atheism often functions as an organised worldview which 
influences the lives of its adherents in the same way that religion does (Caldwell-Harris et al., 2011, 
Bullivant, 2013). It is for this reason that many atheists prefer to refer to themselves in affirmative 
rather than negative terms, with labels such as secular, humanists or freethinkers. Dawkins (2006) 
suggests that if religion is a shared belief system based on a transcendent understanding of life, then 
affirmative atheism can be understood as a shared system of belief based on a materialist 
conceptualisation of the world which offers naturalistic explanations and derivative principles. 
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Similarly, Farias (2013) highlights that based on survey data it becomes clearer that the psychology of 
atheism cannot be a mirror image of the psychology of religion, because many committed atheists 
today tend to have distinct ontological, epistemological and ethical beliefs about reality that deserve to 
be studied in their own right.  
 
In his work “The book of disquiet”, Pessoa (2002) suggests that people are naturally predisposed to 
believe; and that those who reject religion, choose something else to replace it with either intuitively 
or reflectively. This can be briefly enunciated as the belief replacement hypothesis. Whether explicitly 
or implicitly, atheists will adopt different naturalistic beliefs which provide meaning and explanation 
about reality and the world, and can ultimately play a compensatory role in dealing with adverse 
circumstances. Existentialism, New Humanism and Marxism are examples of beliefs systems 
associated with atheism and the affirmative atheistic movement (Farias, 2013).   
 
If the belief replacement hypothesis is true for atheists, then we would expect these beliefs to be 
particularly relevant, not only at the cognitive, but motivational and emotional levels. In other words, 
if they are as meaningful as supernatural beliefs are for religious people, they should fulfil similar 
psychological functions to those observed for religious beliefs, such as emotional reassurance in the 
face of adversity. 
 
In support for the belief replacement hypothesis, Rutjens and his Dutch colleagues (2009; 2010) 
conducted two laboratory and field experiments that showed how the humanist belief in scientific and 
moral progress helped secular individuals cope better with existential anxiety and uncertainty. The 
results suggest that atheists may view progress in the same way that theists view providence: that their 
faith in a progressive course of history (i.e. that we are advancing not just technologically and 
scientifically but also morally) can provide emotional reassurance. Thus, secular people may use this 
sense of faith in humanity’s moral progress to find comfort or security, in the same way religious 
people use their belief in God.  
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In a similar third experiment, Rutjens and colleagues (2013) also found that participants whose belief 
in progress had been enhanced (i.e. the experimental group read a positive essay), had fewer death 
related thoughts compared to a control condition. According to the authors this makes it more likely 
that the belief in human progress can provide a secular version of faith that counters fear of death. 
Notably, the results are limited by the fact that in both cases the researchers examined only one 
direction of the effects. These findings do however correspond with the results of an earlier laboratory 
experiment (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) where secular participants were primed with thoughts about their 
death (i.e. through having to write about their own deaths). In their effort to cope with their increased 
levels of stress, participants endorsed a higher belief in science and in the deterministic laws of nature 
that shape us. The researchers concluded that perhaps belief in science is emotionally reassuring when 
an atheist faces adverse situations, because it provides a tightly ordered understanding of the world 
that eschews randomness—similar to what religion achieves through the idea of a governing deity. 
 
The social psychological studies reviewed above provide supporting evidence for the claim that 
atheists do have beliefs - albeit of a non-supernatural type - and that these beliefs are not dissimilar to 
religious ones in their psychological function. The failure of the literature on religion and mental 
health to acknowledge the complexity of atheist identity and beliefs can be seen as further indication 
of unexamined bias and does much to bolster the need for including more atheists in research on 
health care. To add insult to injury, a controversial suggestion resulting from the positive association 
between religiosity and mental health is that if being more religious is health-promoting, individuals 
who are atheists or secular have poorer psychological outcomes (McCullough & Smith, 2003; Hwang 
et al., 2008). Researchers advocating the health benefits of religion assume a linear relationship 
between the two and are often implying that non-believers have a harder time adjusting to difficulties 
in life (Hackney et al., 2003, Myers, 2000). This sentiment is summarised by McCullough and Smith 
(2003) who, in their systematic review, concluded that ‘‘people who are religious devout, but not 
extremists, tend to report greater subjective well-being and life satisfaction, more ability to cope with 
stress and crises and fewer symptoms of depression than secular people” (p.191-192).  
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A similar lack of attention to atheist identity can also be observed in the research regarding the role of 
client religious beliefs in psychotherapy. There is an abundance of literature exploring how such 
beliefs can be essential to the therapeutic process (Brown et al., 2013). However, despite the growing 
literature on the subject, it is noticeable how committed atheists are excluded from this discussion and 
it appears that there are only a few articles that address atheistic beliefs as a diversity issue (D’Andrea 
& Sprenger, 2007; Hwang, 2008). This is especially unfortunate for the field of counselling 
psychology which distinguishes itself through its commitment to holism and egalitarianism and 
requires practitioners to engage actively and openly with clients’ meaning-making systems, religious 
or otherwise (Woolfe et al., 2007).  
 
More notably, there appears to be a significant absence of qualitative studies that specifically explore 
the beliefs and experiences of atheists in a way that would allow for their own personal voices to be 
heard. Only two qualitative studies were found that explicitly focus on affirmative atheists and how 
their beliefs may impact coping with distress. Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) and Smith-Stoner 
(2007) interviewed older participants and participants with terminal illness respectively and offer 
some support on how a strong atheistic belief system may serve to provide meaning, comfort or 
motivation in the same way that strong religious beliefs can. If atheistic belief-based coping methods 
are analogous to theistic, there is a need for researchers to focus on understanding which factors 
enable or impede such processes and how these factors can be taken into account in psychotherapy.  
Understanding and respecting a client’s belief system (religious or otherwise) is not only vital to the 
therapeutic process but has also become a question of ethical practice (D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007). 
This lack of attention on the experiences and views of committed atheists may result in counselling 
psychologists stereotyping atheist clients about the content of their beliefs, the meaning they subscribe 
to their atheist identity and possible distress associated with that identity (Josephson & Peteet, 2007). 
The proposed study, therefore, aims to add to the literature linking atheism and Counselling 
Psychology with the objective of widening mental health professionals’ knowledge of clients with 
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these beliefs. As such the proposed research will ask: What are the experiences of atheist clients in 
Psychotherapy? It is hoped that the present study will provide valuable insight for counselling 
psychology on how to work more effectively with atheist clients and will encourage practitioners to 
examine their own assumptions or biases about this understudied population. 
 
Methodology 
Design 
As described, this study aims to provide a multi-dimensional awareness of atheists and their 
therapeutic experience in a way that moves beyond common sense understanding and allows a more 
informed, nuanced and empathic therapeutic practice. With regards to qualitative interviewing, 
Creswell (2007) highlights its importance when the phenomenon under study is contextual and 
ideographic, as is the case with atheist and psychotherapy. For an experience as personal as belief or 
non-belief in God, insight on idiosyncratic and personalised accounts can be an important adjunct to 
descriptions of general experiences. Research which does not “give voice” to the nuances conveyed 
by individual participants, risks portraying an experience that is average and fails to resonate with any 
one participant. Such research may be of limited usefulness to counselling psychology practice for 
which a key defining and differentiating principle is its driving concern to attend to each individual’s 
unique experience (Woolfe et al., 2007).  
Given the contextual and ideographic resonance of the phenomenon under exploration, the 
philosophical underpinning to the study is hermeneutic phenomenology. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology is the phenomenology of interpretation of the meaning of texts and is generally 
concerned with studying a particular subject “in such a way that it is allowed maximal opportunity to 
show itself ‘as itself’” (Larkin et al., 2006: 108). It seeks to reveal something of individuals’ life-
worlds (Husserl, 1970). In psychological research, this goal manifests as an aspiration to understand 
and give voice (Larkin et al., 2006) to participants’ concerns and experiential claims pertaining to a 
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particular realm of their lives. In this case it pertains to individuals’ identity as atheists and in relation 
to their therapeutic experience.   
From the antithetical lens of an objectivist epistemology, it is possible to understand the subjective 
meaning of action in an objective manner (Schwandt, 2000). This requires an objective and 
“disinterested” observer who in theory is able to step outside their historical frames of references in 
order to reproduce the meaning or intention of the observed. No essential reference is made to the 
interpreter who, objectifies (i.e., stands over and against) what is to be interpreted. In that sense, the 
interpreter remains external to the interpretive process and unaffected by it. From this vantage point, 
phenomenology is regarded as an appeal to a long-refuted form of introspection, or as promoting an 
unregulated rhapsodising on the nature of lived experience (Prior, 2004). Similarly, hermeneutics is 
framed as a technique or procedure of understanding. In contrast, Gadamer (1976) explains that 
understanding is not a procedure or an isolated activity; it is a very condition of being human, a basic 
structure of our experience of life. Thus, it is not feasible for any interpreter to disconnect from their 
embedded facets of their lives to understand anything about lived experience.  
 
Phenomenological hermeneutics rejects the epistemology of representation and holds a non-
objectivist view of meaning. Given that our frame of reference and preconceptions influence 
interpretation, the point is not to free ourselves of all prejudice, but to examine them through 
introspection and “bracket” those that disable our efforts to understand others (Schwandt, 2000). 
Understanding requires engagement of one’s biases and an open dialogical encounter with what is 
different and alien which can challenge and adjust our preconceptions as they emerge during 
interpretation. In this sense, understanding is something that is produced in the dialogue, not 
something reproduced and determined by an interpreter through analysis (Willig, 2008).  
IPA (Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis) is anchored to the core principals of phenomenology, 
hermeneutics and ideography and was thus chosen as the most appropriate research method for this 
project. Based on key phenomenological principals, it involves a comprehensive exploration of 
participants’ lifeworld, how they experience a particular phenomenon, how they make sense of these 
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experiences and the attached meanings (Smith & Osborne, 2003). A grounded theory methodology 
was not considered because despite its inductivist nature, it seeks to generate a more theoretical-level 
account of a phenomenon and thus cannot address the research question appropriately.  
IPA’s fundamental focus on idiography raises questions about the generalisability and practical utility 
of IPA research. Further, because IPA is primarily concerned with cognition, it relies heavily on 
participants’ language skills and ability to self-reflect (Biggerstaff & Thompson, 2008). Thus, it has 
often been criticised for suggesting a Cartesian world-view that is incompatible with some facets of 
phenomenology. Moreover, critics highlight how IPA can often provide only a limited understanding 
of phenomena as language precedes participants’ experiences and thus shapes these experiences 
(Ponterotto, 2005). However IPA studies do not aspire to objective accounts of the studied 
phenomenon and only claim to access one version of the experience as the individual tries to make 
sense of it through their narrative account (Smith, 2008). Further, the concept of identity and 
experiences in psychotherapy has been a common thread through a significant proportion of IPA work 
and it’s proven value for tackling questions of faith, transition (Todorova & Kotzeva, 2006), loss 
(Osborne & Coyle, 2002), and identity (Smith & Osborn, 2007) makes it an ideal method for research 
on atheists.  
 
Participants 
IPA sampling is purposive and homogeneous. Its ideographic nature stipulates a commitment to the 
in-depth study of small groups of participants, most typically between five and ten participants 
(Smith, 2008). In line with the idiographic focus, a small sample is commonly recommended for IPA 
studies (Smith & Osborne, 2003). Thus, 6 individuals were interviewed so as to provide an adequate 
number of cases for exploring similarities and differences across participants without losing attention 
to the richness of each individual case. Because this study was designed to generate a rich description 
of a relatively understudied phenomenon, demographic diversity within the sample was treated as less 
important than each participant’s ability to provide a detailed account of their atheism and 
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psychotherapy experience. Few demographic details were collected from the participants before the 
interview. Because the study focused on narratives rather than predictor variables, demographic 
factors that did not emerge in the course of the participant’s story were judged to be relatively 
unimportant. Rather than using a demographics form, participants were asked at the beginning of the 
interview to state their age, occupation, marital status, educational background and place of residence.  
 
Five men and one woman were interviewed, ranging in age from 31 to 62. Two participants were 
unmarried, three were married and one was divorced. All six participants held at least an 
undergraduate degree; four described themselves as White British, one as Irish and one as Scotish. 
The homogenous sample consisted of participants who identified as “affirmative atheists” and were 
all members of the British Humanist Association. Atheism was defined as ‘lacking a belief in a god or 
gods and living one’s life on the assumption that God is not there.’ (Dawkins, 2006). It was deemed 
important to specifically target those who actively assert their non-religious stance through 
membership in secular organisations. This criterion made it more likely that participants would 
consider their atheism to be a significant aspect of their lives and identity. Further, participants had to 
have ended the psychotherapy at least a year prior to the interview. This criterion was set in order to 
ensure that participants would have had adequate time to reflect and make sense of their therapeutic 
experience. No specific requirements were set in terms of the circumstances under which participants 
sought out psychotherapy. Given the scarcity in the qualitative exploration of how atheistic beliefs 
might interact with the therapeutic process, limiting the scope of the research to a specific condition 
might reduce the richness of the data and the opportunity to uncover interesting and important areas of 
atheists’ experience. 
 
Ethics 
With respect to ethical considerations of the current project the ethical standards that governed the 
entire research were the British Psychological Society’s ‘Ethical Principles for Conducting Research 
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with Human Participants’ (BPS, 2010). The main areas of consideration include: Obtaining consent, 
debriefing, withdrawal from the investigation, confidentiality and participant protection. 
The process of obtaining informed consent consisted of three sequential elements: the information 
letter, the telephone conversation during which the study was explained and the potential participant 
was given an opportunity to ask questions and seek clarification, and a review of the information letter 
and consent form (Appendix) immediately prior to the interview. At each stage of the consent process, 
I emphasized the voluntary nature of participation. Participants were reminded before the interview of 
their right to decline to answer any question, to change topics, to request a break, or to withdraw from 
the interview at any point. This offered the participants a level of control over the interview process, 
in order to mitigate any emotional distress they might experience. In one instance the participant 
became visibly upset and tearful during the interview. I conveyed nonverbal empathy. If a sensitive 
topic arose that was tangential to their psychotherapeutic experience, I acknowledged the topic but did 
not probe for further information.  
Confidentiality was ensured in a number of ways. Participants were ensured that their anonymity 
would be protected by giving them a pseudonym. Details within the transcript, such as names of small 
towns were altered in order to disguise the participant’s identity. The undisguised transcripts, consent 
forms, and interview recordings were kept in secure electronic folders or dossiers, at my home. After 
transcription had been completed, only disguised transcripts were kept as data on my computer. This 
research project was approved through the “fast track” research approval process of the University of 
Surrey.  
 
Procedure 
An e-mail summarizing the study and inviting potential participants to contact the researcher was sent 
to the ‘British humanist association’ and “Atheism Uk”. Upon second contact with these organisations 
only the British Humanist Association expressed an interest in advertising the research and posting 
the information sheet (Appendix) on their UK mailing list. After the posting was made several 
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candidates expressed an interest and got in touch with me via email. On initial telephone contact with 
the participants, confidentiality was again assured and I established whether the participant had read 
and understood the information sheet. Naturally the participants had questions which were raised and 
answered. These questions pertained mostly to interview arrangements regarding duration, time and 
place. During this telephone conversation, I asked a brief series of questions to ensure the individual 
met the inclusion criteria. All participants expressed the desire to be interviewed over Skype for 
convenience. 
Arrangements were then made to forward the consent forms either by post or scanned attachment. 
Once consent forms were received, I again made contact with participants for the final interview 
arrangements. Interviews lasted from 35 minutes to 1 hour and 20 minutes across participants. Given 
my lack of experience in conducting qualitative studies, I consulted my supervisor for forming the 
interview questions. The intention was to help participants explore as fully as possible their views on 
being an atheist and their psychotherapeutic experience. For this purpose the interview consisted of 
six broad and open-ended questions (Appendix) which encourage participants to tell their own story 
and engage in a dialogue whereby the initial questions may be modified in light of the participants’ 
responses. This allows greater flexibility in coverage and can produce richer data (Smith & Osborne, 
2007). Further the questions were constructed as part of a funnel which allows respondents to first 
give their own general view of the two central themes (Atheism and psychotherapy) before funnelling 
them into more specific questions pertaining to their personal accounts. Prompts were also used were 
appropriate to elicit further descriptions from each participant. 
 
Analysis 
Following the transcription of each interview, analysis proceeded according to the guidelines 
described by Willig (2008) which consists of 4 stages: Initial encounter with the text, identification of 
themes, clustering of themes, and production of a summary table. Initially, I read the transcripts 
several times to obtain a general familiarity with the participants’ accounts while making notes of 
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general thoughts and observations that came to mind. These notes are unfocused and wide-ranging. 
They were not codes but documentation of my initial open engagement with the text (Willig, 2008). 
In subsequent readings the one margin was used to note down comments, thoughts and observations 
that came to my mind about what the participants were saying. Then, returning to the beginning of the 
transcripts and using the other margin, these initial codes were re-examined and revised into theme 
titles which attempt to capture the essential quality of what was found in the text. This transformation 
of initial notes into themes was continued with a constant revisiting of the transcripts in order to 
identify emerging superordinate themes and sub-themes which were clustered under several headings. 
This circular process of questioning and uncovering meaning in interpreting and understanding a 
phenomenon is known as the hermeneutic circle (Smith,  2008). 
As the clustering of themes emerged across texts, I checked the connections with the primary source 
material and compiled directories of the participants’ phrases that support related themes. The final 
step included creating a comprehensive table of themes and sub-themes for the group of participants 
as a whole. Some of the sub-themes mentioned by only one participant had to be abandoned and the 
remaining ones were selected based on their prevalence and link to other sub-themes. In the write-up, 
I attempted to strike a balance between discussing generalized essences and revealing elements of 
specific participants’ life-worlds (Smith & Osborne, 2003) 
 
Credibility 
Creswell and Miller (2000) highlight that researchers conducting qualitative studies are encouraged to 
apply at least two strategies which address credibility and trustworthiness. Following this line of 
reasoning, three techniques were employed to address issues of credibility. 
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Personal reflection: 
Personal reflection was used to assess my preconceptions and background on the research topic. This 
method was intended to “bracket” and decrease the effects of my personal biases and beliefs that 
could play a role throughout the data collection and analysis. A reflective journal was kept and entries 
were made after the conclusion of each interview so as to maintain awareness of how I might have 
potentially influenced the process and participant’s accounts.  
 
Participant checking:  
Participants were invited to review and comment on the emerged themes as well as the inferences 
made by the researcher. The aim was also to check with participants whether their words matched 
what they actually intended and to offer them the opportunity for clarifications and additional 
thoughts. Out of the six participants, two were available to provide assistance and confirmed that 
interpretations depicted their accounts in an accurate and comprehensive way. Ideally, it would have 
been preferable to have had at least one more independent researcher check the accuracy of 
interpretations, thus increasing sensitivity against personal bias. Unfortunately, time and resource 
constraints did not allow for such a strategy to be applied.   
 
Thick descriptions:  
To further ensure internal coherence of evidence and to facilitate transferability of information across 
situations, Morrow (2005) highlights the importance of incorporating thick descriptions of 
participants in the write-up of the results. For this purpose, attention was given to inserting adequate, 
direct quotes from participants to allow the provision of sufficient context and information which 
directly connect participants’ statements to themes. 
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FINDINGS 
The domains and superordinate themes that constitute the results of this study are presented in Table 1 
Table 1: Super-ordinate and sub-themes. 
Super-ordinate theme Sub-Themes 
The road to Atheism i.   Religious and secular upbringing 
ii.  Using reason, science and evidence 
iii. Humanism as a positive statement 
The humanist identity i.   Perceptions of morality 
ii.  Perceptions of life and death 
iii. Negative perceptions of religion 
The therapeutic experience i.   Struggle with the meaning of death  
ii.  Negative experience of therapy 
iii. Positive experience of therapy 
      a.  General therapeutic factors 
      b. Emphasis on self-awareness and personal 
responsibility  
 
 
The road to Atheism 
To make sense of how participants experience their identity as atheists, our discussions began by 
enquiring about their personal perspectives on atheism. Unsurprisingly, every participant in one way 
or another stated that first and foremost, being an atheist means lacking a belief in a God or a supreme 
being of some kind. The majority of the participants gave a detailed account of how they came to 
embrace an atheistic belief. They answered a question about their religious upbringing to obtain an 
understanding of their potential investment in a religious or non-religious identity earlier in their lives.  
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- Religious and secular upbringing 
Garry and George claimed that they always had doubts and probably never truly accepted religious 
teachings. During that time, they were not able to justify completely their scepticism and fully identify 
the content of their doubts about religious beliefs. While they prescribed with their parents’ religion, 
the bestowed Christian title was superficial and unimportant. Borrowing from James Marcia’s (1966) 
identity theory, this is reminiscent of what she describes as “identity defusion” where individuals 
accept passively a set of beliefs or identity with a low level of substantial commitment and an 
unwillingness or indifference to scrutinise.  Garry describes his relation to religious belief as a child:  
‘ ‘My mother was classic Church of England if you like. Christmas, Chrisenings, uhhh… but 
not a main believer. My father is very similar. They go to Church in Christmas, Easter, 
Christenings, weddings etc… Strangely enough I’ve probably been an atheist as long as I 
can remember, from about when I was 6 or 7, I just never ever… it just never struck me as 
being remotely possible….even the word spiritual life I don’t understand what it means… At 
the time of course theism or atheism or humanism, these labels I wasn’t familiar with.’  
However affirmative Garry appears in his atheistic belief, the use of the word “probably” suggests 
that he might not have been always as certain about his atheism as he is today.  
John and Billy were raised into a Christian household and initially accepted religious belief and the 
existence of God. So did Mary despite her parents being predominantly secular. However, at some 
point early in their lives they became dissatisfied or uncomfortable with their religious identity. This 
was often reinforced by negative experiences associated with being a person of faith or by a crisis of 
meaning. In such instances, according to James Fowler’s stages of selfhood and faith development 
(1981), individuals can be classified as being in an “individuative-reflective” stage where one starts to 
explore “outside” the box as one realises there are other “boxes” and begin to critically examine 
beliefs and assumptions.  For John, the negative experience was the impact of his “dreadful” 
relationship with his father who was a clergyman:  
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John: So I come from a long line of religious and followers who could not get it right. And I 
swore I would deny that, I wouldn’t be like that”  
Interviewer: ‘You had quite the religious upbringing’ 
John: ‘Yeah it was incredibly destructive and it was more about control.’ 
He later on attempted to clarify further and make sense of his atheism using reason rather than his 
emotional reaction to his past: 
‘I just don’t see that as likely. Obviously the term God is so ill-defined… some people’s 
descriptions when you talk about it sounds suspiciously like the force in Star Wars but you 
know I don’t see any evidence of something that would be fitted into that category.’ 
Billy was also raised as a Catholic. For him and George, their inability to reconcile an adherence to 
the Christian doctrine with their own homosexuality was a focal point of their disengagement and 
their often expressed resentment for organised religion. As George explains:  
‘…one of the things that convinced me of my atheism is my own homosexuality. Because the 
church is telling me you are weird you are unnatural… so in order for God to forgive this 
weird thing that you have you need to not act on it so basically you cannot be a normal 
human… For me it’s just such a horrid thinking that I just cannot believe in.’ 
In a similar fashion, Dean started questioning the morality and benevolence of God when he was 10. 
At that age he experienced his parents getting divorced and his infant cousin being murdered. When 
describing his experience, his words reflect his uncomfortable dissonance created by the image of a 
just and loving God who allows terrible things to happen:  
‘…and there was the murder case and the divorce and the custody trial and I just remember 
thinking… if there was really a God would he let all this sort of stuff happen? And the more 
I thought about it even at that age the more I sort of.. man I can’t… you know… I sort of 
stopped believing cause you’re just take it for granted as a child. Adults tell you God 
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created the earth and all that sort of stuff and I like to read a lot of science and wildlife book 
as a child and the more I read the less it sort of rang true what I was being told by the 
adults. I sort of came to my own conclusions’  
Dean later on used a quote by David Atenborough to emphasise how his journey towards atheism was 
one where he used reason, logic and scientific evidence to discern his beliefs.  
 
- Using reason, science and evidence 
In a similar fashion as Dean, the paramount importance of free inquiry, critical thinking and the 
scientific method was a characteristic subtheme that emerged from several participants in this 
typology. This new value was in stark contrast to their experience of religious doctrine. As atheism 
can take several ideological forms, Nash (2003) has observed that humanists in particular often 
become aware of atheistic beliefs through exploring scientific and naturalistic explanations that place 
science and faith at odds with each other.  
For example, Mary, who is a big supporter of the scientific method, describes how disillusioned she 
felt by the religious teachings at school. As she explains:  
“People had put those thoughts in me… From a very young age at school been taught to 
praise God, sing hims and implicitly that people who didn’t believe in God are bad. They 
are supposed to be educating you and… mind you now that educating you to put it most 
charitable is improbable (Laughter)”.  
Like most participants she engaged in a personal journey of reading and educating herself to come to 
her own conclusions and understanding using science and evidence:  
“It was just something I engaged with very personally. I had all these doubts and I think 
that these people seem to believe it so if I understood it better I would believe it properly but 
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as I learned more there was more and more and more reason to doubt which drove me 
crazy”. 
It appears that while participants might place high value on independent critical thinking, this has not 
come about in an arbitrary way. It is a product of their biography, their narratives and interactions, as 
is the case with many atheists (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006). This is particularly so for atheists 
who had to struggle with de-converting from previously held religious beliefs (Smith, 2011).  
 
- Humanism as a positive statement 
In discussing the differences between atheism and humanism, all participants seem to focus on how 
being an atheist seems like a label without content. They embrace the atheistic label as an integral part 
of their identity but it is seen as an answer to a single question (i.e. do you believe in God?). In that 
sense it seems incomplete, reductionist and not representative of what they stand for and what they do 
believe in.  
For example when discussing the differences between Atheism and Humanism, Billy explains:  
‘It wasn’t until… 5 or 6 years after (‘I discovered I was an atheist’) where I kind of reached 
that point where I found the title humanism. Uhmm… So my concept of Atheism is… I am 
not someone who doesn’t believe in God, but that’s not my starting point. Uhmm… I just 
don’t need that to validate who I am. I… I am the best person I can be, the most 
understanding the most accepting, the most liberal person I can be.’  
Billy uses the word ‘liberal’ in the end as perhaps a way to surmise and make sense, in simpler terms, 
of what it means for him to identify as a humanist.   
Most participants however agreed that humanism is an “umbrella” term which entails a wide spectrum 
of beliefs and worldviews which share the lack of belief in a God, promotes critical thinking and the 
right for individual expression. This is perhaps an expression of the “many paths, many meanings” 
view of secularism (Smith, 2013) which contains a plurality of viewpoints, identity trajectories and 
outcomes connected to the seemingly simple idea of atheism.  
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Mary’s description is quite representative of that view:  
‘Humanism is broader more philosophical. It’s more of a way of thinking. I like the lack of 
orthodoxy about it. I haven’t read it (‘the humanist bible’) … I wasn’t keen on AC Graylings 
humanist bible but I think that’s the opposite of that. When you have a bible that means an 
authority. Yeah, I’d like to hear your thoughts (‘AC Grayling’s) and your take on it but 
when you call it the bible you are giving it an authority… he’s done a lot of good stuff but it 
kind of defeats the purpose. I think most people’s response is pretty much the same.’  
 
For others like John, the discovery of Humanism as an alternative worldview was marked by 
enthusiasm:   
‘I am not sure I can give you a coherent, congruent response on that but humanism is like… 
here is my analogy for it. It’s like, it’s like when you breathe through your nose and it’s 
blocked and someone says well why don’t you breathe through your mouth and then I said 
ohh why didin’t I think of that. And then I said what about the nose and well we’ll work on 
that later, let’s get you breathing through your mouth properly. So humanism to me is like 
having missed all those basic bits all this time.’ 
His analogy of finding Humanism as learning how to breathe suggests a sense of relief, perhaps 
indicative of his desire to escape the ‘suffocating’ experience of growing up in a very religious 
community.    
 
The Humanist Identity 
Participants further elaborated on what it means to be a humanist in relation to life’s big questions 
such as morality, the purpose in life and the finality of death.   
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- Perceptions of morality 
For most participants, humanism was linked to considering their moral obligation towards others and 
society in general. Their views on morality were often contrasted with religious morality formulations 
which they experience as onerous prescriptions for either gaining a divine reward or avoiding eternal 
punishment. They consider that being good for the “sake of goodness” as perhaps superior to 
following scripture because it originates from a genuine place and feels more personal. These values 
resonate with Kohlberg’s (1976) moral development theory which highlight that moral decisions are 
grounded more on what is beneficial for others and the community at large and less on benefitting 
one’s self or on compliance to an authority.  
As Dean elaborates: 
‘I would say it’s about doing the right thing for the right reasons. You know for their own 
sake not for the prospect of something better later on.’  
When describing what it means to be a humanist, Garry refers to the Golden rule as his basic moral 
tenant: 
“So I definitely believe in the humanity in people. And then we start talking about where the 
ethics come from, where does morality come from and which I can have a lovely discussion 
with you but I have a fundamental belief that there is a… worthiness in all humans which we 
should respect and we should try to support, uhh…we should really as much try and live by 
the classic golden rule, which is do on to others as you would have them do to yourself and 
by the same rule don’t do onto others that which you don’t like done to you… so that’s how I 
try to live. That’s it really” 
Billy makes reference to humanistic morals as being fluid, evolving and situational rather than fixed 
in time as is the case with scripture. He later explains how ‘morality is something that comes from 
within’ and that continuous scientific developments should be a source of questioning ones moral 
values on issues such as abortion, assisted dying and stem cell research.  
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- Perceptions of life and death 
Most participants expressed a drive to embrace life’s opportunities and make their own positive 
contribution to the world and others. This view was often contrasted with the Christian doctrine that 
our brief existence is primarily a transitional state in preparation for eternity in heaven. 
Dean discussed in detail how he feels there is a humanistic responsibility in everyone to contribute as 
part of a whole. When discussing his job as a martial arts teacher he explains:  
“…if I do my job potentially someone who could do much more for the species and for the 
planet can get on and do their job you know?  I see myself as a cargo in this sort of giant 
machine”. 
Others seemed to embrace a scientific, materialistic view of life in which the question of purpose and 
ultimate meaning is irrelevant. As Garry explains:  
“when you sort of get into the question of what is the ultimate meaning of life, it’s 
evolutionary, biological but there is no why, we are not here for a reason we are here 
because that’s how it’s worked out.” 
Many participants discussed a common perspective among atheists regarding the finality of death. 
While recognising that there are atheists who are not as comfortable with the idea of dying, from their 
perspective, rejecting transcendence into an afterlife seems to make their lives meaningful, since this 
implies they only have a finite amount of time in which to experience the world. 
For example Dean had to deal with the loss of his mother after a 20 year battle with cancer. He 
described in detail how he struggled with his loss before elaborating on his thoughts regarding death:  
‘That’s nature. People are born… from the moment you are born… you know you’re going 
to die. I think religion sidesteps the issue especially on grief because it’s “oh you’re going 
to be reunited”. No you’re not, they’re gone, they’re gone. You know… They were dead for 
14,3 billion years and they are dead again, you know… but they had that brief flash in the 
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universe of life… They were one of the lucky few. And if you sidestep that issue you… you 
deny everything that person did.’   
Dean’s remark on how people ‘were dead for 14,3 billion years and they are dead again’ is 
suggestive of his view on death as a non-continuation of consciousness. In this sense, not believing 
facilitates an acceptance of death as a benign state of non-existence.  
In similar fashion John notes how death should be an opportunity for celebrating a person’s life in 
contrast to what he perceives as an ‘awful obsession’ of religion:   
Interviewer: “So where does humanism fit in”? 
John: “So instead of rehearsing or dispensing the bible and this awful obsession we have in 
Ireland like celebrating the death of someone instead of their life that has to be put on one 
side as a complete distraction and it’s about the relationship with each other and the animal 
kingdom and the natural world.’’  
 
- Negative perceptions of religion 
When discussing humanism, a prevalent theme for all participants was their negative views on 
religion. These criticisms evolved around, but were not limited to, the nature of the bible as a source 
of moral prescriptions, the role of religion in promoting and justifying intolerance, the violent 
atrocities from religious extremism and the infringement of science and human rights on issues such 
as abortion and homosexuality. Their disapproval was expressed in several ways and with different 
undertones ranging from anger and resentment to more nuanced criticisms regarding the content, 
usefulness and impact of religious faith for the individual and society in general. These criticisms 
serve perhaps to clarify and strengthen their atheist identity as part of a collective (Bullivant, 2013) 
which has a shared sense of purpose or a shared common threat. They suggest a pushback against 
ignorance, irrationality and the undesirable elements of religion. 
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Notably, the 3 participants who believed in God and/or had a religious upbringing, overtly expressed 
their discontent regarding religion. It seems that the intensity of their criticism in tone and language 
was proportional to the grief and discontent religion had brought in their life. John elaborated on his 
‘traumatic’ experience as he calls it of being raised by a ‘tyrannical clergyman’ in ‘Bible thumbing 
Ireland’. In this instance he was asked about the differences between atheism and humanism which 
seemed to immediately spur a harsh rhetoric against religion:  
‘To me religion a lot of the times is something that holds people by the throat. It’s just 
another scourge but I think we can dispense of religion completely and… the big issue is 
how we handle so much destructiveness and cruelty. If we could dispense of religion first we 
might be able to handle ourselves better. But religion has got to go, all of them’.  
 
The Therapeutic Experience 
Participants sought psychotherapy for different reasons including depression, anxiety, trauma 
relational problems and bereavement. Despite such diversity, several subthemes were identified which 
capsulate the shared experiences of the participants. 
- Struggle with the meaning of death  
For three of the participants the issue of death and loss was one of the main therapeutic concerns. In 
this sense, their meaning making regarding death was a focal point in therapy. Although this subtheme 
was identified by only three participants, it warrants mention because of its direct relevance to 
therapeutic practice. 
Mary was faced with 2 family deaths close together during her transition to unbelief. At the time she 
could not recognise that her debilitating anxiety and consequent nervous breakdown was linked to her 
uncertain and wavering beliefs about the finality of death. She saw a psychiatrist but initially did not 
find it helpful. She admits that this unhelpfulness was likely due to her own apprehension to discuss 
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her doubts about the afterlife with someone who she assumed was an atheist because of her 
profession. 
‘I didn’t know this (‘my anxiety about death and existence’) was the problem. In my mind  I 
knew she must be an atheist because someone who knows so much about how the human 
mind works couldn’t be religious which I know, I realised looking back that this was a 
projection and I didn’t have the slightest idea of what she believed in but I was projecting 
my own doubts onto her. Me believing that someone like her couldn’t believe it meant in a 
sense that I didn’t believe it and I knew as soon as I started talking about it I would have to 
admit it. After that it came up quite a lot, I think talking about things I found traumatic, the 
therapist noticed that I still had a lot of anger about religion and that sort of thing.’  
For Mary, the projection of her ‘own doubts’ onto her psychiatrists possibly resonates with her fear of 
not being understood or not be taken seriously if she chose to explore these doubts. Her reluctance is 
also suggestive of the significant psychological cost she would have to endure from facing up to what 
was at the edge of her awareness - specifically her belief that there is no afterlife and that death is 
final. This perhaps would have further exacerbated her existential anxiety and thus would have led her 
to avoid discussing the topic.  Despite claims to the contrary (James & Wells, 2002), clearly dealing 
with loss and the finality of death can be a complex issue for affirmative atheists.  
Unlike Mary, when Dean had to deal with the death of his mother he claims that at the time he felt 
quite certain about his atheist identity and the finality of death. However his reaction was one of 
profound anger. Working as a prison guard he felt a deep sense of injustice because as he explains ‘I 
see so many people who quite frankly deserve probably to die a painful death and I had to watch my 
mother doing it for 20 years and all she did was try to raise her children right.’ 
When he was asked whether his humanistic beliefs on death was an influence in some way he says:  
‘I just, you know, it’s… I think religion sidesteps the issue especially on grief because it’s 
‘oh you’re going to be reunited’. No you’re not, they’re gone, they’re gone. You know… 
They were dead for 14,3 billion years and they are dead again, you know… but they had 
70 
 
that brief flash in the universe of life you know… They were one of the lucky few. And if you 
sidestep that issue you, you deny everything that person did. You deny everything they meant 
to you. You know… You are not dealing with the issue. You’ve sidestepped the issue because 
you don’t want to deal with it and for me I have to confront things head on. I knew I’d been 
given the tools to… to manage and to be ok, and it was that I didn’t want to be ok cause I 
just lost a very important person to me and I knew deep down eventually I would be ok and I 
didn’t want to be ok. Does that sound strange to you?’ 
Dean uses the juxtaposition of the religious view of being ‘reunited’ after death to make sense of his 
own beliefs about death as a discontinuation of consciousness, a perception that is often observed 
among many atheists (Bullivant, 2013). Not wanting to ‘be ok’ indicates how experiencing grief for 
his loss was a necessary process and a way for him to ‘do justice’ to his mother.  
For Billy the challenge of coming to terms with death originated not from the loss of a loved one but 
from his job as part of the military identification team for deceased soldiers. In contrast to Dean, 
Billy’s challenge with the finality of death was marked more with a sense of confusion and even 
despair: 
‘so I had been going to a lot of post-mortems and I had guilt about all these young guys who 
had died uhmm… and me I’ve done all this time.. 25 years of time… and I had been able to 
go and serve been able to do my duty… I…they had… Now these guys have died so what’s 
life all about… they’re young they are living without a chance to live uhmm… where did 
they go? I don’t believe in heaven, I don’t believe in hell so what was the point?’ 
As he reflects on his own process, he makes reference to the Christian doctrine by which he was 
raised before becoming an atheist. Without the comforting idea of an afterlife he was left feeling 
guilty about the fate of his deceased comrades. Also, he expresses his sense of hopelessness through 
questioning ‘where did they go?’ and ‘what was the point?’ 
Later on he explains how he left ‘isolated’ and ‘thinking very deeply about things’ because as he 
describes ‘I was still quite fresh to humanism and those perspectives. I didn’t have an out, I didn’t 
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have a full understanding to hang my hat on’. This is suggestive of how his humanistic beliefs might 
have offered him some help with coming to terms with his struggle. However he refrains from making 
such an assertion.  
- Negative experience of therapy 
Four participants had more than one therapeutic experience and reported that at some point in their 
lives they were referred to receive psychotherapy which they did not find particularly helpful. Two 
participants attributed this to the fact that the first point of contact for receiving such services was 
religious based therapy or therapy with religious undertones. Billy explains his thinking when he was 
referred by the military to the Chaplin service for his distress:  
Billy: ‘The Chaplin is a Christian [Chaplin]. …that organisation has already identified that 
I am a sinner. Because I’m going through a divorce. Because I am homosexual, I am going 
to hell. So before I even engage with that individual to try and seek impartial guidance and 
a listening ear, from that standpoint he already has an opinion about me.’  
Interviewer: ‘He’s prejudged you in a way.’ 
Billy: ‘He’s prejudged me uhmm… and what the Chaplin would say we have an all souls 
ministry, but I am a humanist, I don’t have a soul. So we don’t even speak the same 
language’. 
Billy assumes that the Chaplin service cannot be ‘impartial’ and that he will be rejected as a ‘sinner’ 
even before he begins to explain in detail his experience. This is reflective of his difficult past with 
religion and it also suggests how he regards any therapy offered within a religious context as unfitting.  
This was a common impediment posed by all participants in one way or another. They expressed that 
seeing a practitioner who had strong religious beliefs or who could not at least maintain a neutral 
stance would be unhelpful and difficult to relate with. 
Similarly, John was referred for counselling at an organisation affiliated with the church of Ireland to 
help him deal with his traumatic religious childhood. He describes how in the beginning he felt that 
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‘the woman could totally empathise’ until they reached the end of the session where the counsellor 
suggested they ‘have a prayer’. In his words ‘It was as if like I was talking to a different person, have 
you not heard a word I’m saying? All of a sudden It was like in a twilight zone… the contrast was 
horrible.’ 
His reaction of ‘have you not heard a word I’m saying’  is suggestive of his frustration for not being 
understood and of the counsellor not realising that religion was at the core of his trauma and distress.   
Mary was originally referred by a psychiatrist to see a psychoanalyst after she had expressed a strong 
desire to engage in analysis. She recalls how she felt very flustered and disappointed by the analyst’s 
passive stance and symbolic language. She describes how it ‘did not make sense’ and was unable to 
understand how this was helping her resolve her anxiety and ‘solve my problem’ as she puts it. She 
describes her reaction after she pointed out to the analyst that her chair was wobbly: 
‘…this was the thing that was going to make me better and she was telling me I was angry 
for being there and she was telling me I had magic powers to break things (‘the chair’) with 
my mind. She wouldn’t mean that but, then later on I started sitting on the couch which 
helped a bit because I wouldn’t have to look at her face and I’ve never wanted to slap 
someone so much’.   
 
- Positive experience of therapy 
A. General therapeutic factors 
Those who reported a positive overall experience emphasised the importance of the relationship they 
developed with the therapist. After his disappointing experience with his psychiatrist, George 
described his therapist as ‘an amazing, caring person who was willing to listen to me. She was curious 
about me, simply that’.  
For John and Billy who had struggled with their previous religious identity, engaging in therapy that 
was secular was received with a sense of relief. As Billy explains: 
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‘… because that person… he was a civilian …I have absolutely no idea of his religious 
belief system because it wasn’t relevant. It didn’t at any stage come into the conversation… 
but because it wasn’t there, because there wasn’t that elephant in the room it didn’t cloud 
any of the issues, I could be and speak exactly how I felt without that pre-perceptions, 
without the prejudgment.’     
Some participants also reported how engaging in activities related to their humanist identity provided 
them with a sense of ‘pride and fulfilment’ or a ‘useful distraction’. Such activities include discussion 
in on-line forums for atheists and humanists, doing volunteer work as a way to contribute to others, 
taking part in meetings at their local BHA branch or being advocates for issues of social justice.  Not 
surprisingly, elements that are essential to any therapeutic relationship such confidentiality, a holding 
environment, acceptance, genuine involvement and respect, were valued by all participants. 
 
B. An emphasis on self-awareness and personal responsibility.  
When asked about their perceptions of psychotherapy, most participants emphasised the importance 
of self-awareness, helping themselves and using their intellect as a way to deal with their problem and 
move forward. D’Andrea and Sprenger (2007) suggest that for atheist clients, therapists might be well 
placed to use approaches that focus on personal responsibility and emphasise personal empowerment. 
For example Garry received CBT treatment for depression and anorexia. He contrasts his view of how 
psychotherapy works to the ‘placebo effect’ that religion can provide in times of distress. He later 
explains: 
Interviewer: So what would you say works for you? 
Garry: self-knowledge …An understanding why this has occurred. I mean I am very much 
materialist …that I believe in the explicability of many things are, can be resolved 
ultimately, if not today, by science [to] find out what reality is and this is all part of, 
probably from my background. …I think self-knowledge is very important. You have to 
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understand, what is the fundamental –as far as we can understand it– issue that is causing 
this problem. But once you understand that then you are half way there to stopping it.’  
He also describes how when he was in primary care he used to engage in discussions with the medical 
stuff for information to help him better understand his problem and how he can further help himself.  
Dean also recalls how when he attended grief counselling ‘It was just talking to someone and 
straightening it out in my own head and connecting the dots’. He then elaborated by contrasting his 
experience with his perception of dealing with things from a faith based perspective:  
‘I can’t see how it [religion] can help anyone because it doesn’t actually deal with the issue. 
It doesn’t deal with the grief, the stress, it’s just, it’s just stories, it doesn’t really deal with 
anything, you know? Uhmm… it’s not a cure it’s a temporary patch.’ 
 As someone who describes himself as ‘the fixer’ and ‘the go to guy’ for solving problems, part of 
coming to terms with his mother’s death was realising that this is not something he could “fix”: 
‘I am a smart guy, I can figure most problems out and it was just yeah get out of this one 
you know… but I couldn’t. I’ve been defeated. …I had to come to terms with it because the 
one thing you can’t fix is death’.  
John on the other hand expressed his disappointment about his second counselling experience with a 
person-centred therapist. His words are suggestive of how he was expecting something more in terms 
of his internal pain and symptoms decreasing. As he recalls:  
‘Digging deep can be painful. It’s like open heart surgery without anaesthetic and you can’t 
back out of the surgery and the wound is open and you’re lying there and you think well I 
thought this was supposed to help and well they say no that’s your work. We opened the 
wound and we teased out the bacteria but the rest is your job you have to clean it up and 
close it up. So like open heart surgery without anesthetic’.   
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In one of her later therapeutic encounters, Mary recalls how she benefited from the guidance she 
received to deal with her problems through self-help books and personal reading:  
‘And I just said to him this is what I want, I can work it out, I need to be put on the right 
path, I don’t need much the insurance won’t cover much and I was very specific. If I could 
be given, put in the right direction I could take it from there. …We didn’t get to the hardcore 
but I bought the practitioners manual and took it from there and it worked extremely well. It 
was quit strange business that it was very effective.  
 
Discussion 
The study represents an initial phenomenological exploration of atheists’ experiences in 
psychotherapy. A general consideration arising from the first superordinate theme is the significance 
of emotional events and experiences in some participants’ accounts of what motivated them to reject 
religious belief and to assert their non-religious position. An atheistic stance is often characterised as a 
rational, reasoned viewpoint based on intellectual disagreement with theological propositions and 
contradictions between scriptural narratives and scientific knowledge (Beit-Hallahmi, 2007).  
However evidence from these participants suggests that the rejection of religious beliefs may often be 
initially motivated by an individual’s emotional response to specific events or experiences in their 
lives. The perception that decisions based on reason and evidence are considered more valid than 
those based on emotional reactions may explain why some participants framed their rejection of 
religious beliefs in reference to scientific discoveries and historical evidence.  
 
The identity of unbelief 
Specifically, 3 of the participants were brought up with a religious identity, were involved with a 
religious institution and followed to some degree the customs and practices of Christianity. None of 
them were raised as atheists per se. Even participants whose families were not committed to religious 
76 
 
beliefs or practices were unable to stay away from a religious socialization altogether. From their 
early years, the majority emphasised their ability and desire to critically evaluate what they had 
learned using reason, logic and scientific evidence. This prompted many of them to explore different 
avenues in an attempt to make sense of life’s big questions regarding ethics, purpose and death. 
Eventually they were able to draw their own conclusions and remove themselves completely from 
past religious prescriptions in a process which Fowler (1996) refers to as “disenchantment”. This 
process also resonates with what Magolda (2001) calls “self-authorship” where regarding significant 
questions about life, participants shifted from external and dependent constructions of meaning to 
more internal and interdependent ones. 
 
A second general finding pertains to how atheists experience and express their atheist identity. 
Contrary to persisting stereotypical views that without faith and God atheists are not capable of 
making meaning of questions around ethics, purpose and mortality (Epstein, 2009), participants in this 
study demonstrated quite the opposite. Evidence suggests that for these participants, embracing a 
humanistic identity serves as an umbrella framework which further helps them explore, identify and 
express such views. It seems that humanism facilitates a move beyond their atheistic label and the 
construction of boundaries with relation to religion. More specifically, participants clearly articulated 
how morality is about respecting human nature, making a contribution to the human condition and 
that life’s purpose is about nurturing and harnessing one’s natural attributes in a way that serves 
humanity, brings fulfilment and benefits others. These prescriptions resonate with Kohlberg’s (1976) 
moral development theory which highlight that moral decisions are grounded less on benefitting one’s 
self or on reverence to an authority and more on what is beneficial for others and communities at 
large.  
 
It becomes clear that atheists’ identity is not always ascribed but is rather a status that is achieved. 
This is even more evident when we examine the accounts of the 3 participants who earlier in their 
lives accepted the notion of a God. For these participants it took some time to embrace atheism and 
undo years of religious socialization. For a deeper appreciation of their journey to atheism, it is 
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helpful to situate their process within the context of identity theories and specifically to Marcia’s 
(1966) four identity statuses of achievement, foreclosure, diffusion, and moratorium. Drawing from 
their accounts, we can hypothesise that these participants initially seemed to display religious identity 
foreclosure in which they adopted their given Christian identity as the only viable option at the time. 
This was supplied either by their parents - as was the case for Billy and John - or in Mary’s case from 
her school system. However, all three participants and for different reasons experienced significant 
tension with their religious identity which paved the way for an individually chosen identity 
commitment.  
 
Based on the assimilation-accommodation model of identity change (Kunnen & Wassink, 2003), 
when a person is not able to assimilate script-discrepant information successfully this may result in 
unsustainable levels of tension leading to the process of accommodation. In such a case, the person 
begins to reject existing scripts and develop others that are psychologically superior and safer. For 
instance, Mary observed that belief in God and the afterlife supplied no meaningful comfort regarding 
her existential anxiety and in the wake of losing two family members. For Billy, the tension was 
centred on the intolerance of religion regarding his homosexuality, while John could not reconcile the 
benevolence of God and religion with his father’s ‘tyrannical’ and controlling attitude. As a result 
they exhibited what Marcia (1966) refers to as “Identity diffusion” where they passively accept their 
religious identity without real commitment to its meanings and values. Having transitioned from 
belief to unbelief and adopted new core scripts these participants can once more be classified in terms 
of Marcia’s (1966) identity statuses as having an “achieved identity”, characterised by high levels of 
commitment after ample exploration. The same commitment and exploration can be observed for all 
participants regarding their atheistic and humanistic identity.  
 
 
Implications for therapeutic practice 
Despite the diversity in terms of the reasons why participants sought out therapy, several valuable 
insights can be extrapolated for practitioners who work with atheists. Firstly, the evidence suggests 
78 
 
that building a strong therapeutic relationship, having an empathic and non-judgmental stance is an 
essential basis for working with this subgroup. When clients describe conflicts related to their atheist 
identity in conjunction with a religious upbringing or with living in a religious community, it is 
important for counselling psychologists not to make assumptions about the level of distress stemming 
from such conflicts and to employ a collaborative stance which welcomes such issues in therapy. 
Discussing potential differences and dissimilarities in worldviews between therapist and client should 
also be prioritised for the purpose of building an authentic, safe and transparent therapeutic 
relationship.    
 
Counselling psychologists who work with atheist clients are encouraged to reflect on their 
unexamined assumptions regarding their attitude towards spirituality, whatever that concept might 
entail. For counselling psychology, exploring and respecting a client’s spirituality has become a 
matter of ethical practice and commitment to contextualised understanding (Woolfe et al., 2007). 
However, many assume that because of spirituality’s relation to existential and transcendent issues, it 
is a universal human characteristic (Chiu et al., 2004). Evidence from these participants suggests that 
using spirituality and associated terms with atheists, inquiring about their spiritual beliefs even after 
they have claimed to have none, or promoting spirituality as essential to mental health and well being, 
could leave clients feeling misunderstood and alienated. Therefore, practitioners may need to consider 
other terms such as “inner development” or “inner process” to explore and examine clients’ values, 
meaning systems and ethics. Further participants expressed that seeing a practitioner who had strong 
religious beliefs or who could not at least maintain a neutral stance would be unhelpful and difficult to 
relate with. If a practitioner feels unable to adopt a neutral stance, one opinion might be that it is 
ethically necessary to refer the client to a different therapist.  
A more specific finding pertains to participants’ views on death and dying. The struggle with the 
finality of death and the loss of loved ones reported by some participants provides a unique and 
personalised perspective to the mixed results from quantitative studies (James & Wells, 2002; Lundh, 
& Radon, 1998) which explore death anxiety of committed atheists. Clearly dealing with death can be 
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a complex issue for affirmative atheists despite their materialistic and naturalistic world view which 
often provides a buffer from existential anxiety. Further, it became clear that participants experience a 
variety of emotions towards God and organised religion that range from indifference and contempt to 
anger and resentment. This finding adds to the literature on how religious individuals who turned to 
atheism often might harbour resentment towards God (Exline et al., 2011) and as a result experience 
distress especially if they reside in a predominantly religious community as was the case with two 
participants. Practitioners can help atheist clients explore their options for self-care strategies and for 
emotional support through their atheistic/humanistic network. For these participants, their network 
serves as a platform for meaningful discussions about existential and philosophical questions. As 
such, they can often be a source of support as well as inspiration and can facilitate coping with 
bereavement or with frustration that may accompany the loss of a religious identity. Practitioners may 
also wish to emphasize the varied timelines and pathways of different individuals’ grieving processes 
(Sbarra & Hazan 2008).  
Further, participants valued interventions that would help them to normalise and validate their 
confusion. They also emphasised the importance of self-knowledge, understanding their difficulties in 
intellectual term and self-empowerment. These are also likely reflective of their humanistic 
worldview of intellectual inquiry, critical examination and expressed autonomy. Such clients may be 
well placed towards more cognitive based interventions such as CBT in which they can get personally 
involved through exercises and homework.  
 
Limitations and Future directions 
Because this study was descriptive and interpretative rather than correlational or experimental, its 
results are not necessarily generalizable to all atheists or humanists. Moreover, it is suspected that any 
fully generalizable description of an experience as idiosyncratic as atheist identity might be so broad 
as to be nearly meaningless. This was further exacerbated in this study by the fact that no inclusion 
criteria were set regarding the type of difficulty or symptom presentation of the participants which 
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made links between beliefs and coping harder to extrapolate. However, given the unexplored and 
understudied nature of the phenomenon, using a qualitative approach with fewer criteria allowed for 
preservation of the rich and complex essence of the experience. Further, even though participants 
were reasonably diverse in terms of age, they lacked even-gender distribution and other forms of 
socio-demographic diversity such as ethnicity.   
A vital consideration is how my background might have influenced the line of questioning, probes, 
comments and interpretations during interviews and data analysis. Participants were aware that I 
identified as an atheist, a BHA member and a counselling psychologist trainee as this was conveyed 
by the association when the information sheet was posted. This was something I was aware of and 
required a continuous reflective stance for the purpose of bracketing personal preconceptions and 
assumptions about atheist identity and psychotherapy. Having an insider status potentially facilitated a 
shared understanding, the building of rapport, trust and openness with the participants. However, I am 
mindful of how personal preconceptions and biases might have led to overemphasising commonalities 
with the participants or underappreciate divergent points of view. This was perhaps more apparent 
during discussions and analysis of descriptions regarding participants’ humanist identity. A sensitive 
and responsive approach during interviews and data analysis allowed my fore-conceptions to be 
challenged and adjusted by the data as much as possible while an understanding was maintained that 
interpretations are inevitably influenced by my personal, prior experience.  It is also unfortunate that 
the participants were not asked how their knowledge of my identity as an atheist and a counselling 
psychologist trainee might have influenced them. Such an inquiry would perhaps have opened new 
avenues of disclosure and discussion regarding participants’ psychotherapeutic experience and how 
they present themselves in the company of like-minded people versus non-atheists. In any case, it is 
inevitable that participants’ awareness of my history influenced, to an extent, their accounts (perhaps 
more cautious descriptions regarding psychotherapy and more open negativity towards religion). This 
fact is not a true limitation, but an influence to be considered. Finally, an additional limitation of the 
current research was the lack of at least one independent researcher for the purpose of corroborating 
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the accuracy of interpretations and thus increasing sensitivity against my “biographical presence” 
(Willig, 2008). 
Since all participants in the current study were humanists, future research might seek to interview 
individuals who identify with other labels in the unbelief spectrum such as freethinkers, rationalists or 
secularists. Moreover, the current research provides a sound foundation for initiating a deeper 
exploration of how affirmative secular individuals relate to the concept of death and how they 
experience the finality of dying of their loved ones. Finally, future researchers may wish to 
quantitatively and qualitatively investigate predictors and experiences of losing faith. Such efforts 
could provide valuable insight on how de-converters cope with psychological distress related to 
embracing a secular worldview, losing a religious identity - and consequently a relationship with God 
-  and ‘coming out’ in their religious communities . Few such studies have been conducted in the more 
religious fundamentalist environment of the US but are absent in the UK.  
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Appendix 1 - Reflection 
 
Perhaps one of the biggest personal challenges throughout the data collection and analysis was being 
aware of how my prior experiences, views and preconceptions influenced my work as a researcher. As 
an active member of the British Humanist Association I often engage with other members in - what I 
find to be - very meaningful discussions regarding atheistic/humanistic values. These discussions and 
my personal reading have shaped not only my own worldview and belief system but also my 
perception of what it means to be a humanist and what is the essence of the collective humanist 
identity, if such a thing even exists. In order to adopt a sensitive and responsive approach to the data 
collection and analysis I found it absolutely necessary to reflect in detail and in writing on my ideas 
and biases of what it means to carry the atheistic/humanistic label and on my preconceptions about 
how atheists might experience psychotherapy. These reflections functioned as a reference point which 
I used before the interviews and during interpretations for the purpose of raising my awareness and 
bracketing my own assumptions. However useful it was identifying my beliefs in advance, when 
listening to the recordings it became clear that in my moment to moment interaction with the 
participants, more assumptions inevitably began to emerge which in turn influenced my 
understanding, questions and probing of the participants. For example, listening to participants’ 
emotionally charged descriptions about their religious upbringing triggered similar unpleasant 
memories from my extended family and these negative connotations perhaps helped me empathise 
more with my subjects. At the same time it offered another layer of resistance in understanding how 
they made sense of their own past. This was also the case with respect to some of the negative 
experiences of psychotherapy described by participants. 
   
Similarly, during data analysis it also became apparent how the meanings that emerged were in some 
way always contingent on at least some basic assumptions from my part about participants’ 
underlying views, beliefs or cognitions. Through the interpretive process I realised that while my prior 
experiences where necessary to make sense of what was described, they were also a hindrance to 
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understanding possible nuances and hidden meanings of what was conveyed. I found this tension in 
the process difficult to resolve at times. In the end, I feel that perhaps this struggle is an inescapable 
and necessary part of the co-construction process between me and my participants. It was a constant 
reminder that I had to remain open to challenging my fixed ideas and to adjusting my preconceptions, 
thus enabling me to ask more informed questions from the text. Another challenge during data 
analysis was setting aside my findings from previous cases before moving on to the next. This meant 
that I had to maintain, as much as possible, my sensitivity towards each participant’s unique story 
against my desire to find common themes across participants. This was no easy task given the time 
constraints and the volume of the work required. In hindsight I feel that having an outsider – who has 
no familiarity or personal attachment with the topic – check the accuracy of my interpretations, would 
have improved the credibility and quality of the findings.   
 
Moreover, it is important to elaborate further on how my negative views on religion in general came 
into play during the research process. As a committed atheist and a person who identifies with a 
naturalistic and scientific worldview, I have often found myself feeling perplexed about the usefulness 
of religious conviction. The atrocities of armed violence as a result of religious extremism and the 
infringement of civil rights often sponsored by religious ideology in issues such as abortion, sex 
equality and homosexuality have shaped my negative assumptions about organised faith. These topics 
became a focal point of discussion with every participant during the interviews but also after the 
recorder was switched off. Even though there was clearly a meeting of minds between me and my 
participants, I feel that at some level there might have been an increased emphasis from my part on 
the more militant views expressed. While I refrained from explicitly expressing these views until after 
the interviews were over, this is ultimately very relevant to the formation of at least one subtheme. In 
the end I feel that the openness and engagement of my participants left me with a sense of privilege 
for being allowed to hear their stories and has offered me new perspectives and insights on the 
experiences of atheists.   
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Appendix 2 - Consent Form 
 
 
 
 I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on Atheism and psychological therapy. 
    
 
 I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided.   I have been given a full explanation by the 
investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the study, and of what I will be expected 
to do.   I have been advised about any discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being 
which may result.   I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and have 
understood the advice and information given as a result. 
 
 I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during the study and to co-operate fully with the 
investigators.   I shall inform them immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind in my health or 
well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms. 
 
 
 I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, being used for this study 
and other research.  I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is held and processed in the 
strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to justify my decision 
and without prejudice. 
 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this study.  I have 
been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to comply with the instructions and 
restrictions of the study. 
 
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS)       ........................................................  
Signed               ........................................................  
Date  ......................................  
 
 
Name of researcher/person taking consent (BLOCK CAPITALS)  ........................................................  
Signed                                         ........................................................  
Date                                                           ......................................  
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Appendix 3: Ethics approval 
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Appendix 4 - Participant Information Sheet  
 
 
PROJECT TITLE  
Atheist identity and the therapeutic experience: A qualitative exploration 
 
Introduction 
My name is George Spyropoulos and I am a Doctorate student (PsychD) of Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. I would like to invite you to take part in a 
research project. Before you decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
In psychotherapy, understanding and respecting a client’s belief system (religious or otherwise) is 
vital to the therapeutic process and has also become a question of ethical practice While there is an 
abundance of literature exploring the relationship between various religious beliefs and 
psychotherapy, there has been very little research in understanding how non-religious individuals 
experience therapy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore how atheists and humanists 
experience their identity and the therapeutic process for the purpose of providing insight into the 
possible ways that their diverse beliefs (spiritual or otherwise) might or might not interact with 
therapy. I would like to invite you to share your views in this respect. 
 
Am I eligible to take part in the study? 
You are eligible to participate in the study if you identify as an atheist, humanist or secular and have 
had psychotherapy at some point in your adult life. The therapeutic relationship is required to have 
ended before March 2014. You are not eligible to take part if you are still undergoing psychotherapy 
of any kind. There are no specific requirements regarding the nature of the reason for seeking 
psychotherapy as long as it pertains to some form of psychological distress or personal difficulty and 
not just for personal development.   
 
The process  
 
You will be asked questions as part of an interview and your answers will be audio recorded. The 
information you give will remain confidential, meaning that your name and answers will only be 
accessible to me. The information will be stored in a password-protected file in a computer at the 
University of Surrey. Research data will be kept for 10 years, in line with the University’s Code on 
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Good Research Practice. The interview will be in a form of a discussion and conducted with me at a 
time and place of your convenience or via skype. It will last approximately one hour.  
 
Are there any possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
In the unlikely event that you experience discomfort during the interview, we can pause and discuss 
any concerns you may have. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time without needing 
to justify your decision and without prejudice. 
   
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that this study will provide a more in-depth 
understanding of how secular and atheist clients experience the therapeutic process.   
 
What will I have to do? 
If you would like to take part please contact me at georgios.spyropoulos@surrey.ac.uk or at 
07455002820 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee. Ref. number: FT-PSY-68-14 
 
Complaints: 
 
Any complaint about any aspect of the study will be addressed. Please contact me (Mr. George 
Spyropoulos, e-mail: georgios.spyropoulos@surrey.ac.uk) or my supervisor (Dr Dora Brown, tel. 
0044 1483 683979, e-mail: dora.brown@surrey.ac.uk). 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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 Appendix 5 -  Interview schedule 
 
Interview Schedule 
- What is your perspective of Atheism/ Humanism?  
- Did you have a religious upbringing? Explain 
- It is my understanding that you have used psychotherapy services. What is your perception 
about psychotherapy? 
- How do you think psychotherapy services marry – if at all with religious beliefs/ 
Atheism/Humanism.  
- What do you think of practitioners who hold/use religious beliefs during their practice? 
- For future practitioners would you recommend practitioners to be taught to hold competencies 
regarding religious beliefs/Atheism/Humanism? Explain 
 
 
 
 Appendix 6 – Additional Quotes 
 
1)THE ROAD TO ATHEISM 
 
i.  Religious and secular upbringing 
Billy: “I wasn’t always an atheist or a humanist. As I said I was brought up in a roman catholic church. 
Actually at one point I was searching… I was searching for a… I just wasn’t comfortable within the 
Roman Catholic establishment, their perceptions on how to live life and so on”. 
 
ii.  Using reason, science and evidence 
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George: “I just followed blind the doctrine, now I question myself critically like with everything. I 
question whether my decisions, my beliefs are… valid…. Have stood up in time or perhaps I need to 
go away and learn more about it and come back and… oppose that decision”. 
  
John: And I used to read, I always read a lot. Looking stuff up and what does the evidence show? 
Really getting into the core of the arguments and if they hold water.  
 
Garry: I mean I am very much materialist not from the point of view that I want to buy things but 
materialist that I believe in the explicability of many things are… can be resolved ultimately, if not 
today, by science 
 
iii. Humanism as a positive statement 
Dean: a lot of the Atheist-Humanist movement is not sort of like the dictionary atheist view there is 
more to it, there is more to living your life than having come to that conclusion. 
 
George: the reason I identify as a humanist means that there is a lot more. You are saying “ok I don’t 
accept this worldview, what do I accept, how do we live our lives?” that kind of thing. That’s where I 
see humanism and things like that in.  
2) THE HUMANIST IDENTITY 
 
i.   Perceptions of morality 
George: this thing called religion that is unnecessary because a lot of the times a lot of humanistic 
values, if you cherry pick the bible, are in the bible 
John: psychologically that’s that motivator to be the best you can , to be the best person you can be. 
To support others to be the best person that they can be.  
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ii.  Perceptions of life and death 
George: me as a humanist when I die the lights go off and I will.. you know as a person I cease to 
exist, my energy becomes part of the world uhmm… but I do believe I live on. I live on and the good 
works I’ve done, the impact the’ve had on other people’s lives, positive impacts or negative impacts 
but hopefully positive. 
 
Mary: I saw him, he was visibly frail his acceptance was huge but when if you haven’t reached that 
acceptance fase that’s when I suppose you can have problems. I thought… Fear of death. Yeah I see 
it in the sense that you have to keep yourself alive. 
 
iii. Negative perceptions of religion 
Dean: We are adhering to the law as it was written by a primitive tribal group of people. And they 
are trying to apply that perspective and those ideals in a modern society, and it doesn’t… it doesn’t 
fit.  
 
Mary: The only problem I have is that when their choices start to limit my choices. That’s when I 
start having problems with religion and that’s when I … perhaps become… I don’t want to say more 
combative… more defensive uhh.. perhaps more vocal. 
 
Billy: I don’t see people fighting wars because they don’t believe in God. I don’t see people being 
murdered because they didn’t draw a cartoon, you know that’s the thing. 
THE THERAPEUTIC EXPERIENCE 
 
i. Struggle with the meaning of death  
George: I think at the time maybe the thought that someone, somewhere is in charge would be 
quite reassuring. 
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Mary: Like I said the thing that kept me honest was the fact that the minute you accept that you had 
to accept death and you have to accept everything else.  
 
ii.  Negative experience of therapy 
John: I believe within my pastoral system it is totally inappropriate for someone from a religious 
background to be the prime focal point of offering that therapy 
 
Mary: I had for example a very consistent, a very irritating person sitting and staring at you saying 
absolutely… very little or nothing for hours. 
 
 
iii. Positive experience of therapy 
Garry: The thing that helped me most was CBT, definitely from the point of view of eating again.  
 
      a.  General therapeutic factors 
Dean: Especially in the beginning. She was very warm and sensitive like she went out of her way to 
make me feel comfortable. 
 
      b. Emphasis on self-awareness and personal responsibility 
George: it’s about opening up perhaps avenues that you haven’t considered because you haven’t got 
the experience. You’ve never been eposed to before. It’s perhaps something you have never 
considered 
 
Billy: Not having religious beliefs anymore helped me, because it helps you face the actual issue. And 
I couldn’t blame, you know, the guy in the sky or anybody else.  
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 Appendix 7 – Example of transcript annotation: Garry 
     
CODING  LINGUISTIC CONCEPTUAL THEME 
 
 
 
 
 
Elaborating on beliefs 
 
 
Describing 
membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding  
humanism 
 
Relating Humanism to 
 
B: I am a Humanist-Atheist.  
 
A: Humanist-Atheist.  
 
B: I believe in humanity very 
much so and I remember 
that the British Humanist 
association … and I sort of 
arranged Humanist funerals 
for people. Not directly but 
in contact with the BHA.  
 
A: Uh-huh 
 
B: SO I definitely believe in 
uhmm the humanity in 
people. And then we start 
talking about where the 
ethics come from, where 
does morality come from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I believe” 
 
“I sort of 
“arranged” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“believe in the 
humanity of 
people” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Validating 
humanist identity 
through 
participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is humanism about 
humanity? What 
does that mean? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The humanist 
identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The humanist 
identity 
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ethics  and morality 
 
Explaining 
fundamental belief 
 
 
 
 
 
Living by the golden 
rule 
 
 
 
Identifying personal 
morals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and which I can have a lovely 
discussion with you but I 
have a fundamental belief 
that there is a… a worthiness 
in all humans which we 
should respect and we 
should try to support, 
uhh…we should really as 
much try and live by the 
classic golden rule, which is 
do on to others as you 
would have them do to 
yourself and by the same 
rule don’t do onto others 
that which you don’t like 
done to you… so that’s how I 
try to live. That’s it really.  
 
A: You know… and it sounds 
the way you talk about 
humanism, a lot has to do 
with morality and getting a 
set of morals and codes by 
which we live, for you, Is 
that right? 
 
“I have a 
fundamental 
belief” 
 
 
 
 
 
“golden rule” 
 
 
 
 
“that’s how I 
try to live” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How much does 
he experience 
Humanism as 
relating to 
morality and 
ethics? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there further 
nuance? What 
about moral 
relativism? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions on 
morality and 
ethics 
 
 
 
 
Morality and 
Humanism 
 
 
 
Morality and 
Humanism 
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Referencing other 
people 
 
 
Describing religious 
argument. 
 
Rejecting religious take 
on morality 
 
 
 
Expressing personal 
counter-argument on 
religious morality 
 
 
Criticising Christian 
inconsistency/Cafeteria 
Christians 
 
 
 
 
 
B: Yes. Very much so it’s a 
lot of people you get all the 
classic… to be honest… 
uhmm.. not many people 
say this but it’s the sort of 
classic thing the clichéd you 
know… If you don’t believe 
in God why don’t you go 
around killing people. You 
know.. as though morality 
actually really does come 
from some supreme being. 
But the interesting thing I 
find is that a lot of people 
have an inherent morality 
and then fit their religion 
around that morality. You 
know they are cafeteria 
Christians. They’ll pick out 
the bits of the bible they 
like.  
 
A: They cherry pick… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“as though” 
 
 
 
“the 
interesting 
thing I find” 
 
 
“They pick out 
the bits they 
like” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps validating 
own point of view 
through refuting 
counter argument 
 
 
 
 
 
Religion does not 
provide with moral 
prescriptions. It 
validates existing 
ones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Criticising 
religion/religious 
morality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criticising 
behaviour of 
religious people 
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Explaining cafeteria 
Christians 
 
 
 Justifying position 
through personal 
reading 
 
 
 
 
Being appalled by Bible 
 
Protesting inhumanity 
in Bible  
 
Avoiding discussions 
with Christians 
 
Criticising Christians for 
lack of Bible knowledge  
 
 
 
 
B: And they leave out the 
bits that they don’t. And it’s 
this Cafeteria Christianity 
that kind of let’s you do that. 
Uhm, if you read the bible 
and I have read it from cover 
to cover about 3 times. 
 
A: Uh-huh 
 
B: It’s the most appalling 
book. It’s the most appalling 
book in the world, you know 
the inhumanity of that book 
is unbelievable. I don’t get 
into many discussions with 
Christians because I don’t 
see a lot of point but I’ve 
had a few and it’s amazing 
how many haven’t read the 
book they are meant to 
believe in. They haven’t read 
it.  
 
A: Yeah. 
“they...” 
 
 
 
 
“I have read it” 
 
 
 
 
“appalling” 
 
 
“inhumanity” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What about 
Humanism? Does 
he experience 
inconsistencies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why compare 
religious 
prescriptions to 
humanistic? For 
validation, point of 
reference?  
 
 
“Inhumanity” of 
bible vs. 
Humanism 
 
 
 
Criticising 
Christians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criticising 
Christianity and 
Bible 
 
 
 
 
Criticising 
behaviour of 
Christians 
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Making sense of 
people’s behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining morality 
through science 
 
 
Making sense of 
morality through 
evolution 
 
 
 
B: But… (laughter) people 
are weird. 
 
A: SO humanism sounds like 
it’s taking a different take, a 
different perspective on 
what you see as, you know, 
a lot of the brutality that 
there is in the bible and you 
know so, humanism seems 
to come in as an antithesis 
to that... is that how...? 
 
B: Yeah… I mean I think that 
there is a… from an 
evolutionary point of view, 
the sort of evolution of 
morality there are 
evolutionary advantages, 
very significant ones on why 
the golden rule was 
developed and it was 
undertaken. I am not saying 
that Christianity is worse 
 
“weird” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“evolutionary 
point of view” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I am not 
Explaining 
behaviour by 
assertions about 
character traits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justifying point  of 
view  through 
reason, logic and 
evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Refers back to 
Criticising 
religious people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining 
morality through 
science 
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Comparing Christianity 
to other religions 
 
 
 
Criticising religious 
source of morality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Making sense of 
Christian morals  
 
Humanism not a 
substitute for religion 
 
Comparing religious 
morals to Humanistic. 
 
Religious morals based 
than any of the other 
religions or better than any 
of the other religions. I am 
just saying that, uhmm, a lot 
of people who say they 
claim they take their 
morality out of the bible are 
people who have never read 
the damn book. They just… 
they just take the bits they 
hear in church and because 
normally living in the UK 
mainly it’s Christianity, uhm, 
tend not to read the nasty 
bits of the bible, they read 
the nice bits and think that’s 
all there is so… it’s not a 
question of if it is a 
substitute for religion. I 
believe that a lot of… a lot of 
the religion from a moral 
point of view is based on 
humanism and then they 
wrap it up in.. uhm, supreme 
beings and stuff and I think 
saying 
Christianity” 
 
 
 
“people have 
never read the 
damn book” 
 
“They take the 
bits...” 
 
 
 
 
“They think 
that’s all there 
is” 
 
 
 
“religion based 
on humanism” 
 
 
Christianity as a 
point of reference. 
Why? Attempting 
to sound fair and 
balanced to add 
credibility? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trying to 
understand the 
paradox of 
Christian morality 
through a logical 
explanation  
 
  
Humanistic morals 
pre-date religious 
morals? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious source 
of morality vs. 
Humanist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Association of 
religious morality 
to humanistic 
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on humanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referencing other 
religions 
 
 
Identifying positives of 
religious morals 
 
Religious morals 
it’s complete… sorry are you 
with me? 
 
A: Yes,so it’s like you are 
taking out this ablaze, this 
thing called religion that is 
unnecessary because a lot of 
the times a lot of humanistic 
values, if you cherry pick the 
bible, are in the bible.  
 
B: Yeah 
 
A: Mmm… 
 
B: That’s correct and 
probably, I never read the 
Koran or probably in the 
Koran and probably in Hindu 
teachings, you know, 
religion has got a lot of good 
in it. It’s got a lot of both in 
it, a lot of good in it tend to 
cement groups of people 
together, a lot of religions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Koran”, 
“Hindu” 
 
 
“a lot of good” 
 
“Cement 
people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lumping all 
religions together 
 
 
 
A lot but not all? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussing other 
religions 
 
 
Positives of 
religion 
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uniting people 
 
Discussing ethics of 
religion/using example 
 
 
 
 
Religion as a force for 
good vs harm 
 
 
Evaluating net negative 
outcome of religion 
 
 
Defending religion 
 
 
 
 
Identifying religious 
extremism  
 
Connecting ISIS with 
do have an ethic on helping 
others, uhmm… a lot of 
religion does, you know the 
classic love thy neighbours 
as thyself, you know they’re 
good I am not mocking 
them, religion has done a 
hell of a lot of good but it’s 
also done a hell of a lot of 
harm. To be honest, I don’t 
think net it hasn’t added 
anything, in fact it might be 
slightly negative… uhmm. 
You know people are people 
they can be complete 
bastards with or without 
religion  
 
A: Yes 
 
B: uhm… What I tend to 
think is that extreme 
religious belief can tend to 
focus people into the ISIS 
part of things where it 
together” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“but it’s also” 
 
 
 
 
 
“with or 
without 
religion” 
 
 
 
 
 
“religious 
belief” -
“focus” -“ISIS 
part” 
 
 
Wants to appear 
dispassionate, 
undogmatic  and 
balanced in his 
criticism, 
acknowledging 
nuances?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labelling 
detrimental 
religious belief as 
extreme as a way 
to split the good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criticising 
religion 
 
 
 
 
Defending 
religion 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious 
extremism 
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extremisms and 
inhumanity 
 
 
 
Being fair to religion 
 
Identifying extremism 
as the exception 
 
Justifying position 
through personal 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
becomes completely 
inhuman. 
 
A:Mmm… 
 
B: Totally inhuman. But that 
is… you know if I’m being 
totally fair to religion in an 
overall world is the 
exception rather than the 
norm. Most people have 
trouble all over the world, 
met people from all 
different religions, all 
different beliefs, all different 
sexual orientations, most 
people are nice and they’re 
good  
 
A: Yes. And they just happen 
to be religious. I see what 
you are saying. 
 
B: With or without. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“fair” 
 
 “exception” 
 
“met people” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
from the bad 
 
 
 
 
 
He implies that it 
is only the 
extremists that are 
not nice people. 
What does that do 
for him? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defending 
religion / 
religious 
etremism 
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Defining therapy 
 
Therapy as returning to 
normality 
 
Reflecting on normality 
 
 
A: I see what you are saying. 
Ok thank you for that. 
Uhmm… So what is your 
understanding of therapy  
B: In a mental sense? 
 
A: Uhm.. In your sense, in 
however you want to explain 
how you experienced it and 
what is your perspective.  
 
B: Ok, that’s actually it’s a 
very deep and quite a 
philosophical question 
actually because in a 
simplistic term I would say 
therapy is trying to recover 
somebody from the fringes 
of normality towards 
normality.  But on the other 
hand what the hell is 
normality so… there is no 
such thing as the average 
but in everyday speak terms 
as far as I am concerned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“recover” – 
“fringes” – 
“normality” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectualising 
and being very 
“heady”. What 
about his own 
experience?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining therapy 
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Therapy as a 
collaborative 
process/resolving 
issues 
 
 
 
 
a group of people 
helping one individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
therapy is… humans 
interacting together to try to 
resolve issues that the one 
has. Now whether they are 
societal issues of therapy, 
even for things like criminal 
acts or for mental issues, 
uhmm… poor upbringing or 
whatever it may be, it’s 
other people trying to help 
focus attention and try to 
resolve the issue of the 
individual  
 
A: Mmm… 
 
B: Does that make sense? 
 
A: It does make sense. You 
mentioned humans 
interacting together but you 
also said other people trying 
to make sense of you. 
 
B: Ok, obviously therapy can 
 
 
“Humans 
interacting 
together” 
 
 
 
 
 
“other 
people”, 
“individual” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost like a 
dictionary 
definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining therapy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining therapy 
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Therapy as one to one 
 
 
 
 
Therapy provided by a 
team of people  
 
 
Reflecting on recovery 
 
Physical recovery 
required for mental 
recovery and vice 
versa. 
 
 
Identifying difference 
in therapy experience 
 
 
 
 
 
be on a one to one basis, 
that’s how it worked for me 
but it’s uhhh… in my whole 
situation when I was ill it 
was a team of surgeons, 
therapists from a mental 
health point of view, nurses, 
all are part of that therapy. It 
wasn’t one. I could not have 
had the mental recovery 
without the physical 
recovery and I don’t think 
my physical recovery would 
have happened without the 
mental recovery so it was a 
team but I don’t think this 
applies to everybody. 
Because people can have 
specific instances where 
one… generally it is society 
putting resources into 
generally trying to help the 
individual.  
 
A: Ok… thank you. So how 
 
“one to one” 
 
 
 
“team” 
 
 
 
 
 
“mental”, 
“physical”, 
“recovery” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connecting 
physical to mental 
health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapeutic 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapeutic 
experience 
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Difficulty in pinpointing 
difference without 
holding religious 
beliefs 
 
Religious beliefs create 
placebo effect 
 
Rejecting alternative 
treatments 
 
 
 
 
Religion as helpful vs. 
as harmful 
do you think religious or 
secular beliefs marry, if at 
all, with therapy? And this 
might be something you 
haven’t really thought of… 
 
B: I have. I’ve thought about 
it yeah and… it’s quote a 
difference… without having 
religious belief it’s very hard 
for me to understand how it 
helped me and it obviously 
does help people.. uhm… 
there is a big placebo effect I 
mean… I am also you know a 
“throw it out the window” 
type of person as far as 
some of the alternative 
treatments go uhm… but 
there is a very, very strong 
placebo effect and I certainly 
think that certainly whithin 
religion you can get groups 
that help but also you can 
get group rejection. I mean I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“hard to 
understand”, 
“without” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“alternative 
treatments” – 
“placebo” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He again begins by 
making reference 
to religious beliefs 
first. Does his 
secular beliefs 
exist only in 
reference to 
religious ones?  
 
Comparing 
placebo effect of 
alternative 
treatments to 
religious effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapy and 
religious beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapy and 
religious beliefs 
 
 
 
 
Criticising 
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Using other people as 
example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Making  sense of the 
comfort religion 
provides 
 
 
Comparing and 
differentiating self 
from religious people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
know fairly recent that 
people who have problems 
with their sexuality, like they 
couldn’t accept their 
homosexuality or whatever 
it may be… but now it’s 
changing a bit so I am not 
sure that religion, has a 
particularly positive or 
negative effect overall. 
Certainly for some people  
there is no question at all 
that a belief in a higher 
power, having a reasonable 
life can give people 
considerable comfort and 
help and help them out of 
issues. It doesn’t work with 
me but it obviously does 
with some.  
 
A: So what would you say 
works for you, if we take 
religion out of the equation? 
 
 
 
“I know 
people” 
 
 
 
 
 
“positive or 
negative effect 
overall” 
 
 
“Can help 
people” – 
“does not 
work for me” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledges 
nuance and 
different 
outcomes of 
religion 
 
 
 
Trying to 
summarise 
religious effect 
“overall” like an 
equation 
 
Comparing and 
contrasting to 
clarify own 
preference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
religion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessing impact 
of religion 
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Self-knowlege as a way 
of overcoming issues 
 
 
Identifying with 
materialism 
 
Explaining materialism 
 
 
Science as a tool for 
understanding reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seeing self-know 
B: uhh.. self-knowledge 
 
A: Self-knowledge 
 
B: An understanding why 
this has occurred, why… I 
mean I am very much 
materialist not from the 
point of view that I want to 
buy things but materialist 
that I believe in the 
explicability of many things 
are… can be resolved 
ultimately, if not today, by 
science. One way or the 
other. Science in a broader 
sense of a method trying 
to… not find what reality is 
because you never will do 
that but find out… getting 
closer and closer and closer 
to it. Find out what reality is 
and this is all part of… 
probably from my 
(inaudible)  background. 
 
 
 
 
 
“materialist” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“resolved by 
science” 
 
 
 
“what reality 
is” - “never do 
that” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How does 
materialism 
connect to self-
knowledge? 
 
 
Materialism is 
about 
championing the 
scientific method? 
 
Ontological claims 
about reality. 
What does he 
mean by never? 
 
 
 
Shifted from being 
 
 
 
 
Emphasis on self-
awareness and 
personal 
responsibility 
 
 
 
Science as a way 
to resolve issues 
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ledge as understanding 
causality 
 
 
Personal responsibility 
vs. relying on God. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gaining information as 
a way of coping 
 
 
 
Self-knowledge as 
understanding the 
issue creating the 
problem 
 
 
 
That certainly I think that 
self-knowledge… uhhh 
understanding why do I… 
what’s causing it is the key in 
many respects to resolving 
it. So it’s not that I… saying it 
is God’s will and therefore I 
will not worry about it 
anymore because it is not 
my problem. I will work 
through this you say… ok If I 
am ever going to a hospital 
and I still occasionally go in… 
I always have very 
interesting discussions with 
the medical stuff about what 
is the issue, can you explain 
it to me, like what do I need 
to know, what can you do, 
how is that, what works, not 
just give me the pill and I’ll 
be fine. I want to know. I 
think self-knowledge is very 
important. You have to 
understand, what is the 
 
“why do I” – 
“what’s 
causing it” 
 
 
“so saying it’s 
God’s will” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I need  to 
know”...”what 
works” 
 
 
 
 
personally 
responsible with 
“why do I” to an 
abstract cause of 
“what’s causing it”  
 
 
 
 
 
Again juxtaposing 
personal 
responsibility and 
self knowledge 
with “God’s will”  
 
 
 
 
 
Uses example of 
personal action 
against passively 
receiving “the pill” 
 
 
 
Comparing and 
contrasting with 
religious 
faith/criticising 
religion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self knowledge 
as a tool 
 
 
 
Personal 
responsibility for 
dealing with 
issues 
 
information and 
facts can 
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Understanding 
causation to solve 
problem 
 
Understanding is key 
to resolving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifying as 
rationalist 
 
 
 
Acknowledging 
limitations of being 
rational 
 
 
 
 
 
fundamental – as far as we 
can understand it – issue 
that is causing this problem. 
But once you understand 
that then you are half way 
there to stopping it.  
 
A: It sounds like, using your 
intellect as a way of coping 
as opposed to for example, 
faith       
 
B: I am a rationalist without 
a doubt. 
 
A: Without a doubt, ok. 
 
B: As far as any human being 
can be rational. And we are 
not very rational.  
 
 
A: Yes. Ok. So what do you 
think of religious or spiritual 
beliefs being used in the 
“understand”, 
”fundamental 
issue”, 
“causing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“rationalist” 
 
 
 
 
“not very 
rational” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-knowledge = 
causality? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using another 
label to define 
himself. Meaning 
for him? 
 
Qualifying being a 
rationalist. 
Appearing 
balanced and 
undogmatic? 
 
 
 
facilitate coping 
 
Knowledge and 
self-knowledge 
as a tool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emphasis on 
reason and logic 
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Acknowledging other 
views and preferences 
 
 
 
 
Rejecting spirituality in 
therapy for self  
 
Contrasting needs of 
others to own 
 
 
Being rational vs. being 
religious 
context of therapy? 
 
B: I have no problem with 
that so long as the person to 
whom I am speaking…. For 
example I have no problem 
if there is a say a 
psychiatrist.. not a 
psychiatrist, a psychologist 
or a therapist who is a 
Christian and the person 
they are speaking to has 
strong Christian beliefs and 
they use Christianity as part 
of the, of the resolution of 
the issue. However if they 
try that with me we would 
have an argument, it 
wouldn’t work. So they… I 
got no problem, in principal 
in them doing that, so long 
as it’s aimed with the correct 
people. The same way that a 
react very strongly to 
rationalised argument, some 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“with me”, “it 
wouldn’t 
work” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did not 
differentiate 
between religion 
and spirituality. 
Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rejecting religion 
and spirituality in 
therapy. 
 
 
 
Emphasis on 
reason and logic 
117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8: Religion and Health – Journal Notes for contributors 
 
Manuscript Submission 
Manuscripts, in English, should be submitted to the Editor-in-Chief via the journal's web-based online manuscript 
submission and peer-review system: 
http://jorh.edmgr.com 
Inquiries regarding journal policy, manuscript preparation, and other such general topics should be sent to the Editor-in-
Chief: 
Curtis W. Hart, M.Div. 
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Religion and Health 
e-mail: cuh9001@med.cornell.edu 
Tel.: (347) 752-7421 
The online system offers easy straightforward log-in and submission; supports a wide range of submission file formats [such 
as Word, WordPerfect, RTF, TXT, and LaTeX for manuscripts; TIFF, GIF, JPEG, EPS, PPT, and Postscript for figures 
(artwork)]; eliminates the need to submit manuscripts as hard-copy printouts, disks, and/or e-mail attachments; enables real-
time tracking of manuscript status by author; and provides help should authors experience any submission difficulties. 
Manuscripts should be checked for content and style (correct spelling, punctuation, and grammar; accuracy and consistency 
in citation of figures, tables, and references; stylistic uniformity of entries in the References section; etc.), as the typesetter is 
instructed to follow (accepted) manuscripts as presented. Page proofs are sent to the designated author for proofreading and 
checking. Typographical errors are corrected; authors’ alterations are not allowed. 
Books for review and inquiries about book reviews should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief at the above address. 
 www.jorh.edmgr.com 
 
Drawn towards 
rational arguments 
 
people won’t. And to try to 
force that as a helping 
strategy.  
 
A: Yes 
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Abstract 
While there is a proliferation of psychological literature on the processes of de-conversion from 
religious cults, little research attention has been given to the narratives and experiences of those 
exiting fundamentalist denominations of mainstream religions. The present study employed a 
constructivist grounded theory methodology to investigate how individuals de-convert from religious 
fundamentalism within the context of religions of the Abrahamic tradition (i.e. Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism). In-depth interviews were conducted with nine former fundamentalists living in the U.K and 
findings were organised in the two major categories of “the doubting phase” and “the de-conversion 
phase”. Results reveal that the journey out of religious fundamentalism can be understood as a gradual 
increase of unsustainable cognitive and emotional tension which resulted in a series of shifts in 
identity scripts that culminated in relinquishing religious belief. In addition, following the formation 
of new scripts which support an identity of unbelief, participants experienced contrasting emotions 
and significant difficulties with familial and social relationships. Implications for therapeutic practise 
and future research are also discussed. 
 
Keywords:  Religion, Atheism, De-conversion, Apostasy, Atheist, Atheism, Mental health, 
Psychological distress,    
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Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, the study of religious fundamentalism has seen an increased interest in both 
empirical research and theoretical conceptualisations (Adam, 2009; Phillips & Ano, 2015; Saroglou, 
2016). What constitutes religious fundamentalism is notoriously difficult to define, especially given 
the controversy regarding the negative connotations of this term and its overlap with similar concepts 
such as religious orthodoxy and extremism (Phillips & Ano, 2015). The most common definition cited 
in the psychological literature, which will also be used in the present study, is provided by Altemeyer 
and Hunsberger (1992, p.118):  
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, 
basic, intrinsic, essential, inherent truth about humanity and the deity; this truth must be 
followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and those 
who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the 
deity.   
 
Concurrently, some of the relevant literature in recent years has focused on the exit narratives of those 
who abandon mainstream fundamentalist religious orientations (Streib et al., 2011), namely of the 
Abrahamic tradition (i.e. Christianity, Islam, Judaism). This represents a significant change from the 
prevailing research foci on “apostasy” from New Religion Movements (NRM). In the sociological 
literature, “Apostasy” is the most commonly used term to describe religious de-conversion and is 
viewed as an act of political opposition which entails making a statement against the exited group 
(Bomley, 1998). In other words, an “Apostate” is someone who not only leaves the group, but who 
actively opposes it.  
Indeed, it is undoubtedly important to recognise the legitimate role of activist apostates, especially as 
it pertains to the study of exiting cults. For more mainline religions however, such a description does 
not account for personal and private de-conversions that are not politically shaded. It also does not 
attend to the ordinary men and women who de-convert independently and wish to live on decent 
terms with the members of their former religious group, as far as this is possible. Further, the use of 
the term “de-conversion”, rather than “apostasy”, avoids the almost unavoidable negative 
connotations which associate blaming the individual for a break of loyalty. De-conversion should also 
be distinguished from the terms “disengagement” and “disaffiliation” which frequently recurs in the 
sociological literature on religious exiting (Albrecht et al., 1988). Whereas the former refers to 
minimal participation in the routine activities of a religious group, the latter refers to termination of 
organisational identification with a religious group. However neither is proof of de-conversion. For 
example there are Mormons who, despite becoming inactive in the life of the church, retain an 
organisational identification with Mormonism and if asked, would define themselves as a member of 
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that church (Bahr & Albrecht, 1989). Lastly de-conversion should be differentiated from defection 
which refers to leaving one group for another (Cragun & Hammer, 2011) 
Like conversion to a religious belief, de-conversion can be viewed as a major psychological 
transition. Kirkpatrick (1992) argues that a believer’s bond with God can be understood as an 
attachment relationship resembling the attachment with the primary caregiver. He suggest that for 
many individuals who have dropped out of their religious faith, the process of losing faith can be 
accompanied by intense emotional and intellectual struggle and may be similar to the experience of 
losing a parent or partner. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) use the term “the profundity of exit” 
(p119) to distinguish between religious fundamentalists and moderates with respect to the emotional 
and intellectual distance travelled from the point of departure to the point of exit. Fervent believers 
who de-convert travel far indeed, whereas formerly moderate or nominal believers cover markedly 
less ground since their point of departure is closer to the point of exit. It is likely that the process of 
exit for the latter is less protracted and tumultuous than it is for the former, especially when we 
consider the level of social and ideological insularity provided by religious fundamentalist groups 
(Babinski, 1995). As Cottee (2014) puts it “defection is an easy process only for members and groups 
who are lightly or tangentially committed” (p56).  
In his discussion on fundamentalist Christianity, Thurston (2000) also emphasises the vital role of 
religious faith as a major constituent of identity and daily life for devout individuals.  Fundamentalist 
religious groups offer a close-knit community of believers whose interpersonal connections can be a 
psychologically powerful incentive. In contrast, they are also characterised by strong ideological 
pressures, separatist tendencies and rejection towards outsiders. Undoubtedly, one of the greatest 
challenges non-religious ex-fundamentalists face, is adapting to a life apart: not only from their 
former co-religionists but also from non religious individuals who show little interest in, or 
understanding of their situation.  
On “apostasy” from Islam, Cottee (2014) notes how ex-members may feel marginalised and silenced 
within conventional circles, or are used as a tool of social control. They are often presented as objects 
of condemnation, even demonization and coercion. The sociologist Lewis Coser (1956) argues that 
the reaction of the group can be understood in terms of a continuum between acceptance and 
resistance depending on the nature of the group and the status of the leaver. Consequently, the more 
totalistic the group and the higher the leaver is in the group the less accepting members will be.  
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Religious identity, fundamentalism and counselling psychology 
 
In the U.K counselling psychology literature there appears to be a consensus regarding the importance 
of including a client’s spiritual or religious identity in the therapeutic process (Jafari, 2016). Coyle 
(2010) discusses how counselling psychology is ideally placed to consider matters of religious 
identity and personal values, because of the emphasis on the individual in contexts and a holistic view 
of the person. Concurrently, Western concerns about the socio-political implications of fundamentalist 
Islam have raised polarised debates with strong anti-religious arguments attracting considerable 
attention. This has further encouraged some practitioners - who feel “outsiders” to religion - to share 
the representation of religious faith as an irrational defence or to regard idiosyncratic religious beliefs 
and practices as problematic (Coyle, 2010). After all, the dogmatic and oppressive approaches often 
observed in religious fundamentalism seem at odds with some of the defining features of Counselling 
Psychology which eschews dogma and encourages continuous questioning of the assumptions we 
make in our daily lives (Woolfe et al., 2007).  
 
However, Counselling psychology has a firm commitment to holism and egalitarianism that requires 
practitioners to engage respectfully and openly with clients’ meaning making systems - religious or 
secular (Nielsen & Nicholas, 2016). To do otherwise would be a failure to embody the sort of ‘being 
with’ the client that defines counselling psychology. Taking proper, respectful account of clients’ 
religious identity - or the loss thereof - is an essential part of the field’s emphasis on contextualised 
understanding. More importantly, there is empirical evidence that relinquishing deeply-held religious 
beliefs or exiting fundamentalist groups of any kind can be an emotionally strenuous transition with 
potentially adverse implications for an individual’s well being and adjustment (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992; Babinski, 1995; Streib et al., 2011) This of course does not simply mean that a 
practitioner should provide unrestrained assistance to clients who struggle to break free from religious 
fundamentalist commitments and oppressive practices. It requires, first and foremost, a willingness to 
attend to such dimensions in a meaningful way and to enter into that perhaps peculiar and unknown 
world view with unfettered openness. Understanding an individual’s meaning making system from 
their perspective can, in turn, enable a practitioner to facilitate clients’ critical reflections on their 
transition.   
 
Previous findings 
On the topic of religious de-conversion, a search of the Psychinfo and Medline databases revealed 
only a handful of studies on the psychological experience of exiting fundamentalist denominations of 
the Abrahamic tradition (Brent 1994; Davidman & Greil, 2007; Ross, 2009) all of which were 
conducted in North America.  In an Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis of exiting Christians in 
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Canada, Ross (2009) found that the majority of participants felt as if they had lost a significant 
attachment figure when they distanced themselves from God and described feeling empty, adrift, and 
alone in the aftermath of losing faith. Further, while for many participants their transition was 
ultimately characterised by a sense of relief and joy, they all struggled in one way or another with 
disruptions in their social life and relationships with family and friends. In a qualitative exploration of 
Atheists’ experiences in psychotherapy (Spyropoulos, 2015), a secondary finding also suggests that 
those who had undergone more conservative religious training in their early years, experienced 
intense intra-psychic conflict in the process of relinquishing belief.  
 
Davidman and Greil’s (2007) narrative analysis on Ultra Orthodox Jews provides valuable insight on 
how identity change occurs after de-conversion. Their attempt highlights the implications of 
abandoning an established cultural role and identity without available alternative narratives to guide 
individuals in their transition to secularism. It is notable however that their focus is more on the loss 
of one’s religion rather than on the loss of faith, thus overlooking the potential psychological 
implications of losing the relationship with God.   
 
On the other hand, Brent (1994) focuses more on the psychological process involved in his study of 
de-conversion from Protestant fundamentalism. He proposes a universal model on the process of 
leaving which comprises of seven sequential phases. However, the study exhibits some weaknesses 
the most important of which is a strict emphasis on chronology against the psychological richness of 
the data. Further, his study was conducted in the more conservative religious climate of the U.S. and 
at a time when “exit scripts” for ex-Christians were largely absent from the public sphere. Today, with 
the increasing popularity of the new Atheist movement and the proliferation of internet forums 
promoting humanism and free inquiry, this reality is beginning to change and new scripts are 
available. This might affect the psychological process and trajectories of departure from religious 
fundamentalism.   
 
The current study aims to further address the existing knowledge gap in this area by focusing on the 
process of exiting from fundamentalist groups of three mainstream religions (i.e. Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism). Thus, the current study will explore how individuals in the UK de-convert from religious 
fundamentalism.  
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Method 
 
 
Ontological and epistemological considerations 
 
With regards to epistemology and ontology, the current study adheres to constructivism for several 
reasons. Constructivism accepts that multiple realities exist and can be elucidated through researcher 
and participant interaction (Creswell, 2007). The way individuals relate to their religious convictions 
and the way the loss of religious faith is experienced, is arguably a deeply personal and subjective 
phenomenon. Therefore, the constructivist paradigm guides the present study whereby the participants 
are the experts on their lived experience but also recognises the role of the researcher in 
“constructing” interpretations of these experiences. Further, phenomena such as divine worship or 
religious doubt occur within social life and religious people often draw on a shared language, rules 
and norms embedded in specific historical and cultural contexts. The understanding of de-conversion 
- like the understanding of conversion - depends on the characteristics of the religious field in a 
specific culture at a specific point in time. Thus, an appreciation of the complexity of the phenomenon 
under study requires a shift from the positivist notion of creating a general abstract theory towards a 
construction of knowledge that is contextually situated, interpretive and sensitive to particular social 
circumstances. To do otherwise might foster oversimplification.   
 
In keeping with the constructivist philosophical underpinnings of the study, the method employed will 
be constructivist grounded theory as described by Charmaz (2014). Grounded theory is ideal for 
developing a theoretical understanding of the psychological processes involved in life transitions. 
Through the use of inductive rather than deductive methods, researchers can gain conceptual 
understanding of a phenomenon based on specific instances rather than on a priori general theories 
and assumptions (Fassinger, 2005). Such preconceptions may undermine the impact of contextual 
differences and do not do justice to the unique way people respond to problematic situations and 
shape their world around them though social interaction. On this account, even though grounded 
theory paradigms can range from a postpositivst ideology to constructivist and critical ideology, 
Ponterotto (2005) firmly argues for a constructivist/interpretivist perspective. This is consistent with 
the philosophical underpinnings and aims of the current study which intends to remain true to the 
contextual and ideographic exploration of the phenomenon and preserve the uniqueness of individual 
participants’ stories.  
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Recruitment 
In grounded theory methodology, data is gathered and analysed simultaneously while sampling 
decisions are determined on whether the data contributes to the emerging theory (Charmaz (2014). 
For the current study, this meant that sampling was theoretical and cumulative, without a 
predetermined sample size. The discontinuing of participant recruitment was based on the principle of 
theoretical saturation, as described in the “Data Collection and Analysis” section. 
 
The research was advertised through the British Humanist Association (BHA) which is actively 
engaged in organising support groups for ex-religious fundamentalists across the U.K. The BHA 
emailed a comprehensive participant information sheet to the mailing lists of these groups. Candidates 
who expressed interest were given an opportunity to ask questions about the research before signing 
an informed consent form, in advance of the interview. Candidates who expressed interest and were 
invited to take part had to meet the eligibility criteria of identifying as ex-religious fundamentalist of 
one of the three mainstream religions (i.e. Christianity, Islam and Judaism). This inclusion criterion 
was dependent on each participant’s subjective personal identification, but in all cases participants 
were part of a religious sect or denomination which adheres to the study’s description of a religious 
fundamentalist group. Further their previous religious identification is also recognised as 
fundamentalist by the existing literature (e.g. Mormonism, Jehovah’s Witness, Islam-Wahhabism). 
For candidates who met the eligibility criterion, a time was arranged for the interview that was most 
convenient for them. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
All participants were interviewed via skype for convenient purposes using a semi-structured format. 
Semi-structured interviews are a highly exploratory method which facilitates the emergence of rich, 
deep and contextualised data regarding the psychological and social world of the respondents 
(Ashworth, 2009). Interviews lasted approximately 1.5 hours.  Notably, I was aware that emphasis on 
building trust and rapport with the participants was warranted as the more impersonal nature of a 
conference call (compared to face-to-face interaction) was likely to add some initial constraints in this 
respect. During the interviews a conversational tone was maintained combined with the use of 
primarily open-ended questions to encourage unanticipated accounts. Variations of the questions of 
the interview schedule (Appendix C) were used or were spontaneously addressed as part of each 
participant’s account. The semi-structured interview protocol was developed following a review of 
studies related to life transitions, identity change and in combination with Charmaz’s (2004) 
recommendations on interview questions about a life change.  
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After initial interviews were transcribed, open coding was applied, whereby initial codes were 
designated to text units (i.e.  phrases or sentences). These first codes were provisional and remained 
very close to the data to facilitate theoretical openness and fluidity (Charmaz, 2014). In the focused 
coding phase of the analysis, the most significant and frequent codes were used to sift through larger 
amounts of data. Once the adequacy of those codes was verified, more conceptual codes were used to 
synthesize and explain larger data segments in individual transcripts and across participants.  
 
In accordance with the methods of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014), additional avenues of inquiry 
relied on each participants’ unique testimony which generated questions, hunches, and ideas that 
surfaced during the ongoing process of data analysis and theory development. Data from the later 
interviews were then analysed within the framework of the emerging categories and themes, whilst 
being alert to data that did not fit into any of the existing categories or which suggested a new 
dimension or attribute of that category As preliminary categories begun to form, new properties and 
leads from subsequent interviews also emerged. When several middle-order categories emerged, these 
were grouped together were appropriate and then into two higher order categories.  Dimensions of 
each middle-order category were developed to take account of the codes and properties of each 
dimension. Eventually no new dimensions were discovered and saturation of the categories appeared 
to be complete. 
 
Participants  
The final sample consisted of 9 individuals (6 women and 3 men) whose age ranged from 22 to 65 
years old.  Four participants were married, three were unmarried and two were divorced at the time of 
the interview. Eight participants had achieved university education, one had attained high school 
education and one was attending university at the time of the interview. All participants but two came 
from a religious home and had a religious upbringing. The experiences that participants disclosed 
occurred between 3 months and 40 years prior to the interview. This fact potentially influenced 
participant’s accounts in different ways. It became apparent that those who had transitioned relatively 
recently, felt less challenged to recount a more detailed and nuanced description of events and 
experiences than the two participants who had transitioned over a decade ago. On the other hand, a 
more recent experience of events might also mean less opportunity and time to reflect and process 
their impact in a meaningful way. Seven participants identified their ethnic background as Caucasian 
and 2 as Middle Eastern. With regards to their previous religious identification there were 2 Muslims, 
3 Pentecostal Christians, 2 LDS Mormons, 1 Evangelical Christian and 1 Jehovah’s Witness (Table 
1).     
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Trustworthiness 
In keeping with the constructivist foci of the current study, the primary consideration for assessing the 
quality of the results will not be based on the level of abstraction or generality, but on whether they 
can provide a rich conceptual analysis of the phenomenon (Charmaz, 2014) - in this case, of de-
converting from religious fundamentalism. More specifically, results were considered on the basis of 
their credibility (i.e. categories cover a wide range of empirical observations and are grounded in the 
data), originality (i.e. categories offer new insights and theoretical significance), resonance (i.e. results 
make sense to participants and portray the fullness of their religious transition) and usefulness (i.e. 
interpretations that advance our understanding and can inform therapeutic practice with this particular 
group).  
Several levels of credibility checks were imposed in our study to ensure the rigor of scientific findings 
(Morrow, 2005). First, participant checking was used to increase the reliability of the data and the 
accuracy of the findings. Respondents were asked questions at the end of the interview to check that 
the responses were thorough. I also refrained from using leading or closed questions before the 
interviewees had the opportunity to reveal and clarify their own perspective. Further, respondents 
received a summary of the final results and were asked to provide feedback or suggestions. Only 4 
participants contacted me with feedback regarding the results.  
 
To increase authenticity and credibility of findings several field notes were kept along with memos, 
descriptions in emails by participants and a reflexive journal along with interview data. One of the 
aims of the journal was to elucidate any assumptions or preconceptions which might be unconsciously 
imposed on the data, and to aid the bracketing process (Tufford & Newman, 2012). However, keeping 
a journal may not be wholly successful in this regard because, due to its private nature, writing alone 
may not bring any preconscious assumptions into awareness. Therefore, I also conducted a 
preliminary bracketing interview with another counselling psychology trainee, with the aim of 
elucidating assumptions and feelings in relation to the interview topic of religious de-conversion. The 
same peer provided feedback regarding the creation of categories and the subsequent data analyses for 
a period of approximately 40 days. This procedure of investigator triangulation limits the potential 
bias that may occur when data are analyzed by a single researcher. In addition, feedback and guidance 
on the use of grounded theory methodology was obtained from my research supervisor. Further, 
throughout my research, I maintained an audit trail of the data gathering and applied processes. This 
trail consisted of annotated transcripts, summation sheets and e-mail exchanges with participants, 
memos and notes of themes, dimensions and categories. 
 
,  
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Ethics 
The current study was carried out in accordance with BPS (2011) and HCPC ethical guidelines 
(2012a). Due to the sensitive nature of the data, it was deemed necessary for the study to obtain 
ethical approval from the University of Surrey ethics committee. The process of obtaining informed 
consent consisted of three sequential elements: the information sheet; the telephone conversation 
during which the study was explained and the potential participant was given an opportunity to ask 
questions and seek clarification; and a review of the information sheet and consent form (Appendix) 
prior to the interview. At each stage of the consent process, I emphasized the voluntary nature of 
participation.  
Participants were reminded before the interview of their right to decline to answer any question, to 
change topics, to request a break, or to withdraw from the interview at any point. This offered the 
participants a level of control over the interview process, in order to mitigate any emotional distress 
they might experience. In the few occasions where participants became visibly upset or tearful during 
the interview, I conveyed verbal and nonverbal empathy. If a sensitive topic arose that was tangential 
to the loss of faith (such as the loss of a loved one), I acknowledged the topic but did not probe for 
further information. Participants were also given the contact details of the research supervisor should 
they have any concerns and of a confidential support line should the research interview create any 
distress. Finally, a debriefing was carried out to allow participants to discuss any personal concerns 
that may have risen from the interview. To ensure confidentiality and protect participant anonymity, 
participants were presented using a pseudonym and background information (such as names of towns 
or churches) was omitted or altered where necessary. The audio recordings and raw, unedited 
transcripts were stored in password-protected electronic folders. After transcription was completed, 
only edited transcripts were kept as data on my computer.  
 
Findings 
Two core categories or phases emerged from the data which represent a general outline of the 
dynamic de-conversion process from religious fundamentalism. These were: (1) the doubting phase; 
and (2) the de-conversion phase. Within these two categories several sub-categories emerged as 
illustrated in Table 2. The analysis presented offers a description of the exiting pattern which does not 
consist of a set of discrete stages in the formal sense, especially given that there is considerable 
overlap or interweaving between them and a person may be in more than one phase at a time.  
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Table 1. Participants’ self-reported religious identification 
Participant Self-reported religious identification 
Peter LDS (Latter-day Saints) Mormon 
Allan LDS (Latter-day Saints) Mormon 
Suzan Muslim  
Kate Muslim 
Lisa Pentecostal 
Anna Pentecostal 
John Pentecostal 
Carol Jehovah’s Witness  
Mel Evangelical 
 
Table 2. Core categories and sub-categories 
Core Categories Sub-Categories 
The Doubting Phase i.   Types of doubts  
a. Epistemological doubts 
b. Moral doubts 
c. Practical doubts 
ii.  Pathways to doubt 
iii. The phenomenology of  doubt 
iv. Exploring doubts 
a. Dissatisfaction 
b. Dissonance 
The De-conversion Phase i.   Disengagement 
ii.  Disavowing the faith 
a. Crossing over 
b. The phenomenology of disavowal 
c. Coming out 
iii. Readjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
The Doubting Phase 
The process of de-converting began with a feeling that something “isn’t right” or that it “doesn’t 
make sense”. All participants felt a stab of doubt or multiple stabs of doubt at different times and with 
different intensity, but in a cumulative sequence which varied from person to person.   
 
I. Types of doubt 
 
a. Epistemological doubts 
A lot of the participant’s doubts centred on the epistemological claims of their religion about how the 
world is or came to be. For Kate, a 22 year old ex-Muslim, it was the very existence of God and his 
human-like attributes that she doubted from the start:  
“I think from the beginning there were certain things like for example the concept of someone 
being in the sky just watching how I live my life... and also that God is sort of like a human 
with human characteristics but he's also a god... that didn't sit well with me” 
For the majority of respondents, their epistemological concerns were also about the unjustified misery 
and arbitrary injustice in the world which cast doubt on the existence of an intervening and benign 
creator. Another type of epistemological doubt focused on the creation story of their religion which 
some participants did not find believable. For many, this was a direct consequence of their exposure 
to evolutionary theory which, if true, would mean that their religious creation story couldn’t be. 
Working this out however was often a protracted process, as Peter explains:  
“So when I started with evolution just out of curiosity it became point to me that it was the 
case that’s how human beings came here. However at the time I managed because it wasn’t 
significant enough in terms of material, there wasn’t enough contradictory material. I 
managed to find a way to have some sort of nuanced belief where evolution is true but 
Mormonism is still true too.”   
 
b. Moral doubts: 
For all participants, other types of doubt centred on the morality of religious teachings or prohibitions, 
including the oppression and unfair treatment of women, their church’s view on homosexuality, 
abortion and the punishment for unbelief. As a young philosophy student, Suzan frequently pondered 
on these issues: 
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“The Koran is basically saying the damage of property, marital rape and the murder of 
children in a religious context by a religious individual cannot be questioned. This doesn't 
make sense. At the time I was thinking that if you get killed as a child how is it fair that you 
are not going to Heaven.” 
 
c. Practical doubts 
A small number of participants reported that they had experienced doubts over the practical or rational 
utility of various religious commands and ceremonies. Suzan for example expressed her frustration as 
she discussed her love for the arts which she wasn’t allowed to engage with as a teenager because “it 
didn’t fit with becoming a Muslim lady”.  
Similarly, Allan found himself feeling perplexed by the impractical or nonsensical nature of many of 
the recurring rituals of the Mormon Church. These doubts in turn had the consequence of amplifying 
his epistemological reservations about an all-knowing God:  
“The Mormon temple and all the ceremonies are a little bit crazy. Actually the thing I 
objected to the most was time wasted, and you know the temple’s purpose is to baptize dead 
people and get their salvation sorted out. I was sitting there every time thinking there has got 
to be a more efficient way to get through all these dead people, like God can come up with a 
smarter way, it was a contradiction. I just could not understand God in that process. It 
instigated serious doubts to the whole god knows what he's doing sort of thing.” 
 
II. Pathways to Doubt 
Even though for all participants the spectre of doubt was a constant presence in their lives, most were 
also able to identify a trigger or triggers which ignited reflection on assumptions that were taken for 
granted or remained unexamined in the past. Events such as the death of a loved one, the discovery of 
infidelity, the experience of sexual and physical abuse, the diagnosis of a terrible illness or simply the 
discovery of information that was inconsistent with their beliefs, were incidents that provoked 
emotional turmoil and rumination on fundamental existential questions. For Lisa, the ground breaking 
event was the death of her teenage crush who was suffering from kidney failure. She recalls how 
devastated and angry that made her feel: 
“so when he died I was absolutely devastated beyond belief. I went to church and I was really 
sad about losing Kevin and they told me that he was going to hell for eternity and that was the 
absolute truth because he did not know the lord and did not welcome the Lord into his life. 
And I just thought this is outrageous how can you say to me that this lovely man is now 
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screaming in pain somewhere in some fiery horrible place after having lived through a lot of 
pain towards the end. I was absolutely knocked sideways by it really but I still carried on 
going but that's when the doubt started really setting in.” 
For Carol and John, the decisive cause was their realisation of their gay identity. Carol realised she 
was attracted to women from a very young age. Although she felt a strong desire to explore her sexual 
identity, she knew that as a member of the Jehovah’s Witness church “if you speak about these things 
out loud then everybody is going to know it and you are going to be exposed”. 
In contrast, for Peter, it was his exposure to alternative ways of thinking through science that sparked 
his inquiring mind and made him question the validity of the Mormon doctrine.  Mel on the other 
hand described that her doubts came into focus when she was exposed to a different lifestyle during 
her university years: “that’s where it all started and that was to do with experiencing, been taken out 
of the bubble that I was in and away from my constant indoctrination”.  
For some respondents it was also the feeling of spiritual emptiness and alienation which led them to 
further explore their doubts. A sense that their faith or church experience was no longer satisfying or 
fulfilling. As Allan indicates:  
“So that's when the real questions came in to say what are we doing here every Sunday. The 
church is telling me that I am supposed to be feeling this and doing this and you know this is 
the only way to happiness and here I am every Sunday and I'm not happy.”  
 
III. The phenomenology of doubt 
For most, the experience of emerging and intensifying doubts was deeply unsettling. A common 
reason for this was the fear of terrible suffering and torture in the afterlife. John, who had risen to a 
leadership position in his Pentecostal church, described in length how he struggled for years with the 
“absolutely excruciating fear and anxiety that if you doubt at all you will end up in hell”. Lisa 
remembers that even as a young child she had a lot of doubts but it wasn’t until her teenage years 
when she realised that having doubts in the Pentecostal church comes at a price:  
“Pentecostal church is so hell, fire and brimstone and I can remember our pastor telling 
stories about someone who had taken Communion even though he had doubts in his heart and 
he was struck dead on his front doorstep by God. I can clearly remember these stories and 
thinking oh my god this is so scary I don't want to go to hell for eternity and there is no way 
out.”  
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An equally potent and no less common source of anxiety was fear of social ridicule and rebuke. For 
John and Carol, expressing their doubts on the issue of homosexuality was not an option as it would 
very likely result in them being ousted and scorned for their gay identity. Carol was able to find a 
confidant in another female member of the congregation who was gay. For John however, the guilt 
and fear of being discovered was overwhelming and so dealing with his doubts was a terribly lonely 
process. 
In contrast to the above picture - for Peter and Suzan - being open and transparent about their initial 
reservations was met with acceptance by their close relatives. Although in both cases it was their 
immediate family who fiercely resisted when they de-converted, they felt that they could openly share 
their initial doubts with them. Notably, for them and Allan, the fear of divine punishment or social 
rebuke for doubting their faith were present but were not their primary concern. It was the potential 
suffering from losing their relationship with God, as Suzan describes:  
“It was psychological torture because I was trying to believe in him while thinking that God 
was stopping me from believing and it's heartbreaking because you love God. It's like a 
personal relationship so you are scared of losing that personal relationship. I was deeply, 
deeply scared of losing that comfort I've got.” 
 
In similar fashion, Peter discussed his fear of “information” that could cause a severe disruption in all 
aspects of his life if his doubts about his faith were affirmed:  
“My faith was everything to me. Literally everything. You know, you are at a point where it’s 
like, you know you could lose your job, you could lose your health but you are still fine 
because you have god and the truth and so on. Everything is subordinate to this religious view 
point” 
  
IV. Exploring doubts 
All participants embarked on a journey in search for clarity and illumination. More importantly they 
were looking for reassurance and security in their belief. Peter described this common experience 
when asked what his intentions were:  
“In fact in the beginning I was 100% sure that I would remain believing. The irony is that I 
had doubts but there were no doubts that I would still be believing after I’d gone through 
that.” 
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a. Dissatisfaction 
Some went in search for answers by delving into scripture or searching on-line for relevant material. 
Alternatively, they sought people from their church or mosque, people who they perceived as more 
knowledgeable about the teachings of their religion than themselves.  Despite their efforts, probing 
had the unintended consequence of intensifying rather than clearing up their original doubts. As Suzan 
remembers: 
“So I started literally opening the Quran going through it with a notepad taking notes and 
trying to understand it what I wanted to do is look at the verse look at what's behind that look 
at how it fits with today and what is the moral lesson to be gained from it that sort of stuff and 
double checking that nothing contradicts anything else and I didn't even make it through 
Bukhara because there are so many freaking contradictions there are so many freaking 
inaccuracies.” 
Like several others, Kate engaged in discussions many times but her questions often attracted pleas 
for silence because as she explains “they used to tell us you should never question God” and even 
when she insisted she either felt “completely shut down” or was told that “as humans we are not 
capable as God is to know the answer to those questions”.  
As a young wife and mother, Anna too engaged vigorously with reading the Bible to try and make 
sense of some of the inflammatory messages of her faith, especially with regards to the treatment of 
women and parenting. One memory is particularly vivid: 
“A particular one I remember and they were many other that were ridiculous to me was... I 
think it is in Joshua 22.26 where the Arc becomes unsteady and someone reaches their hand 
to steady it and he gets killed by his father and I just thought what the fuck I wouldn't do that 
to my child”.  
When she eventually sought answers from the Elders of her Pentecostal church she was met with 
“blank stares” and “awkward silences” which made her think: “It was just easier to ignore it 
altogether and move away from that thinking something's wrong here, I have asked the wrong thing”.    
As a leader and an established member of his congregation for over 40 years, John was often regarded 
as the go-to person for clarifying scriptural discrepancies. He too however would find himself 
struggling periodically with the available interpretations:  
“The doubts were coming and going differently at different times so I would have periods 
where I would trust my doubts a bit more but still wouldn't quite leave the faith and there 
were times where I dealt with them through scripture” 
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b. Dissonance 
After their probing exacerbated existing doubts or revealed new ones, the voice of doubt progressively 
became more insistent and emboldened. Up until this point, most respondents had explored their 
doubts through mostly pro-religion sources and with the intention of reigniting their faith. This time 
however, they started subjecting their religious teaching to greater critical scrutiny and would 
deliberately expose themselves further to points of view or sources which previously were mostly 
avoided as propaganda. As Mel puts it: 
“...and then all these little lightbulbs all going on within a few weeks of each other made me 
realise that I had never looked at the atheist argument. When I had questions I like 
automatically went to Christian apologetics or my own interpretation, or my own like 
rationalisations or whatever. And it seemed... suddenly complete obvious, an obvious 
oversight to never have read Richard Dawkins.”  
The “rationalisations” Mel speaks of was a way to alleviate the mental discomfort caused by 
discovering information which contradicted her religious beliefs and values. Most respondents 
periodically employed this effective tactic to manage the cognitive dissonance and achieve internal 
consistency. It was a way to make “the unexplainable explainable within the Christian framework” as 
Anna concluded. A kind of “mental gymnastics”or “cherry picking” according to Allan and Kate.   
Lisa had an analogous experience when she decided that:  
“I just don't believe in hell and you don't go to hell for your sins but I do believe in God. So I 
kind of went to I still believe in God but I kind of think he doesn't know everything we do and I 
don't think he is actually that interested in us”.  
Even though his research was telling him that the Mormon Church wasn’t true, Allan was desperately 
trying to “make it work” for him but also for the sake of his wife and parents who were devout 
Mormons and had close ties with the Mormon community. This is how he reflected on his own 
process:  
“so I was addicted to following the delineation over the Mormon stories podcast because his 
journeys reflected my journey of what I wanted and you know you were just hoping that the 
next podcast there would be something that put you in comfort that Mormonism is ok... that 
there are great things about Mormonism and there are things about it that are true, or 
listening to people how they make Mormonism work for them as a spiritual advantage to 
them. So I was just piling through these podcasts like every second I could, but I had great 
anxiety, I had to run often I had to jog to listen and to expel energy because I was so anxious. 
If I didn't run I had to walk around in circles or find a private place and listen so I wouldn’t 
be discovered”. 
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For some this phase was so tumultuous that it left them feeling mentally drained and almost schizoid: 
sceptic the one minute, believer the next. It instigated a torturous and self-perpetuating cycle of doubt 
and belief. As Peter remembers: 
“Oh it was the worst thing I have ever experienced in my life, without a doubt. So I was 
awake one night walking around my house and I was recording and the recording kept 
jumping back and forth between belief and disbelief. I was like what if this is not true and I 
could see there was some glimmer of hope but then I was like if it’s not true I can be free, 
won’t have to go to church on Sunday etc. But then oh no that can’t be the case, no that’s 
definitely not right. And so I would walk around, you know, several times during that winter 
in the middle of the night in the streets, talking to myself on my mobile phone sometimes 
slipping into sort of prayers, you know, and I would say a prayer like come on God these are 
my questions, if you resolve them I will do whatever you want.” 
Amongst all respondents, John was entrapped in a similar cycle of belief and doubt for the longest 
period of time and he was desperate for it to end: 
“I wanted to find good reasons to stop this vicious circle I was in, the loop of what kind of 
Christian to be, how much to believe, what to believe all that staff constantly going around, 
around in circles constantly thinking that doesn't work then that doesn't work then that 
doesn't work but maybe that works or that works. I desperately needed to get out of that circle 
of dissonance I was.” 
 
The De-Conversion Phase 
The intensity and duration of the dissonance phase varied among respondents. It was especially 
tumultuous and prolonged for those who had previously been devout for many years, whereas for 22 
year old Suzan and Kate, it was notably less so, since their psychological investment in their religion 
was smaller. It was also intensely tumultuous for those from devout families, where the weight of 
expectations related to religious affairs was very heavy. However, reading the work of atheists and 
agnostics was a fundamentally validating experience for all. They discovered a voice with which they 
could identify. It legitimised their doubts and with their newly found self-confidence, their sense of 
guilt and anxiety began to fade. As Anna remembers:   
“I read the God Delusion and Hitchens who I had never heard of before. The main thing I 
think is that I stopped feeling afraid. I think I just felt free. I felt more free than I ever had 
reading the Bible.” 
138 
 
 
I. Disengagement  
For all respondents, disengaging both physically and emotionally was a gradual process and began 
before the point of de-conversion. Regardless of the strength of their initial belief, they all went 
through an estrangement from their faith, sometimes dropping in and out of belief or even trying 
different churches and by the time they came to renounce their faith, they had reached a point of 
almost complete estrangement from it. This spiritual alienation was reflected outwardly in their 
behaviour and came in various forms and with mixed feelings. Kate for example, referred to her 
disinvolvement as her “angry period” and this is how it played out:  
“I was moving further and further away from it. I had a few boyfriends, I was partying, kind 
of going on a rebellious route I think because I was just so angry that I wanted to do 
everything I was told not to”.  
Some gradually felt it was becoming intolerable to pray, attend sermons or read scripture. Allan felt 
“repulsed reading scripture”. Others like Peter, Allan and Suzan started involving themselves only 
when they had to or when it would have been unreasonable not to because they didn’t want to raise 
suspicion. Carol’s case sharply illustrates just how difficult and draining this process can be especially 
considering her experience of separation from the outside world as a Jehovah’s Witness:  
“And this female friend of mine we were together in this with one foot in and one foot out 
although we didn't associate with anybody outside but we were very close to the perimeter so 
to speak. Even in the big meetings we used to have in the summer I always took a seat on the 
sidelines in the perimeter of the gathering. So eventually it dawned on me that I'm not part of 
the group. I'm at the assembly, watching all the people clapping and getting excited and I am 
just observing them. I'm not part of them anymore. I'm sitting here at the very far end. This 
was before my midlife crisis when I decided that this was not the life for me and I had to get 
out. It was a gradual process but by that point I felt that I wasn't part of the group. I didn't 
have any energy. I was in limbo, not part of the congregation but also not part of the world. I 
was nowhere.” 
 
II. Disavowing the faith 
After many months or even years of deliberation and rumination, participants came to realise the 
incompatibility of their situation and resolved to make a firm decision on the core issue of belief. 
Intellectually they had decided that they couldn’t go along with their religion. But they had also 
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decided emotionally, at the level of the core self and personal identification. Their religion didn’t 
speak for them or reflect how they truly felt about themselves and how they wanted to live.   
 
a. Crossing over 
For many, their decision came after an event or situation which clearly brought into focus the 
magnitude of their doubts and the futility of trying to contain them indefinitely. For example, once her 
husband had left her for another woman, Anna described how the Christian counsellor she was seeing 
broke confidentiality and shared some information with the elders of the Church. When she protested 
she was met with derision and as she explains:  
“that was the moment where I thought wake up Anna this is not real if God was real as a 
parent because he is our father there is no justice in letting that happen and why would he let 
that happen”.  
For Kate, the “catalyst” as she calls it, was her mental breakdown following her depression when she 
was 20. She repeatedly had to endure sexual and physical abuse from her “arranged” husband. The 
explanation she was offered was that her feelings were due to her waning faith. That left her feeling 
flustered and angry until she decided “that’s it, I’m done with religion”.  
A few respondents were unable to locate the exact moment at which they finally disavowed their 
faith. This self-knowledge was acquired gradually without a trigger event or a “light-bulb moment” as 
John noted. Peter used the following analogy when describing this process:  
“when I came to realise that Mormonism wasn’t true, the analogy a lot of ex-Mormons use is 
the shelf analogy. Shelves are like propositions. At the bottom you have theism, on top of 
theism you have Christianity, on top of Christianity you have Mormonism, on top of that is 
LDS Mormonism, so it’s like a stack. So when the shelf of LDS Mormonism crashed, the 
momentum of that crash kept going and so boom I wasn’t a Christian and after that boom I 
wasn’t a Theist. And so I was left with Atheism” 
 
b. The phenomenology of disavowal 
Following their de-conversion, participants reported a range of conflicting emotions from relief and 
excitement to confusion, anger or residual guilt and anxiety. For Kate, her excitement came from the 
freedom to reinvent herself and her view of the world: 
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“I remember that moment in the bus. I felt so free it was amazing. I was thinking now I can do 
whatever I want with my life. I could drink and eat whatever I wanted. I was thinking I am in 
charge now. I can start over”  
Mel felt a surging sense of freedom after months of living in a state of anxiety, uncertainty and 
conflict. She finally knew that she didn’t believe and could not identify with her religion any longer. 
Like most, knowing that felt good because it was massively clarifying.  Similarly to others however, 
her newly found freedom was often interjected with residual self-rebuke:  
“And it was like the most amazing liberation, like this big excitement of oh my God, even 
though there was this small part of my life still there beating me in the head with the guilt.” 
For months or even years after the point of crossing over, many continued to experience uneasiness 
and a lingering sense of “what if I’m wrong” as Lisa put it, even though intellectually she knew it was 
absurd. Anger was also a predominant feeling with varying intensity and duration. Their anger came 
primarily from the awareness of lost time and missed opportunities. In large part, it was directed at 
their religion because as Suzan described “I see it as having being manipulated by some guy who has 
been dead for 1400 years no less and those things got taken away”. For most however, their anger was 
also at themselves for not disavowing sooner or for accepting their beliefs in a complacent and naive 
way. This is what Anna had to say when she compared believing in God to believing in Santa Clause: 
“I am angry and I find it quite embarrassing that I don't know how on earth I went along with 
this for so long. To come to a place to realise that and to make that comparison and to admit 
that to another person you know, I don't want to seem stupid.” 
c. Coming out  
For respondents, the daunting decision to renounce their faith was taken after a prolonged and often 
agonizing period of reflection, self-questioning and self-doubt. Similarly, the decision to come out as 
a non-believer was equally daunting and agonising because it involved the feelings, sensitivities and 
reactions of others. Everyone understood that declaring disbelief meant crossing a much harder line 
than simply expressing doubt. As Suzan described:    
“The storm wasn't over I was in the eye of the storm because Muslim parents are not 
prepared for kids leaving their religion. They are prepared for kids to be sneaky they are 
prepared for the kids to drink on the slide you know, they are not prepared for someone who 
is strong in their religion to lose it.” 
This decision involved other difficult decisions such as who to tell, when and how. They chose to tell 
some people but keep it from others, either out of fear of condemnation or out of respect for their 
feeling. Hence, they were simultaneously in and out of the closet, switching between two personas. 
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“It all depended on who I was talking to” as Lisa described.  Most erred on the side of caution and 
carefully prepared their exit accounts. They sought not only to explain or justify their de-conversion, 
but also to pre-empt any possible resistance or devastating consequences. For this reason, Kate, Carol, 
Peter and Allan chose to write letters to their loved ones as a first step. For others however, using a 
cautious tone felt impossible. Coming out was more of a compulsion than a choice and this was 
reflected in their abrasive and defiant tone. John was “breaking bread and drinking wine” with his 
mother and sister and after a short reading of scripture this happened:  
“I remember having a meltdown and saying I hate God, I hate him and I cried. I said I hate 
him. If he were a person I would knife him to death. I just hate him and so all the anger and 
hate that have built up just came out so that ended the meeting” 
There were few instances were respondents felt supported and validated from other members of their 
congregation. This however was not the case for most of their devout family members. The response 
from their loved ones was almost unanimously one of shock, hurt and despair. Even for those who had 
fully expressed their doubts before. For Peter it reached a point where he was threatened to be 
excommunicated from his church. So he decided to “stay a Mormon on paper” to spare his family 
from shame and embarrassment. For some, the announcement was followed by several arguments for 
months or even years and resulted in irreparable damage to their relationships. For example, Mel’s 
mother “felt like she had lost a daughter” and 10 years later her relationship with her is still “half 
repaired”. Similarly Kate’s relationship with her sister is “non-existent” because she sided with her 
abusive ex-husband.  
 
III. Readjustment 
For all respondents, their faith gave them epistemic and moral guidance. Renouncing it meant that 
they now had to trust or evolve their own sense of right and wrong and for some, the big existential 
questions like “why am I here” and “what is my purpose” were insistent for some time. Most were 
able to find answers eventually and this was significantly facilitated by coming more into contact with 
irreligious people and scientific or irreligious source material.  Allan’s uncertainty on fundamental 
questions was the most acute at the time of our discussion:  
“Being in the bubble was great, it gives you a sense of meaning, of purpose, of foundation 
and socially as well. So now you could say I am sort of aimless, I am like a wanderer, I am 
uncommitted, I doubt myself, I don't know what really brings me joy”.  
All respondents sought the help of others, either online through blogs or by joining support groups for 
the ex-religious. They needed people they could talk with and exchange their experiences and learn 
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from. More importantly, they needed to know that there were others just like them. It helped them re-
establish a sense of community and a feeling of belonging which were lost.  
Further, all but one engaged in therapy and at different stages during their transition. Most of them 
had several therapeutic encounters. For Mel, Carol and Anna, it was years after their exit and several 
therapists later before they felt comfortable to fully disclose their experiences with their therapist.  
This is how Mel remembers it:  
“I feel like the depth that I got to with that, I had to not be a Christian in order to go as deep 
as I did on that particular counselling. As a Christian, you are kind of defending God all the 
time that’s what part of apologetics is about. You are supposed to be this example for the 
world and Jesus and you try to put on this face. But once that had gone and I could look at 
these negative beliefs Christianity had given me about myself, then I could go a lot deeper 
cause I wasn’t protecting God. Yeah it was... kind of looking back at my childhood and 
everything I went through... and I could see so much of that was influenced by the religion 
I’ve been brought up in. The guilt, you are last, turn the other cheek, you know... you are born 
in sin so you have to repent, you are born bad, your heart is black, Jesus put his red blood on 
it to clean it, ask for forgiveness.” 
Like Mel, most respondents struggled with overcoming feelings of guilt, shame and low self-worth. 
Further, Mel’s response also illustrates a common theme in participants’ readjustment. The 
importance of “recognising the manipulations” as Suzan described it: That is, recognising the ways in 
which the congregation and religious fundamentalist teachings use shame and guilt tactics to enforce 
conformity to the group. These discussions - in and out of therapy - facilitated their de-conversion in 
the sense that it categorised it and delineated it. It helped them realise who they were and how they 
were different from other people outside of the congregations. After a prolonged period of resentment 
for being subjected to “cult tactics”, some were eventually able to develop a degree of understanding 
and tolerance for religious beliefs and those who hold them.  
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to explore how religious fundamentalist of the Abrahamic tradition 
relinquish their religious beliefs and exit their religion. In order to help researchers and practitioners 
alike, it would be beneficial to situate the results within the context of identity theories that can offer 
psychologically meaningful interpretations of a relatively unfamiliar process.  
Tomkins (1987) construct of “scripts” can provide valuable insight when discussing the role of 
religion in identity and identity change. Scripts are basic organisations underlying identity and are 
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considered stable, idiosyncratic ways in which an individual perceives oneself and the world. They 
connect emotions, values and meanings with each other and determine how a person develops and 
maintains commitments. For example Mel’s view of “you are born in sin, you have to repent” or the 
shared perception of living a life of servitude to a benevolent and omnipotent God, are implicit scripts 
which encompass participants’ sense of self and guide their identity commitments.  
 
Even though scripts are considered highly resistant to change, a conflict or disequilibrium can trigger 
unpleasant emotions which often operate as the driving force behind development or a change in rigid 
scripts (Kunnen, 2006). Such conflicts may occur if a script becomes at odds with important 
information or a person does not succeed to organize their experience in a satisfying way and in 
situations that matter. In the present study, these conflicts can initially be observed in the “doubting 
phase” where participants’ doubts came more into focus following a significant event in their lives. It 
is also important to note the impact and role of fear in participants’ experience of doubts as described 
under the category “Phenomenology of doubt”. Strayer (2002) argues that fear and ambiguity can 
propel an individual to defend their current identity “scripts” through the process of assimilation and 
for the purpose of circumventing the uncertainty and turmoil of an impending identity crisis.  
 
Assimilation means interpreting the problematic situation in terms of the pre-existing script and 
requires ignoring, distorting, or denying the facts that are incompatible (Kunnen & Wassink, 2003). 
Indeed, as exhibited in the category of “Exploring doubts” most participants probed their doubts in a 
systematic way and with the intention of clarifying them and securing their beliefs once again.  
Respondents frequently researched apologetics and scripture or sought out the explanations of others 
in an effort to assimilate the information threatening their faith. The “rationalisations” or “mental 
gymnastics” can be understood as efforts to incorporate the dissonant information within the existing 
scripts and resolve the tension. In other instances, assimilation took the form of ignoring the 
discrepant information as was the case with Anna when her objections were not met with satisfactory 
responses.  
While assimilation can be used to resolve conflicts for prolonged periods, ultimately, it may lead to a 
build-up of neglected or distorted aspects (Kunnen & Wassink, 2003). As a result, the pressures on 
existing scripts become insurmountable and the individual cannot tolerate any longer the distressing 
emotions of failing to organise their experience according to their scripts. In these instances, Kunnen 
and Wassink (2003) note that withdrawal and accommodation are left as way out. Withdrawal is the 
tactic by which the individual attempts to escape the conflict by abandoning or altering their 
commitments but not the underlying organisation. This response is also clearly represented in the 
results under the sub-category of “disengagement” where participants decreased their level of 
involvement in their practices of their faith as a way to escape their script-conflicting perceptions. 
Withdrawal however is far from optimally satisfying as was evident in participants’ accounts. 
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According to Kunnen and Wassink (2003) when someone withdraws, either the conflict returns in 
some way or it will seriously decrease the individual’s capability to interact with their environment.  
Ultimately, all participants underwent accommodation of their religious scripts as they transitioned 
from belief to unbelief. Lisa’s rejection of the dreaded concept of hell after prolonged deliberation and 
while still believing in God, is one example of the breakdown of the assimilation process and the 
beginning of accommodation. Interestingly, the accommodation of scripts is typically observed as a 
sequence of modifications and may not adequately represent the extremeness of a complete change in 
scripts, as was in most cases after participants disavowed their faith. Kunnen and Wassink’s theory 
(2003) of identity change in adulthood fails to distinguish accommodation from a total breakdown and 
reformation of scripts. It also highlights that accommodation of old scripts are replaced by others that 
are psychologically superior. Preceding this, the individual obtains an increased awareness of how the 
existing scripts result in painful experiences and engages in discovery of irregularities and conflicting 
components. The final component of script reformation implies confrontation of the primary emotion 
such as fear or shame and a re-experiencing of freedom and strength when the new accommodated 
script is applied.  
The above components were notably evident in the way participants accounted for their transition to 
secular identity scripts. However, as was described in the sub-categories of “the phenomenology of 
disavowal” and “readjustment”, the liberation and empowerment respondents felt following their de-
conversion, did not preclude them from re-experiencing residual distressing emotions such as guilt 
and anxiety or uncertainty about existential issues and life’s purpose. This suggests that the process of 
consolidation to new and secular identity-defining scripts can be protracted, tumultuous and does not 
always follow a series of sequential steps in a straightforward way. This was also evident by the fact 
that most respondents felt the need to process their experiences and difficult feelings through therapy 
for months or years after their “liberation” from their religious identity and commitments.  
 
Further, Kunnen and Wassink’s theory (2003) assumes that the new scripts are superior in that they 
represent “greater flexibility” and “a more mature mode of psychological functioning” (p.349). This 
assumption received partial support by this study. Some participants described that as unbelievers 
they had become more alert to biases and dogmatism, and more open to diverse points of view. Even 
though they went through a time of resentment and frustration about their religion, they eventually 
were able to develop empathy for the members of their congregation. In contrast, some participants at 
the time of the interview had developed scripts about religion that were strict and inflexible (e.g. that 
it resembles a cult). This level of inflexibility was perhaps not permanent.  
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As noted earlier, a relationship with a deity can resemble the attachment observed in romantic or 
parent-child relationships (Cicirelli, 2004). Even though this was partially observed in a few 
instances, several participants did not seem to experience God as an attachment figure with a 
particularly close emotional connection. For instance only 3 participants spoke of a reliance on God 
for comfort and hope when dealing with adversity. Suzan and Peter both described experiencing 
despair, confusion and isolation for their loss of belief in God. According to Shear and Shair’s (2005), 
the loss of an attachment figure is often accompanied by such feelings of desolation and uncertainty 
as well as by losing one’s assumptive world.  
 
Implications for therapeutic practice 
Based on participants’ accounts and theoretical literature, several inferences can be drawn for 
therapeutic practice. Unsurprisingly, participants valued general therapeutic factors such as 
acceptance, empathic understanding and support in a safe environment which allowed them to process 
conflicting values and beliefs.. Practitioners should be mindful of where clients are situated in terms 
of their transition and pace therapy based on their readiness and willingness for change. For clients in 
the early stages of their transition, interventions could prioritise managing doubt and self-compassion 
for dealing with potential surges of guilt and shame.  When new scripts and beliefs are being 
consolidated, Basseches (1997) highlights the role of therapists in facilitating the client monitor and 
practice integrating new scripts in everyday thoughts and behaviours. Helping clients discover and use 
their inner resources for emotional regulation and self-acceptance might be equally important given 
their lost status as “a protected child of God” which provided security and an external locus of 
evaluation (Rogers, 1959).  
If a client is struggling with unprocessed feelings of loss and grief, therapeutic work can proceed from 
a bereavement framework (Sbarra, & Hazan, 2008), whereby a direct stance can be avoided in favour 
of a more validating and empathic one. Helping clients identify positive ways in which their 
experience shaped their current identities might be especially valuable for clients who exhibit strong 
negativity and anger towards their former religious identification. Finally, as participants revealed, 
clients might present with concerns regarding social relationships such as conflicts with family 
members, marital problems or social isolation. Interventions how to negotiate and redefine 
relationships more appropriately, can assist clients resolve or cope with such issues. In addition, 
practitioners can encourage clients to seek practical and emotional support from support groups for 
ex-fundamentalists, relevant literature and on-line resources.  
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Limitations and future research directions 
There are several limitations to this study. All participants had completed university education. This 
could mean that these results could represent the experience of a smaller, well educated subgroup of 
people who transitioned from religion. Furthermore, 7 out of 9 participants had already adopted a firm 
commitment to an atheistic world view and were no longer actively part of the ex-fundamentalists 
support groups they were recruited from. This bias towards firmly committed atheists may have 
excluded those who have relinquished their faith but are still struggling without having reached yet a 
new identity commitment. A larger representation of such individuals might have yielded further 
information regarding the different trajectories after de-conversion.  
 
On this vein, future research might seek to interview former fundamentalists who took on a more 
liberal interpretation of their religious beliefs and commitments. There could be significant 
differences in the experiences of those who after abandoning their fundamentalist beliefs, maintained 
faith in God or a higher authority. For similar reasons, it is important to recognise the 
underrepresentation of Muslims (2 out of 9) and lack of representation of Judaism in the current study. 
The exit narratives of fundamentalists from these religions continues to be a neglected but important 
research area especially considering that Islam is the fastest-growing religion in the U.K. (Muslim 
Council of Britain, 2017).  
 
Further, participants of this study were willing and motivated to openly share their experience, in part 
because they had already disclosed their de-conversion to the outside world. Therefore, this study 
might not be representative of “closeted” de-converters who have relinquished their religious beliefs 
privately but outwardly might still remain religiously affiliated out of protective concern for their 
families or out of fear of rejection and retaliation.  
 
Of particular note is that even though I did not disclose my personal identification with atheism, any 
participants’ assumptions about my views on religion and based on my interest in this topic may have 
influenced their accounts. For example, a researcher with moderate or strong religious beliefs might 
have influenced the findings differently (e.g. self-censoring on criticising religion, more balanced 
accounts, fewer descriptive details). 
Finally, my own preconceptions and knowledge of the topic inevitably influenced interviews 
and data analysis, despite the described measures that were taken to aid the bracketing process. For 
instance, my biases might have contributed to under appreciating participants’ accounts on the 
difficulties of adapting to the new reality of their atheist identification which I share. Similarly, our 
shared critical stance of religious teachings and “manipulations” might have fostered 
oversimplification or collusion from my part which might have deterred divergent or more nuanced 
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considerations to come to light. It is also unfortunate that I did not ask participants how my identity as 
a counselling psychology trainee might have influenced them, especially given that most participants 
spoke in length about their therapeutic experiences.    
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Appendix 1: Reflection 
When engaging with my research topic on de-conversion from religious fundamentalism I was 
presented with several personal challenges. As an outspoken atheist myself, for the past 10 years I 
have dedicated a lot of my spare time championing reason and science. At times, I have also actively 
engaged in activism against organised religion which I believe to be authoritarian by nature and 
obstruct critical thinking. My personal reading, experiences and involvement have undoubtedly 
shaped my views on religious faith and my assumptions on what my participants might have 
experienced in their journeys out of religious fundamentalism. For the purpose of adopting a more 
sensitive and unbiased approach towards my participants and data, it was essential for me to keep a 
detailed reflective journal of my preconceptions and expectations prior to engaging with my 
participants and the data. My reflections were essentially a reference point to help me raise my 
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awareness and bracket my assumptions prior and during my engagement with my participants and 
their stories.  
 
Unavoidably, as those stories began to unfold, my preconceptions also emerged, thus shaping the 
intersubjective reality in our moment to moment interaction. This was evident for example when 
attempting to restate a participant’s point to confirm my accurate understanding. At times, I also 
sensed that my probing in the form of closed questions might have been triggered by premature 
insights and personal conviction. Similarly, I found that the process of writing memos was fraught 
with the same challenges. Memo-writing was an important tool to capture my thoughts and ideas, 
make comparisons and connections between the data and crystallize questions for subsequent 
interviews. Upon later retrieval of these memos, which contained raw insights and fleeting hunches, I 
felt that perhaps my conjectures were often informed and coloured by presuppositions that were not 
grounded in the data. This led me to be more vigilant when scrutinizing coding and data against my 
own personal reflexivity.   
 
The interviews with my participants often revealed powerful stories of profound sadness and 
overwhelming confusion. At times, I was left feeling flustered or even angry on behalf of my 
participants, which perhaps was a projection of their own feelings. I could not discard however how 
some of their thoughts and feelings resonated with my own and my past experiences with religion. I 
too as a younger man had experienced a degree of disillusionment, shame and frustration in my 
personal journey from moderate religious faith to atheism. Perhaps my prior experience worked in my 
favour at times when attempting to make sense of their experience or when conveying empathy to 
encourage further elaboration from their part. It might have even helped some participants dig deeper 
in the right direction, illuminating aspects of their experience that would otherwise have remained 
hidden.  
 
However, this personal resonance that can facilitate understanding is a double edged sword that can 
put restrains on capturing nuances, hidden meanings and remaining truly open to all possible 
theoretical directions from my readings of the data. To a degree, it has inevitably shaped the analytic 
frame from which my analysis was build. It was a reminder of the existing tension between my 
participants’ world and my personal meanings. This tension was always there and difficult to resolve 
at times. It meant I had to constantly ask questions from my data, thereby challenging my own fixed 
ideas and tacit assumptions. By the end I realised that this is perhaps an inescapable struggle in 
qualitative research and a necessary constant of the co-construction process that takes place between 
two individuals. If language is what we use to form and define the empirical world, then my codes 
represent my participants’ meanings and perspectives as well as my own.  
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Finally, another particular tension I was confronted with was striking the right balance between using 
my previous findings to fine-tune subsequent data-gathering and remaining open towards each 
participant’s unique story and narrative. When creating categories which were grounded in the data 
and would subsume the meanings of different participants, several considerable variations and outliers 
would emerge. Theoretical sampling helped me identify further variations in how participants 
experienced their transition, how they struggled and how they acted or felt at different stages. Being 
selective about which data and ideas to pursue further, was a difficult task indeed, given the pressures 
and time constraints of completing my research. In retrospect, I think these pressures influenced 
significantly which categories emerged, in what detail and the level of saturation achieved in the final 
analysis. 
.. 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Consent Form 
Consent Form  
 
Study title: A grounded theory exploration of de-conversion from religious 
fundamentalism to atheism. 
 
 
 I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full explanation 
by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the study, and of what 
I will be expected to do.     
 
  I have been advised about any discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being 
which may result.  I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study 
and have understood the advice and information given as a result. 
 
  I agree to comply with the requirements of the study as outlined to me to the best of my 
abilities. I shall inform them immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind in my health or 
well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms. 
 
 
 I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, being used 
for this study and future research that will have received all relevant legal, professional and 
ethical approvals.   
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 I give consent to the interview to be audio recorded 
 
 I give consent to audio recordings being used in reports 
 
 
 I understand that all project data will be held for at least 6 years and all research data for at least 
10 years in accordance with University policy [adjust if required longer by clinical trials 
regulations, funder etc.] and that my personal data is held and processed in the strictest 
confidence, and in accordance with the {UK} Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
  I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to justify 
my decision and without prejudice. 
 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study.  I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to comply with 
the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
 
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS)       ........................................................  
Signed               ........................................................  
Date  ......................................  
 
 
Name of researcher/person taking consent (BLOCK CAPITALS)  ........................................................  
Signed                       ........................................................  
Date                           ......................................  
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Appendix 3 -: Participant Information Sheet  
 
PROJECT TITLE  
A grounded theory exploration of de-conversion from religious fundamentalism to atheism. 
 
Introduction 
My name is George Spyropoulos and I am a Doctorate student (PsychD) of Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. I would like to invite you to take part in a 
research project. Before you decide you need to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
In psychotherapy, understanding and respecting a client’s religious or atheistic identity is vital to the 
therapeutic process and has also become a question of ethical practice. While there is an abundance 
of literature on the relationship between religion and mental health, there has been very little 
research in exploring how Atheists who used to hold fundamental religious beliefs experienced their 
distancing from their religious faith. The present study aims to address this gap and hopes to provide 
new insight on the phenomenon of de-conversion from religious fundamentalism to a firm atheistic 
worldview. I would like to invite you to share your views in this respect. 
 
Am I eligible to take part in the study? 
You are eligible to participate in the study if you are an atheist who in the past belonged to a 
fundamental religious denomination of the “Abrahamic” tradition. This includes Islam, Judaism or 
Christianity.  
 
The process  
You will be asked questions as part of an interview and your answers will be audio recorded. The 
information you give will remain confidential, meaning that your name and answers will only be 
accessible to me. The information will be stored in a password-protected file in a computer at the 
University of Surrey. Research data will be kept for 10 years, in line with the University’s Code on 
Good Research Practice. The interview will be in a form of a discussion and conducted with me at a 
time and place of your convenience or via skype. It will last approximately one hour.  
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Are there any possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
In the event that you experience discomfort during the interview, we can pause and discuss any 
concerns you may have. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time without needing to 
justify your decision and without prejudice. Following the interview, an additional debriefing session 
will be offered to address potential concerns you might have. Should you require further support, 
the British Humanist Association provides a confidential support telephone line that can be reached 
at 020 73243060.      
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that this study will provide a more in-depth 
understanding of how ex-religious fundamentalists have transitioned from their deeply-held beliefs 
to embracing an atheistic world view.  
 
What will I have to do? 
If you would like to take part please contact me at georgios.spyropoulos@surrey.ac.uk  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from The Faculty of 
Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey. 
 
Complaints: 
 
Any complaint about any aspect of the study will be addressed. Please contact me (Mr. George 
Spyropoulos, e-mail: georgios.spyropoulos@surrey.ac.uk) or my supervisor (Dr Lucy Gorvin, tel. 0044 
1483 686908, e-mail: L.gorvin@surrey.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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Appendix 4 - Ethics Form 
 
Chair’s Action 
 
Proposal Ref:   
 
1240-PSY-16 
Names of Student/Trainee:  
 
 
GEORGE SPYROPOULOS 
Title of Project: A grounded theory exploration of de-conversion from 
religious fundamentalism to atheism 
  
Supervisors: Dr Lucy Gorvin 
  
Date of submission: 
 
Date of resubmission: 
6th December 2016 
 
1st February 2017 
 
 
The above Research Project has been re-submitted to the Faculty of Health and Medical 
Sciences Ethics Committee and has received a favourable ethical opinion on the basis 
described in the protocol and supporting documentation. 
 
The final list of documents reviewed by the Committee is as follows: 
 
Ethics Application Form 
Detailed protocol for the project 
Participant Information sheet 
Consent Form 
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Risk Assessment (If appropriate) 
Insurance Documentation (If appropriate) 
 
All documentation from this project should be retained by the student/trainee in case they 
are notified and asked to submit their dissertation for an audit. 
 
      
 
 
Signed and Dated: __09/02/2017_______________ 
                                   Professor Bertram Opitz 
                                         Chair, Ethics Committee 
 
 
Please note: 
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, please contact the 
Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project. 
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Appendix 5 - Interview Schedule  
- Tell me a little bit about yourself, age, occupation, family status, educational background, etc. 
- Tell me about your life as a religious fundamentalist Christian/Jew/Muslim 
- What were your thoughts and feelings about fundamentalist Christianity/Jewdeism/Islam  and 
your life as a fundamental Christian/Jew/Muslim? 
- When did you first experience doubts about your beliefs? 
- How did those doubts manifest and evolve? 
- Who, if anyone, influenced you? 
- What, if anything, influenced you? 
- Tell me about that influence. 
- Could you describe the events that led up to you distancing yourself from your beliefs? 
- What difficulties, if any, did you face?  
- What are the sources of these difficulties? 
- Are there still ongoing difficulties? If yes what are they? 
- How did you or do you manage these difficulties? What helps you, if anything? 
- How would you describe the person you were then and your life?  
- Could you describe the most important lessons you learned from this transition? 
- Tell me about your life as an atheist 
- How have your views changed now compared to then? 
- Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you during 
this interview? 
- Is there anything else you think I should know to understand your transition to atheism better? 
- Do you have any questions? 
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Appendix 6 - Additional Quotes 
1) The Doubting Phase 
  
i)  Types of doubts  
d. Epistemological doubts 
John: “And so I experienced some doubts but not a lot during those years. I think they were 
mainly in connection with... what do you call it.. contradictions from science to my religious point 
of view”. 
e. Moral doubts 
Lisa: “...and I used to question, you know... things that a lot of people question like why are all 
these awful things happening in the world and why is god allowing them.” 
 
f. Practical doubts 
.Carol:  I Hated it, getting dressed up in skirts. I just hated it. It just wasn't me, but still 3 times a 
week I had to because that's what we did”. 
 
Alan: “does God really care about that... Does he really care that you drink coffee or drink alcohol 
or have a drug that might be a great experience but not that dangerous to you...” 
ii)  Pathways to doubt 
Lisa: “In the past I just did what everyone expected and had boyfriends and that was it but the 
whole time all through my childhood when I knew who I was it cost me a lot of problems at 
church because I used to think god what if they knew what I was thinking or what I am or... you 
know I was definitely afraid of being judged by God” 
 
John:  “All the time trying to square off my scientific side of life with my religious life I don't 
know how I did that... it was like a different part of the brain it was that part of the brain and 
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there was that part of the brain very compartmentalised and I was frightened to fully immerse 
myself in my science and in my career because of that.” 
 
iii. The phenomenology of  doubt 
Allan: “Then you suddenly look around you and there are all these people you know and you 
look at the kids, they are struggling, you look at others and they're struggling and then you start 
to think why are we always doing this”. 
 
iv. Exploring doubts 
c. Dissatisfaction 
Allan: they sort of all just combined at once feeling depressed at church and suddenly like 
feeling very critical. Suddenly I was in a mood to be critical so suddenly what I am listening 
to I am starting to be critical. 
Lisa: “I was very enquiring while fully believing and I was hopeful that my church leaders 
would come back to me and say we have the perfect explanation of all of this but they never 
did”.  
 
d. Dissonance 
 
Peter: “So at that time I sort of managed to smooth it over pretty quickly, i didn’t experience 
alot of cognitive disconance then but i think what your question is leading on is in 2015 when 
I was in my intense research period I experienced an immense amount of cognitive 
dissonance. And for months” 
 
Suzan: “So I remember one time when the doubts were really serious and I was really into 
looking at things and I was buying books about the Quran and also I was reading the Quran 
but I wasn't being moved... I wasn't believing it and I was holding the Quran... I remember I 
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was holding it to my chest and I was crying my eyes out going god please please let me 
believe in this... it was such a bizarre thing to do”. 
 
Anna: I felt like I was reading 1984 by George Orwell and thinking isn't this like a thought 
crime? And I remember feeling scared reading it again, feeling scared about having my 
beliefs shattered like that 
2) The De-conversion Phase 
i.   Disengagement 
Suan: I remember once I went to this gathering and everyone was reading a passage from the 
Quran about the end of the world and the final judgement and all these people were crying... 
everyone in the audience was moved and crying and I was like no I am not crying... It was 
like a cult... like everybody was encouraging each other to cry 
 
Mel: It was... and when I tried to go back and be close to God and speak to God I’d feel 
myself sinking down. So I was like... you know I just need to carry on and enjoy myself and 
do whatever I want to. 
 
ii.  Disavowing the faith 
d. Crossing over 
Allan: It happened so quickly. Under the surface I had always had these things that didn't 
make sense to me and then the second I peeled back the cover I was like no wonder they don't 
make sense because this is not true (laughter) so that happened extremely quickly. 
 
Carol: I had left the faith mentally if you will but I was hanging on, trying to please my dad 
but then it reached a point where it was impossible any more I had to think about myself 
because if I couldn't find a reason of getting up in the morning what was the point of anything 
 
163 
 
e. The phenomenology of disavowal 
John: ... I was away and back from hell and then I would feel guilty and say sorry to Jesus and 
all of that and it was like a vicious cycle but I don't say sorry anymore I don't believe in sin 
anymore 
 
Kate: and in the bus I couldn't contain myself at that moment I was talking very, very loudly 
like excited finally that’s it but angry, also very angry, and I had enough of it and that's when 
I claimed to be an atheist.  
 
f. Coming out 
Peter: there is just something... how can I say, something very invalidating about the way 
people treat doubters on religion. You know... your doubts, your concerns are not significant, 
are not important. Uhmm... Sort of like very dismissing and invalidating and that’s what I 
experienced quite alot with the leaving members 
 
Carol: I wrote my dad a whole lot of letters trying to explain... I tried to explain why I had left 
because I knew he didn't understand even though I told him. I wrote one letter saying I was 
gay and I was leaving the congregation and that is not enough for him to understand why I am 
leaving so I spend a lot of time writing to him trying to explain why and how I was thinking 
about these things. 
 
iii. Readjustment 
Carol: So leaving with a strategy was one thing the social aspect was the other I didn't have a 
plan or a structured way of leaving of finding people of finding gay people trying out a new 
way of life without exposing the old way to anybody 
 
Suzan: one of the things that you have to do when you leave religion is you have to reassess 
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your life and one of the things that I decided is that I want to be in my family's life and look 
after my parents in their old age and be there when they died and all these sorts of things... my 
father is really struggling with that 
 
 
Appendix 7 -: Example of memo abstracts 
Expressing loss + Regret – adjustment  
Anna is describing a sense of loss, regret. “How could have I believed”?. A range of difficult 
emotions surface ranging from a sense of loss and regret to sometimes bitterness and a vengeful 
attitude. This is also true for Lisa, John and Kate. Others express their regret and shame in lighter, 
softer terms and often with humour or a chuckle (Mel, Peter). Perhaps some may not feel comfortable 
enough becoming too vulnerable with me. It may also be an indication of different levels of 
adjustment to life after religion. Mel left Christianity long ago, so did Peter, contrary to Anna and 
John. 
How do participants with a longer past investment in religion differ from those who were religious for 
a shorter period?  In relation to the overall process, the mechanisms, phenomenology etc. 
However Kate is by far the youngest (20). She is also the only Muslim so far. Comparatively she 
appears more at ease and comfortable with her short past in religion compared to older participants 
with a long religious past How does age and life experience factor in?  Perhaps recruit other 
young participants for exploring commonalities and differences  What constitutes saturation? 
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Common themes 
They all describe how they wanted to be treated as a person with legitimate concerns and doubts. 
Their narratives are themed with moral expectations, with proclaiming of what is right and what is 
wrong. They were looking for what is true (ontological claims) and what is fair (moral objections), 
They speak of obedience and questioning the status quo. All these themes are build up and 
interconnected and at the same time their sense of belonging deteriorates....   also their identity, 
worldview, sense of self. It flares their emotions and charges their relationships as they attempt to 
redefine themselves.   
Identity deteriorating  Suffering as internal conflict, suffering from relationships 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 -  Example of transcript annotation 
INITIAL CODING  LINGUISTIC FOCUSED CODING 
Remembering 
Christian past 
 
 
 
 
Investigating religious 
text to defend 
 
A: I remember going to like 
a camp, a Christian camp 
when I was about 17 and I 
became aware as the camp 
went on that in these bible 
study groups I was kind of 
holding court. I was like.... 
and everybody was staring 
at me, like really listening 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“holding court” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining 
inconsistencies 
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Making others listen 
 
Feeling proud for 
coming up with 
superior answers, 
explanations 
 
Defending religion 
while believing 
 
Feeling odd  
 
 
Being admired by 
peers 
 
 
Dissatisfied with 
answers from others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
what I was saying because I 
had gone much further with 
my thought if you like. And I 
was coming with lots of 
different ideas and different 
explanations and at that 
point still very, very 
grounded in Christianity and 
you know, still very much 
believing but it was odd 
moment of thinking 
(inaudible)... and I 
remember how the leader 
of the group asked me out 
on a date or something 
(laughter) .... and so there 
was always that something 
more I wasn’t happy with 
the pat answers if you know 
what I mean. So it was 
uhhh... 
 
B: So these ideas, was it 
your attempt to explain 
things you weren’t happy 
“because I had 
gone much 
further with my 
thought” 
 
“explanations” 
 
“very much 
believing“ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking for 
answers alone 
 
 
 
Explaining things 
her own way to 
validate beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissatisfied with 
answers from 
others 
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Feeling confused by 
answers 
Differentiating self 
from others for 
exploring answers 
 
Finding own superior 
answers within 
Christianity 
 
Comparing self to 
others 
Going more in depth 
than other people for 
satisfying answers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with the answers, was it 
that? 
 
A: Yeah, for me there were 
so many... that just, didn’t 
make sense, whereas other 
people could almost just 
accept that pat answer. And 
I was kind of like... no I’ve 
got to figure that out. So I 
figured it out in a very 
clever, intricate way within 
the Christian framework... 
without totally going against 
it but it would be a lot more 
in depth than what other 
people were going to if that 
makes sense.  
 
B: It makes a lot of sense. 
Could you elaborate a bit 
more when you say I could 
make sense of it but still 
remaining grounded within 
the Christian framework. 
 
 
 
“didn’t make 
sense” 
 
 
 
“figured”, “very 
clever”, i 
“within the 
Christian 
framework” 
“a lot more 
than other 
people” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissatisfied with 
answers from 
others 
 
 
 
Explaining things 
her own way to 
validate 
beliefs/rationalisin
g? 
 
 
Looking for 
answers alone 
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Apologetics as a 
source for answers 
 
Finding contradictions 
 
Not finding answers 
 
Necessary  
Interpreting things to 
fit 
 
Maintaining belief 
despite non-answers 
Believing in the story 
of Christ 
 
Explaining the 
unexplained to fit  
 
Acknowledging her 
own flipping. 
Labelling and 
describing the process 
 
A: Yeah... Uhmm... I mean 
you read Christian 
apologetics which is 
basically kind of taking the 
bible... and there’s loads of 
contradictions, there’s loads 
of things that don’t make 
sense, there’s loads off  
things you got to interpret 
and so... I would interpret it 
in my own way... uhmmm.... 
but it was still upheld in that 
God was real, that Jesus 
died on the cross for our 
sins or whatever uhmmm.... 
so making it... how I say it 
now is making the 
unexplainable explainable 
within the Christian 
framework... and you get 
very clever flipping, I call it 
flipping things around. You 
flip it all over and you look 
at it from a different angle 
 
 
“Christian 
apologetics” 
 
 
 
“contradictions
” 
 
 
 
“interpret” 
“it was upheld” 
 
 
 
 
“making the 
unexplainable 
explainable” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring answers 
from religious 
sources 
 
Dissatisfied with 
answers from 
others 
 
 
Explaining things 
her own way to 
validate beliefs 
 
 
 
Rationalising 
 
 
 
 
Reflecting and 
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Making sense of 
process as mental 
gymnastics 
Amused on reflection 
of her own process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finding out on her own 
 
Doing it for her own 
satisfaction 
Being critical and 
inquisitive 
Verifying claims of 
others 
 
Process as part of her 
 
 
and come up with a new 
explanation. It’s kind off like 
a mental gymnastics 
process which is quite 
interesting (laughter) 
(15:17).  
B: Yeah that makes a lot of 
sense. And when you came 
up with those explanations 
how was it for you. What 
did that do for you? 
  
A: Probably, I think because 
it was my own and no one 
was... it was for my own 
satisfaction, I wasn’t just 
accepting what someone 
else had said, I figured it out 
for myself. If someone just 
tells me, I tend to question 
it and I want to go and 
check that fact out for 
myself which is what I am 
still right now. I have to 
check it out for myself 
“I call it 
flipping” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“my own - no 
one” 
 
 
“I wasn’t 
accepting what 
someone else 
had said” 
 
 
making sense of 
on own process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking for 
answers alone 
 
 
Dissatisfied with 
answers from 
others 
 
 
Reflecting and 
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Questions at a young 
age 
 
 
Clarifying doubts 
within Christianity 
 
Incident had impact 
 
 
 
Sourcing bible to 
criticise 
 
Interpreting bible 
verse 
Explaining moral 
objections 
(laughter) 
 
B:Yeah (laughter). Alright, 
thank you for that. So let 
me ask you, when did you 
first experience doubts 
about your beliefs  
 
A:Uhmm.... Let me think... 
probably... I mean I had a 
lot of questions all through 
that period until I was 18 
but I always managed... so 
there would be doubts I 
suppose but I managed to 
figure them out within 
Christianity. I think when it 
really hit was when i went 
to Uni and it was... say the 
whole doctrine on gay 
people. So the doctrine 
there is “Love the sinner but 
hate the sin”. So you are 
supposed to like disapprove 
of, if they have sex with 
“Check for 
myself” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I had a lot of 
questions  - 
until I was 18” 
 
“managed to 
figure them out 
within 
Christianity” 
 
 
 
 
“Doctrine on 
making sense of 
on own process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions earlier 
in life 
 
 
Explaining things 
her own way to 
validate beliefs 
 
 
 
 
Moral objections  
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Assuming intention of 
others 
 
Anticipating reaction 
 
Refusing to conform to 
religious doctrine 
Criticising to justify. 
 
Explaining refusal, 
justifying 
 
Criticising – 
Characterising 
negatively  
 
Giving own answers 
through personal 
experience 
 
 
 
someone else but love them 
for who they are. And so I 
got to uni and one of the 
lads in my group was gay 
and I remember he 
wouldn’t let anyone tell me 
he was gay because he 
knew I was Christian and he 
thought i would judge him 
and... and it was kinda like I 
can’t look at him and say 
that what he is doing is 
wrong, that’s crazy 
(laughter), he can’t help 
who he is, and all that about 
eternal punishment and him 
not being able to express 
who he is, that’s ridiculous. 
And it was kind of meeting 
people who are gay or 
lesbians and thinking there 
is no way I can say that they 
are wrong, you know it was 
just stupid. 
 
gay” – “you are 
supposed” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“He thought I 
would judge 
him...” 
 
“I can’t look at 
him...that’s 
crazy” 
 
“he can’t help -  
 
that’s 
ridiculous” 
 
 
“meeting 
people” 
 
 
 
Making 
interpretations on 
scripture 
 
 
 
 
Experiencing 
conflict with 
religious 
prescriptions 
 
Criticising religion 
to justify non-
conforming 
 
Moral objections 
 
 
 
Giving own 
answers through 
personal 
experience 
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Reflective paper on the development of a Counselling Psychology identity 
 
Confidentiality statement: all identifying details for clients have been changed in this  
document, including ages, names etc. 
 
Introduction 
“If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a 
different drummer. Let him step to the music he hears however measured or far away.” 
        Henry David Thoreau. 
Thoreau’s words always held a special place in my heart, like a personal mantra of sorts. In my 
reading of his metaphor, Thoreau’s poses a challenge. It is a call to rise above the ordinary. To change 
the world by daring to be different and accepting difference in others. The human psyche functions on 
an individual level and if a person does not follow or conform to a norm, it is merely because that 
person is unique or has a different calling; they hear a different drummer. These words are a reflection 
of my personal values and they capture many of the struggles that I have come across throughout my 
life and in my professional training. This paper is my attempt to reflect on this journey.  
 
My journey of personal and professional transformation began 9 years ago. As the chief financial 
analyst of Microsoft in Greece, my self-worth was inextricably bound by having a high-status Job that 
offered me financial security and stability. It wasn’t long before that reality slowly began to change 
and one thing was becoming abundantly clear: I was profoundly unhappy. I was trying to march to the 
beat of the wrong drum. I was lacking meaning and soon my engagement with my work and the world 
around me started to suffer. I waded through months of confusion and introspection, reading self-help 
books while grinding the everyday routine in quiet desperation. I remember realising that the aspects 
of my work I found rewarding had very little to do with amending budgets, tax compliance or 
financial analysis. It was my relationships with people and how they had shaped me as a person and as 
a professional. How I had grown through others and how I, as a manager, had in turn contributed to 
others exceeding their limits and fulfilling their potential. Thus began my fascination with 
understanding how the process of change through relationships comes about. Unknowingly, this was 
perhaps the beginning of my journey to counselling psychology.  
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“Being-in-relation” 
It wasn’t until my first year as a Counselling Psychology trainee when I started to gain a deeper 
appreciation of how the relationship can be a valuable agent of healing and growth. I was deeply 
inspired by the humanistic tradition. Its focus on individual search for meaning and understanding 
resonated with me deeply. The idea of engaging with one’s subjective experience for the purpose of 
enhancing their self-determination and fulfilling their potential. These ideas are at the core of what I 
stand for, of how I perceive a life worth living but was unable to articulate adequately until then. The 
humanistic model of distress also provided me with a conceptual framework to understand my own 
personal crisis and existential confusion which propelled my career change. If I, for example, could 
make sense of my own situation in terms of “introjected conditions of worth” or “misalignment with 
my actualising tendency” then perhaps this psychological framework would provide me with all the 
tools I needed to understand and help others. I was fascinated by the theory and evidence on how the 
quality of the relationship between two people is the key for change and growth, both in and out of 
therapy. Rogers himself noted that “therapeutic relationships are not substantially different in kind 
from those in our everyday lives” (Rogers, 1959).  
Yet, this framework did not seem to provide me with the descriptive map of therapy I needed. Its non-
directiveness did not fit with my linear, problem-solving way of thinking that was ingrained in me 
from my past. It challenged my presupposition of the therapist being the “expert”, directing and 
leading the client. If “being-in-relation” with a client was not a mentoring relationship like the ones I 
had experienced, then what was it about? The humanistic analysis of the relationship in terms of three 
personal dispositions seemed overly simplistic and vague at first. It seemed that the process of therapy 
in the beginning of my first placement felt like I was endlessly following my clients around, retracing 
their steps, going down the same paths and not getting anywhere.   
I slowly and systematically began to de-construct the three core-conditions through personal reading 
and my humanistic theoretical essay. My understanding of the therapist as the authoritative expert 
began to shift. Clearly there are some areas of human experience where dispensing expertise and 
offering more direct guidance is appropriate. However, for many of my student-clients at the 
university counselling centre, I realised that all too often they had spent most of their young lives 
guided by proclaimed “experts”. They were experiencing despair at their inability to fulfil the 
expectations of others, whether parents, faculty members or so-called friends with little sense of 
personal worth. Some felt gravely wounded within the context of such relationships that proved 
treacherous or abusive. And yet, despite the damage they felt, they would come to therapy searching 
for another expert to tell them what to do. It was hard not falling onto the trap of fulfilling such a role.  
A poignant example was my work with Mel, a 20 year old international student who I used for my 
first year process report. Mel was raised in an environment in which she had repeatedly experienced 
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the unaccepting and judgmental attitude of her parents and teachers. The academic and social 
challenges of studying abroad had left her feeling a profound sense of worthlessness, of being doomed 
to rejection and disapproval. With the guidance of my supervisor, I prioritised maintaining the 
appropriate therapeutic boundaries while making sure that she experienced our relationship as 
genuine, helpful and safe. I was able to be myself in the relationship without putting up a professional 
front or a personal facade of expertise and superiority. This allowed her to begin tapping into her own 
resources without clinging to any expectations that I would provide the answers for her; answers that 
she was desperately looking for. I realised that it is not a matter of me being the expert in my client’s 
situation, but of the client being able to express themselves fully in the relationship with me.  
Soon, Mel started openly exploring experiences that were kept private and giving expression to 
dimensions of herself that were previously hidden. She experienced acceptance, empathy and genuine 
involvement and I feel that perhaps for the first time she was in a relationship that would allow her to 
feel safe to explore her overwhelming need for approval. Nearing the end of our work, she was able to 
get in touch with the full extent of her self-rejection and however tentatively, she began experiencing 
the first inklings of self-acceptance. She slowly began to trust her own thoughts and feelings and to 
make decisions in accordance with her own perception and desires (Mearns & Thorne, 2007). To 
paraphrase Thoreau, she started listening and accepting the beat of her own drum.  
In my first year, I also began to realise the value of developmental theories and stage models in 
formulating potential disruptions in my clients’ developmental trajectories. Bowlby’s attachment 
theory (1982) and Erickson’s theory of psychosocial development (Erickson, 1968) seemed 
particularly relevant, given how many of my young clients were still in their late teens, struggling 
with forming their identity, their sense of self and negotiating relationships with peers. I learned that 
aside from any specific issue that brings clients to therapy, stage theories can help identify sub-goals 
for them that might be beneficial. For example, I noticed that a lot of my clients who were struggling 
with intimate relationships, felt hampered by their fear and difficulty in trusting people. This seemed 
to pervade all of their adult experiences. I also understood that these developmental ideas, however 
insightful, should be taken with a grain of salt because they are descriptive of the average person but 
not prescriptive of any of my clients. Especially stage models which I believe are useful summaries of 
what you might expect of someone at a particular age. I feel that they tell us more about the 
constraints on what we can do as we grow up and they focus on what may have “gone wrong” with 
someone’s development. They offer however no clues as to how one can come to live a fulfilling 
adult life. Indeed, I sometimes felt tempted to treat stages as plans for how my clients should have 
developed. This perhaps impedes my sensitivity to their experience and how they made sense of their 
own situation.  
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In my engagement with the person-centred philosophy, I also found it interesting that many of the 
features of the core counselling relationship, such as empathy, congruence and acceptance, are 
precisely what have to be present in relationships with caregivers early in life to ensure confident 
attachment and encourage trust in relationships with others (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). This 
suggests that often the style of the counselling relationship is going to be much more important to the 
client than the content. If I were to prioritise a given therapeutic approach before the style and quality 
of the therapeutic relationship, I think I would have great difficulty in working with clients who have 
failed to establish confident, trusting relationships. 
.  
 
A new way of relating 
From early days in my psychodynamic year I became strongly aware of how my therapeutic stance 
should demonstrate the nature of the therapeutic containment I was offering. The psychodynamic 
model assumes that the client will seek to place himself or parts of himself within the therapist and 
that through transference, early relationship templates will be reactivated (Davanloo, 1978). I knew I 
had to allow myself sufficient detachment from my clients if I were to be able to respond to potential 
transferential material rather than merely react. I was conscious that by holding a respectful distance I 
was creating the necessary space to better attune myself to the client’s different levels of unconscious 
and conscious communication. This was a new way of relating, of being with a client. I also found 
that many of my clients found this way of being a useful model for them, which discourages acting 
out and invites a more open exploration of whatever may arise. On the other hand, I felt that the idea 
of a blank screen - so often associated with the psychoanalytic tradition - does not always meet the 
needs of a particular client nor does it resonate with my desire and capacity for genuine involvement 
with my clients. I think that maintaining a flexible stance but without altering the therapeutic frame 
can communicate to the client that they are reliably held. Through trial and error I realised that when 
the frame would alter or waver, it often provoked insecurity with my clients and resistance.  
On the same vein, my supervisor made me strongly aware of how important it is to maintain the 
integrity of the physical setting in psychodynamic therapy. Just as the internal consistency of my 
behaviour had to remain constant, I found that clients would often count on me to ensure the 
reliability of the external setting and make them feel safe and held in the therapeutic relationship. 
Consequently, I became aware that paying attention to a client’s relationship with the therapy room 
and to changes or intrusions, can provide valuable references to the therapeutic dialogue. As with my 
previous placement, I was also encouraged to maintain strict time and setting of boundaries but to also 
notice and reflect upon when these boundaries were transgressed.  
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I remember reading somewhere that Freud himself often expressed frustration at the over-extended 
attempts to find 'meaning' in every trivial thing. Indeed, that was perhaps part of my own frustration in 
the early days of my psychodynamic year and I would often perceive with scepticism the 
overreaching psychodynamic interpretations in group supervision. These did not sit well with my 
concrete and fact-based thinking. I believe that no one thing, no one thought, 'means' something on its 
own as was often presented to me. In time, I began to observe more systematically how my clients 
were behaving in relation to the boundaries of the setting. While some would insert themselves 
compliantly, arriving and leaving on the dot, others would arrive very early or very late or would give 
no warning of their absence. At the outset of my psychodynamic placement, I often felt that my 
anxiety and preoccupation with my own performance would make me miss my client’s efforts to 
convey something to me through his behaviour.  I had to remind myself to attend to the idea of 
meaning beneath the surface of things and beyond the rational explanations that may be offered. My 
supervisor helped me realise that in each instance where the client is behaving significantly in terms 
of our set boundaries, is an opportunity to consider the meaning of his behaviour in relation to me, 
rather than interpreting their behaviour somewhat personally as a reflection on me. This also meant 
that I would have to learn to sometimes challenge the rational and concrete explanations if I am to 
break through to the unconscious communication they might contain. 
When working with the transference, I understood that if I were to make myself available for use by 
the client, this required much more than a mere theoretical appreciation of the concept. I needed to 
experience myself as being used within their inner world and to be able to tolerate the confusion and 
discomfort that this involved for both me and them (Gomez, 1997). Upon reflection, I understood that 
this kind of availability, this holding of my clients, depended on my capacity to be in the relationship 
as a participant and as an observer at the same time. I think perhaps this was one of the most useful 
skills that I developed through my second year. Being fully present in the therapeutic relationship I 
would allow myself to experience the full impact of my client’s unconscious communication, while 
using my observing bit to remain sufficiently in touch with my role as a therapist. That allowed me to 
reflect on what is happening not only between myself and the client but also within me.  
A particular area I struggled with was learning to work with my clients’ transference and my own 
counter-transference in a way that felt meaningful to them. In the beginning I felt that the framing of 
some of my remarks were along the lines of “I wonder If this is how you feel about me.”, thus missing 
the whole point of the transference by inviting my clients to focus on me. I also realised that even 
though there might be strong indications of transference from early sessions, it is quite unusual for the 
client to be ready to make any links in a meaningful way. My rushed attempts at making transferential 
interpretations were perhaps fuelled by my anxiety regarding the short term contract offered in brief 
psychodynamic therapy.  
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A poignant example lies in my work with John, a 27 year old British, white male who presented with 
difficulties in trusting people, fear of rejection and establishing close relationships with others. He 
was an anxious and timid man who had his reservations about coming to counselling. I felt a strong 
rapport was being created from our first few sessions. He attended regularly and discussed openly 
how he thought his parents’ upbringing had shaped the way he relates to people. He usually spoke in 
very intellectual terms and always about other people or about things in general. What he wouldn’t do 
is give me a glimpse of how things are for him and what his deeper feelings may be about his 
unsatisfactory relationships or our therapeutic relationship. I quickly realised that he is probably 
relating to me in much the same way he relates with his friends. After some reflection, I decided to 
point out the obvious link between his early experiences, his current life situation and what is going 
on in the room. John became tearful by this realisation as it appeared that identifying his relational 
pattern was at the edge of his awareness. The following week and without warning he decided to 
withdraw and end his therapeutic contract with me. This was an exceptionally difficult case to reflect 
on and I found myself rationalising in ways that would protect me from feelings of guilt and self-
rebuke; such as assuming that he might have been unwilling to overcome his basic resistance. It was a 
gut-wrenching moment for me and a significant blow to my self-confidence.  
I explored what had happened in supervision and what became clearer was that he had experienced 
my interpretation as provocative and alienating. His dramatic response was a reminder of what can 
happen when interventions are made in the absence of a strong therapeutic alliance. In this case, I feel 
that my interpretation addressed far too openly the still unconscious aspects in his transference at too 
early a stage in the counselling relationship. Through my experience with John I grew to realise that 
the therapeutic alliance has nothing to do with the counselling couple liking each other or having good 
feelings about each other, however helpful such feelings may be initially. It is about some part of the 
client being available and agreeing to tolerate the strains and frustrations of the therapeutic 
relationship so that he can stay with it and enter the struggle with the therapist (Bauer & Kobos, 
1987). I was reminded again of the value of testing out the therapeutic alliance, making sure that the 
client is engaged in the process and motivated to use the techniques or ways of thinking suggested. 
 
Context, culture, diagnosis 
Throughout my training I was able to recognise the different positions I have adopted with regards to 
the usefulness and implications of diagnostic categories, which I think reflect my needs and reading at 
the time, as well as my fluid and evolving identity as a professional. For example, I always felt drawn 
by the fact that we can take fuzzy concepts such as depression and anxiety and measure them with 
rigor, test them to understand causality, look across time at the same people and ask what the 
contribution of environment and genetics are.  When I was working in primary care in my second and 
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third year, by focusing on diagnosis and NICE guidelines I felt at times I was able to reduce my 
anxiety and perhaps provide a better rationale for my work with my clients. I recognised within my 
service the enormous clinical utility of a classification system which allows professionals from 
different disciplines to share a better understanding and communicate more effectively. For some 
clients even, I noticed how they would welcome their diagnosis as a way to help them cope with the 
unknowns and anxiety of their predicament and without developing a punitive self-concept. For others 
however, the label they were carrying was experienced as stigmatising and detrimental to their 
relationships with loved ones. I also began to realise that although many of my clients would share the 
same label, there was considerable variation in terms of how they felt, how they made sense of their 
own situation and rarely did they fit neatly in the “package” as the DSM would have us believe.  
Through reading and my theoretical essay on human distress, I began to develop a more critical 
understanding of the concepts of disorder and diagnosis as culturally contextualised constructs rather 
than statements of truths. In my essay I discussed the phenomenon of unconventional religious beliefs 
or practices (such as visions or speaking in tongues), in relation to the bias of the DSM when 
clinicians attempt to distinguish between pathology and religiosity. What became clear is that 
discerning between normal and abnormal (or pathological) religious experiences is determined by the 
cultural context and despite claims to the contrary, the DSM cannot provide a clear-cut determination. 
I realised that such classifications are not merely descriptive and objective; instead, they carry an 
ideological presupposition that places human suffering within the individual as manifestations of 
dysfunction (Raskin & Lewandowski 2000). They are treated as entities with roots in individual 
biology rather than responses to individual circumstances and context. 
In terms of my developing practice, I understood that in order to get as close to my clients’ lived 
experiences as possible, it is important for me to listen to their narrative so I can understand their 
circumstances and appreciate how their life events have impacted them.  This may include for 
example their family system and relationships, employment, living accommodation, their culture and 
spirituality, all of which should be considered within a formulation (Woolfe et al., 2007) This meant 
bracketing my own assumptions about what they are going through based on their diagnosis and 
focusing on their own subjective knowing.  
I also felt strongly the implications of the prevailing medical model in CMHT where the focus was 
more explicit on symptom control and reduction. Diagnosis was a strong element of the referral 
system and shared language within primary care. At times I felt challenged with maintaining a 
relational stance and a humanistic value base within a framework dominated by this way of thinking. 
Dealing with this tension, I was able to reflect on the benefits of being able to interleave client-centred 
exploration of a client’s particular situation, with information from a “knowledge based” perspective 
on what a person in this position might be going through. I think sometimes this can be helpful to a 
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client who realises that they are not alone and that there is not only a natural course to a number of 
their difficulties, but also that there is some well-founded ways of addressing some of them. This, in 
my view, does not replace individual exploration of the client’s unique sense of being, through it can 
effectively supplement it. Similarly, in the therapy room I would find myself moving away from using 
classifications or rigid treatment guidelines that focus on disorder. I felt that clinging to them would 
perhaps deter my empathic understanding of my clients and the development of our therapeutic 
relationship. However, when my work with my clients was complete, in my note keeping and in 
multidisciplinary meetings, I would return to the context of diagnosis and symptoms as the language 
with which to liaise with other professionals.  
I felt a similar tension with the use of psychometric tests like the Clinical Outcomes Routine 
Evaluation and the PHQ which I used routinely in my placements every year. I understood that 
clinical outcome measures provide the easiest means of conceptualising effectiveness and change. I 
noticed that part of me would welcome the formal and documented expression of change in the client 
that these clinical measures represented. It offered me some needed validation and justification when 
the work resulted in positive change for the client, or an opportunity to reflect on the therapeutic 
process and my mistakes whenever change (at least in the form of symptom reduction) was not 
visible. At the same time I understood that the way NICE guidelines require therapists to assess their 
contribution, further promotes the idea that client needs and therapeutic change should be 
conceptualised in terms of symptom clusters and symptom reduction.  I was mindful that every time I 
used such measures which track change in emotions or behaviour, they had nothing to tell me 
regarding the vast individual differences in the meaning and uses of these various behaviours amongst 
my clients. Especially when working psychodynamically or in a person-centred way, I often felt 
pulled away from the frame of my encounter with the client and pushed towards generalisations that 
did not help the kind of relationship and understanding I was trying to foster. I am inclined to agree 
with Lemma (Bor & Watts 2016, p.72) who states that “a good assessment is one which identifies the 
needs of the client so as to maximise the chance of having those needs met”. Unpacking this statement 
I believe that the point is to be sensitive to how the assessment positions me in relation to my clients 
and how the administration of psychometrics can create a dynamic of an expert dealing with a patient. 
I often felt that with my clients I had to dispel the notion that they will be passive recipients in our 
work, an impression that I think was often reinforced in their minds from the use of outcome 
measures in our initial meeting. It is for this reason that I started trusting myself more in exploring 
with the client in a less formal way the nature of their needs and any change that may have occurred. 
 
Throughout my placements I had the opportunity to work with clients from a variety of cultures and 
ethnic backgrounds. As a Greek man who has only been in the U.K for a few years, I have always 
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been curious about differences in other people’s cultural identity and in aspects such as how they 
think, how they relate to other people or what are their “culturally appropriate” ways of expressing 
emotion. In working with an Afro-Carribean client who had recently moved to the U.K., I realised 
how incredibly difficult it can be for someone to convey their culture. On discussing her marriage and 
relationship with her in-laws, she felt overwhelmed not knowing how much background information 
to provide me before starting with her own life story, which was meaningful within her particular 
familial and cultural system. When I researched the cultural attitude towards women, I discovered 
how - by western standards - the women in her home country are often treated with prejudice and 
discrimination. I began to notice the differences between her values and my own Western 
individualistic value system, which from her perspective, undervalues the importance of the self in 
relation to family and community. Through my reading and my discussion with her, I was able to 
challenge my awareness on some of the commonly held stereotypes around her race and culture. I also 
realised that holding on to some of my stereotypes about her were the result of my own anxiety about 
working with difference. I was honest with her that I had spent time researching and from there we 
were able to discuss how my impressions fitted with her experience, beliefs and emotions. It was a 
useful venture that also resulted in her feeling positive that I had been interested enough to research 
her cultural beliefs. My work with her also raised my awareness regarding the evolving dynamics that 
can take place in the therapy room as a result of cultural difference. It also emphasised the importance 
of the relationship one has with their culture rather than just focusing on the individual or their 
culture. As Coyle (2010) puts it, if we concentrate on the culture we would be in danger of viewing 
the person within a stereotypical box and likewise, if we concentrate on the self only we would be 
trying to understand a person without the context.    
 
Research 
Religion has always been a topic of great interest for me, even though growing up I never felt 
particularly drawn to any specific religious beliefs. I think perhaps my interest lies in my attempt to 
understand a phenomenon that is integral to the lives of millions of people, yet I feel it is very far 
removed from my own frame of reference and set of values. Metaphorically speaking, it is as if I am 
deaf to the beat of this particular drum. Still, atheists and religious individuals alike, often wear their 
identification like a badge of honour. It often defines who they are, their lives and the scripts they 
embrace for themselves. I felt particularly drawn to better understanding how both groups experience 
their identity and that guided my research questions.  
 
Initially I felt inclined to approach my research question using quantitative methods as I had done in 
the past. This perhaps would have been a more comfortable and familiar choice. However, after 
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completing my person-centred training in my first year, I started to notice a shift in my own 
perception regarding my assumptions on what constitutes knowledge and how it can be attained. 
Through my course and my experience with my clients I slowly started to feel less comfortable with 
the notion of an objective and fixed reality. I began debating the importance of acknowledging reality 
as a personal construct which is influenced by our social and cultural context.  I also understood that 
although NICE guidelines aim to be robustly evidence-based, in practice this means quite a narrow 
definition of evidence derived from randomised controlled trials (RCTs). This meant that other forms 
of research evidence, such as qualitative studies, tend to be overlooked or dismissed as unscientific 
(Woolfe et al., 2007). So I decided to get out of my comfort zone and focus my efforts on a narrative 
methodology. Like my initial experience of psychotherapy, it felt like a leap in the dark. Whatever my 
expectations where regarding qualitative research, in reality I realised that it is an untidy and uncertain 
affair. At times, it also felt highly creative and richly satisfying as I began to realise the enormous 
potential it offered me to better myself personally and professionally. While my preference on 
pursuing qualitative research was guided by my evolving ontological and epistemological outlook, I 
understood that my research question should guide my choice of a specific method rather than the 
other way around  
 
As I engaged in my research, I began to notice some parallels between the process of therapy and the 
process of research. Just as I endeavour to understand each person as unique and to tailor my 
approach to the individual in their particular context, in the same way I needed to match methodology 
to my research question. As a counselling psychology trainee I have embraced in my practice the core 
values of empowering and respecting clients and acknowledging our intersubjectivity in a relationship 
on equal terms. I understood that these same core values colour both how I interact with my research 
participants and how I interpret the data. Similarly, I feel that holding a pluralistic stance in my 
practice has made me aware of the many ways that client difficulties may be conceptualised. Holding 
such an attitude in the research context means being able to reflect on how divergent research 
methodologies can be equally valid when exploring a research question.     
    
The case of Sarah 
In the course of clinical practice, I think every practitioner will have a handful of clients that remain 
memorable for different reasons. Looking back and in years to come, I think there will not be a more 
memorable client than the one I addressed in my second CBT process report. Sarah, a 30 year old 
white female, suffered from severe Obsessive Compulsive symptoms in the form of word patterns 
which get attached and contaminate everything she does or thinks. My failure to help her make any 
significant progress after a whole year of working integratively with her, opened up questions and 
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opportunities for reflection that continued long after our sessions had ended. It was this relatively 
unsuccessful piece of work symbolised a turning point in my learning.   
Sarah attended our sessions regularly and was always forthcoming and engaging in the therapy room. 
Even though she appeared outwardly compliant, she was rarely able to do any of the agreed tasks on 
her own, such as keeping an OCD diary or graded exposure exercises. When I noticed her implied 
lack of engagement with the homework aspect of the work, I was able to empathise with her struggle 
in a way that allowed us to explore what this was about before considering what may be a next 
alternative intervention. We were able to discuss together and understand her reaction in light of some 
aspect of her past experiences and relationships with others. Sarah found this exploratory aspect of 
our work extremely helpful. She became aware that her underlying fear of change, of taking 
responsibility and control of her life, prevented her from taking risks and making any real progress. 
For me this was an example of how it is possible to integrate directive, cognitive and behavioural 
techniques into an insight based approach that is grounded in the therapeutic relationship. In order to 
facilitate change and understanding for Sarah, this had to be done collaboratively, using a broad 
constructivist approach and based on the spirit of a joint enquiry with her. I was reminded that 
relational ways of working are critical where clients are ambivalent about, or unconvinced of, the 
possibility of change.   
Our assessment phase was also lengthy and laborious and it felt ongoing even after 2 months when we 
were well past beginnings and into the work. It was however necessary given her fear and anxiety of 
articulating her obsessive thoughts and causing harm to herself or others in doing so. Reaching a 
shared formulation was also a long and protracted process. It was an example for me of how 
important it is to continually keep the hypotheses by which the work is proceeding under review and 
to prepare to revise and rethink, together with the client when necessary. 
Sarah often expressed the preference for using the therapeutic space to explore her underlying issues 
that were keeping her stuck from even attempting to complete her homework tasks. For my learning, 
this was indicative of some of the current debates about evidence-based efficacy versus client 
preference and about how both can be accommodated. Due to the complexity of her presentation, I 
felt compelled - more than any other client - to extend my usual ways of working by developing and 
applying an integrative approach. This allowed me to be more attentive to her own needs and 
preferences while also exploring her underlying anxieties beyond her presenting symptoms. 
After several months and about the time I started writing my process report, my frustration and 
irritation with our lack of significant progress (at least in the form of symptom reduction and daily 
functioning) was beginning to grow. My therapeutic style at times reflected panic and impatience and 
it was becoming difficult to conceal my disappointment that was surfacing in a non-verbal way. My 
Socratic style of relating with her was becoming overly leading, argumentative and not particularly 
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helpful. When I noticed this, listening to my recorded sessions with my supervisor became a regular 
occurrence every week. With her help I was able to recognise that within my relationship with Sarah, 
I was becoming a lot less emotionally attuned to her and a lot more emotionally involved in the sense 
that my emotions would negatively interfere with our process and the quality of the work. I felt 
hopeless and frustrated alongside her and did not know how else to work with the “here and now” and 
the part of her that was not convinced of challenging her “magical” thinking. My irritation was 
triggered by her ambivalence, by her interpersonal style of wanting to appear hopeless and by the way 
I perceived that our lack of progress reflected on my competence. I can see how my own set of values, 
my past experiences and important relationships seem to reflect this. And it is good material for my 
personal therapy as well as my reflective practice.  
Even though this was the most difficult client I have encountered, looking back at it now I realise how 
painful it was to make so many basic mistakes,. Mistakes that perhaps I thought I had outgrown from 
my experience the previous years. My subtle acting out with Sarah highlighted the importance of 
monitoring and reflecting on my own unhelpful thought process and feelings in a way that will allow 
me to be prepared in the session when they come up, instead of reacting to them in the moment and at 
the expense of my clients. In situations like these I think the question is how exactly can I respond and 
guide the client in a different way that will involve me being more open to unpleasant feelings and 
ideas of self as a therapist, rather than enacting them.   
Through this work, I cultivated a better understanding of my strengths, vulnerabilities and enhanced 
my belief that without self-awareness, therapists can obstruct client progress and their own personal 
development. This requires my willingness and courage to self-scrutinise and self-assess. In this 
matter, I have greatly appreciated how my own personal therapy has helped me. It has made me aware 
of how being the person I am affects the work I do. As the person centred tradition considers, our 
limitations as therapists are our limitations as human beings (Mearns, 2002). I know I will probably 
always carry with me the deep-rooted notion that I am not good enough or that things don’t measure 
up. I am aware of my inherent tendency to resolve my uncertainty in terms of a sense of personal lack 
or by projecting this idea onto others where it becomes more tolerable. At the heart of this is a 
profound sense of shame and guilt for not living up to the ideal of a “good enough son” for my father 
who died unexpectedly when I was 17. It is almost as if nothing and no one can ever fill the inner 
deficit completely and so I am left in a perpetual state of discontent. Because of my own personal 
“baggage”, I know that there will always be clients like Sarah who will elicit such difficult thoughts 
and feelings that I am vulnerable to.  
I have also noticed that as my experience grows, so does my faith in the process of therapy and in the 
client’s own resources. I am becoming more able to tolerate and reflect on my vulnerabilities when 
they arise because experience tells me that I can reframe them as a kind of professional “growing-
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pain” and that they are a sure sign that I am learning a great deal. Personal therapy has also helped me 
with the relational aspects of my work. It has given me more confidence in discussing with my clients 
the process of therapy more openly and honestly.  I also became more mindful of my capacity to 
recognise when my own fitness to practice is compromised and take steps to manage this risk as 
appropriate. Similarly, as was the case with Sarah, ethical practice also requires being aware of the 
client’s personal limitations or readiness for change, without infringing on their autonomy.  
 
Pluralism 
At the beginning of my training, I think perhaps I was under the impression that when I qualify I 
would probably pursue practicing one therapeutic model as a purist practitioner or use bits and pieces 
from different modalities in an eclectic way and depending on the case at hand. I realised however 
that in reality things are not as simple. As I moved from one modality to the next, I felt challenged 
abandoning the safety and comfort of the previous model I was familiar with. Reflecting on that, by 
maintaining a purist approach each year (at least for the most part), I was able to gain maximum 
exposure and appreciation of each model. From this respect, I tend to agree with Bor and Watts 
(2016) that therapeutic models can be seen as heuristic tools for running sessions. They have a set of 
assumptions and rules for interpreting interactions with clients that guide us in our decisions about 
what to say or do next. This may not be appropriate or completely rational but they simplify the 
situation so we can cope, which is why I think the application of specific models is so important early 
on in training. However, through my training I have come to realise that claims of one modality being 
superior to another, are coloured by political and ideological presuppositions. Working in CMHT and 
when dealing with severe and enduring presentations, it became clearer that no one theory can fully 
explain the complexity of human beings, nor can any single therapeutic intervention account for 
therapeutic outcome (Woolfe et al., 2007). 
When reflecting on my evolving pluralistic stance, I also felt fascinated by the fact that there is 
considerable convergence between the different therapeutic schools, none of which are discrete and 
definitive entities (Dragi-Lorenz, 2010). For example psychodynamic work is increasingly focused on 
the “here and now” as a way of understanding the past, rather than the other way around as used to be 
the case. This brings this model much closer to the humanistic-existential tradition . Similarly, in my 
final year I felt very much drawn to working within “Third-Wave CBT” using ACT, which has a 
strong existential component in it. Like in person-centred therapy, Act resonated with me because it 
encourages you to get in touch with your core values and what really matters in the big picture. As I 
move towards my identity as a pluralistic practitioner, I do not feel that the position I hold at the 
moment is tantamount to sitting on the fence; rather it’s an acknowledgment of the multiplicity and 
diversity of needs and values for both clients and professionals.  On a personal level, this means 
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looking at the evidence of what works and using it with my own relational way of working, while 
balancing things out with the needs of the client and the requirements of the service. It also means 
being able to hold the tension of the uncertainty and of not knowing how to proceed at times. It is then 
when I can maintain a reflective and evaluative stance, in and out of the therapy room. I think there 
are very few “alwayses” or  “nevers” in therapy and that the realisation of this can evoke as much fear 
as it can freedom in me. I also need to remind myself how foolish it is to think that it is necessary to 
“see around corners” and that I will have to carry with me the humility of not knowing. Aspirations of 
one day “knowing it all” imply that the answer is out there – that one size fits all. That we all listen or 
respond to the same beat of the drum and in the same way. Thankfully but sometimes painfully, it is 
never that simple.  
 
 
References 
 
Bartholomew, K., & Horowitz, L. M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: A test of a four 
category model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 226-244.  
 
Bauer, G. P., & Kobos, J. C. (1987). Brief therapy: Short-term psychodynamic intervention. Jason 
Aronson. 
 
Bor, R., & Watts, M. (Eds.). (2016). The Trainee Handbook: A Guide for Counselling & 
Psychotherapy Trainees. Sage. 
 
Bowlby, J. (1982). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment (2nd ed.). New York: Basic Books 
 
Coyle, A. (2010). Counselling psychology contributions to religion and spirituality. Therapy and 
beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to therapeutic and social issues, 259-275. 
 
Erickson, E. H. (1968) Identity: Youth and Crisis. New York. Norton 
 
189 
 
Davanloo, H. (1978). Basic principles and techniques in short-term dynamic therapy. Spectrum, New 
York. 
 
Draghi‐Lorenz, R. (2010). Different theoretical differences and contextual influences. Therapy and 
Beyond: Counselling Psychology Contributions to Therapeutic and Social Issues, 105-121. 
 
Gomez, L. (1997). An introduction to object relations. NYU Press 
 
Mearns, D. (2002). Developing person-centred counselling. Sage. 
 
Mearns, D. & Thorne, B. (2007). Person-centred counselling in action. Sage Publications: CA. 
 
Raskin, J. D., & Lewandowski, A. M. (2000). The construction of disorder as human enterprise. In R. 
A. Neimeyer & J. D. Raskin (Eds.),  Constructions of disorder: Meaning-making frameworks for  
psychotherapy (pp. 15-40). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 
 
Rogers, C. (1959). A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in 
the Client-centered Framework. In (ed.) S. Koch,Psychology: A Study of a Science. Vol. 3: 
Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw Hill.  
 
Woolfe, R., Dryden, W., & Strawbridge, S. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of counselling psychology. 
Sage. 
 
 
 
 
